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Abstract 
 
Thomas R. Spencer: “Was ist Gott”? The Representation of the Divine in Friedrich 
Hölderlin 
(Under the direction of Alice Kuzniar) 
 
This dissertation investigates the tension between religious and philosophical ways of 
representing the divine in the romantic-age German poet Friedrich Hölderlin and his 
contemporaries. While religion—especially the Judeo-Christian tradition—represents the 
divine as being partly or wholly “beyond” this world, philosophy tends to situate the 
divine within a “worldly” or immanent system, such as the Hegelian system of Geist. 
While Hölderlin’s poetry has a reflective form closely related to Hegelian dialectic, it 
also tends to represent the divine as transcendent and therefore outside the competence of 
dialectic. Furthermore, Hölderlin repeatedly represents divine experience in terms of the 
spontaneous “event,” which points back to the biblical model of revelation rather than to 
a philosophical notion of God as a universal substance (Spinoza and Hegel) or an “idea of 
reason” (Kant). In reading Hölderlin this way, I suggest that poetry is a form of discourse 
in which other historical discourses—in this case: theology and philosophy—can 
encounter one another without being reduced to the one or the other. His openness to this 
irreducible tension is, I suggest, what distinguishes Hölderlin from intellectual 
contemporaries such as Fichte, Schleiermacher, and Hegel, and is partly what facilitates 
the lively critical interest in him today.  
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Chapter 1 
 
God in Conflict: Situating a Religious Reading of Hölderlin 
  
My intent in this study is to provide a religious reading of the poet Friedrich Hölderlin, 
and my reader should be duly puzzled. What is a “religious” reading? Certainly it is 
something modern, since it implies the meaningful possibility of a non-religious reading. 
In the seventeenth and much of the eighteenth century, no one would have bothered with 
a “religious” reading, because there was no generally accepted “non-religious” 
alternative.1 This being the case, a religious reading carries with it the history of its 
possibility, and this history should, ideally, be part of the reading itself. Such will be the 
case here, since I will be reading the “religious” in Hölderlin as that which 1) is 
associated with the name or concept of God, and 2) finds no counterpart in the secular 
                                                 
1 The seeds of the “non-religious” option emerged from the late middle ages. Hans Blumenberg and John 
Milbank point, in this regard, to the nominalist response of Duns Scotus and William of Ockham to the 
neo-Aristotelian realism of the Scholastics in the late 13th and early 14th centuries. Charles Taylor points to 
the emergence of a desire for universal human betterment, which began in the medieval church, but which 
had turned against religion by the 18th century. The new valorization of philosophical reason (Milbank) and 
scientific “self-assertion” (Blumenberg) that came out of nominalism, and the medieval “Reform” 
movement (Taylor) did not at first constitute a “non-religious cause,” since they were conceived within a 
theological framework. Perhaps not until the 17th century, with figures like Grotius and Hobbes trying to 
move beyond political theology, do we have a self-consciously non-religious alternative open up. Even 
then, not until the popularization of “reason” and the crisis of biblical authority in the Enlightenment can 
we begin to speak of a generally available, self-consciously non-religious way of looking at the world. See 
Hans Blumenberg, The Legitimacy of the Modern Age, trans. Robert Wallace (Cambridge, MA: MIT, 
1983); John Milbank, Theology & Social Theory: Beyond Secular Reason, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Blackwell, 
2006); Charles Taylor, A Secular Age (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 2007); Mark Lilla, The Stillborn God 
(New York: Knopf, 2007); Hans Frei, The Eclipse of the Biblical Narrative (New Haven: Yale, 1974). 
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appropriation (or what was perceived as secular appropriation2) of religious structures 
and ideas undertaken by Hölderlin’s intellectual contemporaries. I will, in other words, be 
reading Hölderlin directly against the secularization process that created what Taylor 
calls the “exclusive humanism” we encounter today. The key religious concept will be 
transcendence, both because it is presupposed by all other theological concepts and 
because it is the concept most irreconcilable with exclusive humanism. Transcendence is 
the “space” into which God withdraws, but it is also the site of divine agency, the place 
from which God can reveal, “touch,” and love humanity without being reduced to 
humanity. The main point of contrast throughout my religious reading will be Hegel, who 
effectively eliminates transcendence by collapsing human and divine spirit into one 
immanent spirit, but I will also reference the immanent religions of Kant, Fichte, 
Schleiermacher, and others.  
 I am not turning the poet into a preacher, nor am I suggesting that Hölderlin is 
“doing” theology. On the contrary, I am saying that theology remains with Hölderlin 
despite himself. Hölderlin is, as Rainer Nägele reminds us, a “poetic thinker,” which 
means that he tries to capture truth through the “constellation and sequence, [and] above 
all the caesuras” of various representational modes (“Poetic Revolution,” 516). We can 
“connect the dots” of this constellation in various ways. Some see the silent anguish of 
                                                 
2 Hans Blumenberg has persuasively argued against the idea that Christianity has any “original ownership” 
over the ideas purportedly secularized in the modern age.  Providence, for instance, was originally a Stoic 
idea, and its importation into Christianity marked, ironically, a secularization (Verweltlichung) of the new 
faith as it tried to deal with the delay of the end of the world. Furthermore, the belief in progress (which is 
supposed to be the seculared form of the belief in Providence) really has its roots in the reaction against 
theological absolutism in medieval Scholasticism. The point is this: what looks like a “secularized” form of 
an “original” Christianity probably isn’t; rather, this is how we explain it to ourselves. Since this study only 
focuses on romantic and idealist writers, I only need to worry about the attitude of secularization which 
does obtain in this period, even if, for instance, Hegel’s view of history has nothing to do with primitive 
Christian eschatology. 
 
 3 
nihilism in Hölderlin’s poetry, while some see the infinite reverberation of self-deferring 
signification.3 Others see the unity-in-diversity of speculative idealism, while yet others 
see, as I do, the strange and benevolent power of a divine agency.4 Again, I am not 
claiming that Hölderlin is an orthodox Lutheran or Pietist, but I do see him employing, 
perhaps unconsciously, the structure and dynamic of transcendence in his poetry. 
Wolfgang Binder sees in Hölderlin “ein Fall theologischer Denkformen im Dienst eines 
fremdes Begründungszusammenhangs” (54). In other words, Hölderlin’s poetry is 
something heterogeneous. It reflects the philosopher’s desire for a dialectical grasp of 
totality, but also demonstrates moments of faith, humility, and gratitude for the gift 
beyond reckoning—attitudes without an obvious counterpart in speculative philosophy.  
                                                 
3 The nihilistic and the poststructural/deconstructionist views are closely related. David Constantine’s 
intellectual biography of Hölderlin (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1988) takes the rather nihilistic view that 
the poetry ultimately comes to rest in a feeling of emptiness and despair. Eric Santner’s monograph, 
Friedrich Hölderlin: Narrative Vigilance and the Poetic Imagination (New Brunswick: Rutgers UP, 1986), 
suggests that Hölderlin’s poetry follows a gradual course toward an effectively nihilistic objectivism. The 
instability of language in the quest to “establish” God and the subject is investigated most thoroughly in 
Rainer Nägele’s Text, Geschichte, und Subjektivität in Hölderlins Dichtung: “Uneßbarer Schrift gleich” 
(Stuttgart: Metzler, 1985), but has also been addressed by Paul de Man (“Heidegger’s Exegeses of 
Hölderlin” in Blindness and Insight [2nd rev. ed.; Minneapolis: U Minnesota P, 1983]), Andrzej Warminski 
(“‘Patmos’: The Senses of Interpretation” MLN 91 [April 1976]: 478-500), Peter Fenves (“Measure for 
Measure: Hölderlin and the Place of Philosophy” in The Solid Letter: Readings of Friedrich Hölderlin, ed. 
Aris Fioretos [Stanford: Stanford UP, 1999]), Alice Kuzniar (Delayed Endings: Nonclosure in Novalis and 
Hölderlin [Athens, GA: U of Georgia P, 1987]), and others. 
 
4 Jochen Schmidt’s readings of Hölderlin tend to emphasize dialectical continuity, both in the act of 
aesthetic creation and in the poet’s view of history. See “Hölderlin: Die idealistische Sublimation des 
naturhaften Genies zum poetisch-philosophischen Geist” in Die Geschichte des Genie-Gedankens in der 
deutschen Literatur, Philosophie und Politik, 1750-1945 (Darmstadt: WBG, 1988); and Hölderlins 
geschichtsphilosophische Hymnen „Friedensfeier,“ „Der Einzige,“ „Patmos“ (Darmstadt: WBG, 1990). 
The prominent critic Manfred Frank departs from the “communis opinio” by sharply distinguishing 
“zwischen dem Idealismus einerseits, Hölderlin und der Frühromantik andererseits,” but he still holds that 
the poem represents a single dialectical unity, albeit one that cannot be thought (“Hölderlin über den 
Mythos,” Hölderlin-Jahrbuch 27 [1990-1991], p. 149). His reading is thus only a partial departure from 
philosophical exegesis, and he makes no room for a religious reading. As something of a lone voice, 
Wolfgang Binder discusses the theological dimension of Hölderlin’s poetry in “Hölderlin: Theologie und 
Kunstwerk” (Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche 69 [1972]: 350-378), which I will discuss further on. A 
more historical and more recent appreciation of the religious dimension in Hölderlin’s work can be found 
in Priscilla Hayden-Roy’s A Foretaste of Heaven: Friedrich Hölderlin in the Context of Württemberg 
Pietism (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1994). 
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It is interesting to note that one of the earliest interpretations of Hölderlin’s poetry 
is religious. Whether it is self-consciously religious is hard to say, but it suggests that in 
Hölderlin’s environment even the elite were bound to theologischer Denkformen. I am 
referring to Brentano’s response to the opening stanza of Hölderlin’s celebrated poem, 
“Brod und Wein”: 
1 
 
 
 
5 
 
 
 
 
10 
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Rings um ruhet die Stadt; still wird die erleuchtete Gasse, 
   Und, mit Fackeln geschmückt, rauschen die Wagen hinweg. 
Satt gehn heim von Freuden des Tags zu ruhen die Menschen, 
   Und Gewinn und Verlust wäget ein sinniges Haupt 
Wohlzufrieden zu Haus; leer steht von Trauben und Blumen, 
   Und von Werken der Hand ruht der geschäftige Markt. 
Aber das Saitenspiel tönt fern aus Gärten; vielleicht, daß 
   Dort ein Liebendes spielt oder ein einsamer Mann 
Ferner Freunde gedenkt und der Jugendzeit; und die Brunnen 
   Immerquillend und frisch rauschen an duftendem Beet. 
Still in dämmriger Luft ertönen geläutete Glocken, 
   Und der Stunden gedenk rufet ein Wächter die Zahl. 
Jetzt auch kommet ein Wehn und regt die Gipfel des Hains auf, 
   Sieh! und das Schattenbild unserer Erde, der Mond, 
Kommet geheim nun auch; die Schwärmerische, die Nacht, kommt, 
   Voll mit Sternen und wohl wenig bekümmert um uns, 
Glänzt die Erstaunende dort, die Fremdlingin unter den Menschen, 
   Über Gebirgeshöhn traurig und prächtig herauf. 
(StA 2,1: 90)5 
 
The stanza was published in Senckendorf’s Musenalmanach in 1807, and in a 
letter to Luise Hensel in 1816, Brentano named it “das liebste Gedicht…das ich kenne” 
and claimed to have read it “viel hundertmal.” The first thing Brentano says in his 
interpretation is that the empty market in lines 1-6 symbolizes “das weltliche Treiben ins 
                                                 
5 “StA” refers to the Große Stuttgarter Ausgabe edited by Friedrich Beißner. I will refer to this edition for 
all quotations from Hölderlin’s poetry, with the exception of the poem “Friedensfeier,” the manuscript of 
which was discovered too late to be included in the StA. For “Friedensfeier” and references to Hölderlin’s 
prose, I will cite the 3 three-volume edition edited by Michael Knaupp, which will be abbreviated “MA.” 
Knaupp’s edition is based on the work of the second major Hölderlin edition, the Frankfurter Ausgabe 
edited by Dietrich Sattler. 
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Reale bis zur Ermüdung.” The association weltlich-Reale-Ermüdung already suggests 
Brentano’s religious intent, which is reinforced by what follows: 
Sind...die folgenden sechs [Verse] nicht die Sehnsucht der Zeit und das Gefühl 
der Verlorenheit, tritt im siebenten Vers nicht der Rückblick zur verlorenen 
Unschuld ein, und sprechen die immer quillenden Brunnen nicht von dem ewigen 
Quell der Verheißung, an dem die Gerechten sich laben? Mahnt diese die Glocke 
nicht durch die den Klang verhüllende Welt zu harren und zu beten, und rufet der 
Wächter nicht die Erfüllung der Zeit aus? 
 
Phrases like “Gefühl der Verlorenheit,” “verlorenen Unschuld,” “Verheißung,” “die 
Gerechten,” “Erfüllung der Zeit” make the religious valence of Brentano’s reading clear, 
although it must be said that each of these terms could also be given a philosophical 
interpretation: by moving beyond prereflective unity, human consciousness also suffers a 
“Gefühl der Verlorenheit” marking its “loss of innocence”; the philosophical “Gerechten” 
also live toward an “Erfüllung der Zeit,” when our fractured consciousness will be 
healed, and man will no longer feel alienated from the world. 
But starting with line thirteen, “Jetzt auch kommet ein Wehn,” Brentano’s 
interpretation takes on a Biblical dimension apparently unwarranted by the text, and it 
clearly parts company with any philosophical reading. 
Ist der dreizehnte Vers nicht der Vorläufer des Heils, die Stimme des Predigers in 
der Wüste, der dem Herrn seinen Weg bereitet und seine Stege richtig macht? 
Und tritt mit dem vierzehnten Vers nicht der Herr auf: “Sieh’, er kommt mit den 
Wolken und es werden ihn sehen alle Augen.” Im sechzehnten Vers aber steht: 
“Und das Licht scheinet in die Finsterniß, und die Finsternisse haben’s nicht 
begriffen.”6 
 
The reason for reading the Wehn in line 13 as a John the Baptist figure is extremely 
tenuous. The interpretation of the moon in line 14 as a Christ figure is even more 
extraordinary. To read the line “Voll mit Sternen und wohl wenig bekümmert um uns” 
                                                 
6 Dichter über Hölderlin, ed. Jochen Schmidt (Frankfurt am Main: Insel, 1969), pp. 98-100. 
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and hear “Und das Licht scheinet in die Finsterniß, und die Finsternisse haben’s nicht 
begriffen” is either divinatory or irresponsible. A “real” critic would likely see the 
movement in this stanza from the familiar to the cosmic as a disconcerting experience. 
Terms like “geheim,” “wenig bekümmert,” and “Fremdlingin” suggest man’s exclusion 
from heaven. Where does Brentano find reason to speak of “Trost,” “Erbarmung” and 
“Erlösung”? 
 Brentano may be more persuaded by the poem’s rhetoric of transcendence than by 
its rhetoric of alienation. The poem’s focal point moves upward from the city to the sky, 
where it encounters heavenly bodies (der Mond and the personified Nacht) that clearly 
stand in for some divine agency. The second stanza (which Brentano did not see) leaves 
no doubt that die Nacht is in fact divine: 
Wunderbar ist die Gunst der Hocherhabenen [i.e., die Nacht] und niemand 
   Weiß, von wannen und was einem geschiehet von ihr. 
So bewegt sie die Welt und die hoffende Seele der Menschen, 
   Selbst kein Weiser versteht, was sie bereitet... 
(StA 2,1: 90) 
Die Nacht is a power capable of bestowing favor, “moving” the world and the soul, and 
“preparing” the future. Because this divine power is “strange” (die Fremdlingin) and 
associated with the extraterrestrial (Sterne, Mond), we naturally suspect it is transcendent. 
The upward shift in the poem’s focus culminating in the vision of transcendence justifies 
his attempt at a religious interpretation.  
But the poem also puts up resistance to such an interpretation, as we have already 
seen. The “strangeness” of the Night may suggest transcendence, but it is experienced as 
indifference (“wohl wenig bekümmert um uns”), which is hardly compatible with the 
Christian divinity invoked by Brentano. Of course, if God’s ways really are higher than 
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man’s ways (Isaiah 55:8-9), it may be that mortals perceive indifference where there is 
really something else. This is a fair theological point, but it does not really justify the 
happy confidence of Brentano’s Christian reading. The stanza ends on a mixed note—the 
phrase “traurig und prächtig” applies to the moon, but it really describes the failed 
sublimity experienced by the poet. The divine has lifted him up only to confuse and 
disappoint him. 
This does not mean that Brentano is wrong to think that the hint of transcendence 
in the opening stanza subtly points toward a Christian hope. It is quite possible that he is 
also right, and that Hölderlin’s work is cross-pressured by theological and philosophical 
tendencies. If this is the case, the poem’s integrity lies not in connection to an ideal, but 
to the poet’s own historical reality. The poem accurately registers the ideological conflict 
of an age of mounting secularization. In other words, the poet harbors an instinctual faith 
in Christian transcendence at the same time that he is experiencing the death of God 
through philosophy.  
 How could a German poet writing before Marx, Darwin, Nietzsche, and Freud 
contemplate the starry face of heaven without bringing us to the threshold of religion? In 
1800, the “cosmic imaginary,” as Charles Taylor calls it, still rests by and large on a 
theological, or at least theistic, base, even if changes in science and social practice were 
beginning to put the secular and the sacred into radical competition. Even an extreme 
critic of religion like Voltaire was not able to fully shake off the need for God, as can be 
seen clearly in various passages of his Philosophical Dictionary. True, the seeds of the 
secular reinterpretation of religion had already been sown. Descartes, Spinoza, Newton, 
Reimarus, Lessing, Kant, Herder and others had done their part, intentionally or not, to 
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recreate religion on new foundation that did not require transcendence and revelation. It 
is a short step, intellectually and historically, from this reduced version of religion to a 
committed disbelief, such as we find in Feuerbach and Marx. The danger, however, 
comes when we imagine this transition from belief to unbelief too cleanly. Flaubert and 
Nietzsche were conscious atheists, but they also knew that in historical and instinctual 
ways they were still religious. 
I confess that Christianity has always been seductive. When you see only its 
gentle side, it wins your heart... I’m not surprised that a generous heart like L. 
Blanc should have dreamed of seeing it purified and restored to its ideal. I too had 
that illusion...7 
 
[Der letzte Papst:] “o Zarathustra, du bist frömmer als du glaubst, mit einem 
solchen Unglauben! Irgendein Gott in dir bekehrte dich zu deiner Gottlosigkeit. 
 Ist es nicht deine Frömmigkeit selber, die dich nicht mehr an einen Gott 
glauben läßt?... 
 In deiner Nähe, ob du schon der Gottloseste sein willst, wittere ich einen 
heimlichen Weih- und Wohlgeruch von langen Segnungen... 
 Laß mich dein Gast sein, o Zarathustra, für eine einzige Nacht! Nirgends 
auf Erden wird es mir jetzt wohler als bei dir!“ 
 „Amen! So soll es sein!“ sprach Zarathustra mit großer Verwunderung...8 
In the 21st century, exclusive humanism is firmly established as a theoretically, 
socially, and psychologically tenable position. It would be a hermeneutic folly, however, 
to think that something similar held in 1800, even among the elite. At that time, orthodox 
belief was beginning to fall into discredit among the general population of elites, and the 
religious habits of thought and feeling engendered by over a millennium of Christian 
influence were scarcely diminished. Indeed, the romantic theologian Friedrich 
Schleiermacher redefines the word “religion” to mean nothing but these internal instincts 
                                                 
7 The Letters of Gustave Flaubert, vol. 2, ed. Francis Steegmuller (Cambridge, MA: Belknap, 1982), p. 
117. 
 
8 Werke, vol. 6.1, eds. Giorgio Colli und Mazzino Montinari (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1968), p. 321. Karl 
Löwith quotes some of these lines in his discussion of the Christian heritage in Nietzsche. See second 
appendix in Meaning in History (Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1949), p. 222. 
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previously associated with the external forms of religion: “[Religion] half mir als ich 
anfing den väterlichen Glauben zu sichten und das Herz zu reinigen von dem Schutte der 
Vorwelt, sie blieb mir, als Gott und Unsterblichkeit dem zweifelnden Auge 
verschwanden (195). The inner form of religion remains when the external form begins to 
crumble, and this inner form is not timeless and a priori. Schleiermacher’s “religious 
intuition,” for instance, is unthinkable without the historical backdrop of Christian 
mysticism. Hegel’s view of history is unthinkable without the Christian historiographical 
tradition that began with Joachim of Fiore. Also, the “double-spirit” structure of idealism 
(absolute Ich/my Ich, Spirit/my spirit) would have probably been unthinkable without the 
Christian doctrine of the Holy Ghost—a superior, universal, eternal spirit that “dwells” in 
our weak, individual, mortal spirits. 
 This study takes seriously the persistence of religious Denkformen and emotional 
habits in the face of secularization. I assume a certain degree of unevenness between the 
pace of religious and philosophical (and for that matter: economic and political) 
development to be an anthropological fact,9 which means that within the right historical 
window a person can be, in some combination, both a humanist and a believer. At the 
very least, historical individuals sometimes have to discipline their feelings and instincts 
in order to keep them in conformity with their reasoned ideas (or vice versa), because the 
historical climate they inhabit is not itself disciplined and consistent. Hölderlin, in my 
view, can be read in this way, and I will treat Hölderlin’s poetry as symptomatic of the 
tension between religious and philosophical tendencies around the year 1800. 
                                                 
9 Marx had something like this in mind when he said that change in the ideological superstructure is often a 
few steps behind change in the economic base. 
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The principle difference between my reading and a “secularization” reading of 
someone like M.H. Abrams is that I focus on tension rather than harmony. For Abrams, 
the “romantics” are those writers who “undertook, whatever their religious creed or lack 
of creed, to save traditional concepts, schemes, and values which had been based on the 
relation of the Creator to his creature and creation, but to reformulate them within the 
prevailing two-term system of subject and object, ego and non-ego, the human mind or 
consciousness and its transactions with nature” (13). The emphasis here is on smooth 
transformation of religious content into philosophical content. Abrams is obviously right, 
to a large extent, about the romantic age “saving” and “reformulating” religious concepts, 
and his study is a necessary one. The problem with Abrams’s study comes in its 
unspoken assumption that religion is cancelled out (aufgehoben) by its “reformulation” in 
philosophical terms. But is this right? Is there any room left among the elite for non-
reformulated religion alongside the reformulated kind?10 
 Here Hans Blumenberg’s thesis about the separate genealogies of theology and 
rational “self-assertion” becomes useful. Blumenberg argues that the rise of scientific or 
“self-assertive” reason (which certainly includes Kantian and idealist philosophy) is not 
substantially identical to the decline of religion. In the romantic period, theology does not 
“turn into” the philosophy of Spirit as the “classic” secularization theorists like Karl 
                                                 
10 In his recent book, Colin Jager makes an argument similar to mine in many respects, but in reference to 
“design” theology within British Romanticism. He also remarks on the limitations of Abrams’ view of 
romantic secularization, and suggests that romantic secularization should be understood “not as a loss of 
belief [in the “unsecularized” religious original] but rather as an example of the differentiation that 
characterizes modernity” (1). The Book of God: Secularization and Design in the Romantic Era 
(Philadelphia: U of Pennsylvania P, 2007). 
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Löwith seem to suggest.11 If this were the case, then it would make little sense to speak, 
as I am doing, of a tension between religious and philosophical ways of thinking. 
In the classic secularization account (to which Blumenberg’s is a response), 
philosophies of consciousness like Hegel’s are reconstructions of religion rather than 
competitors to it, and this means that consciousness can only entertain one view or the 
other, not both. The reconstruction is the evolution of the original. A diachronic tension 
in the form of nostalgia is entirely possible, but not a double-mindedness, a simultaneity 
of religion and rationalism, in which part of me believes and part of me doesn’t. In the 
classic account of secularization, we perceive our “reformulated” religion to be, for better 
or worse, the only contemporary religious possibility. We can reject this reformulation 
and deliberately (and perhaps with bad faith) go back to a primitive Christian faith, but 
this does not mean that primitive faith has been a “living” alternative all along. Löwith 
seems to mildly recommend a return to pre-secularized Christian faith, but this comes 
only after he has discredited “reformulated” religion as an artificial construct that can no 
longer lay claim to our belief. In other words, he returns to faith only after the 
competition has ceased to compete. Löwith’s offers a single-stranded narrative of faith 
and reason. At no point is there really room for double-mindedness, where faith and 
reason sit side by side in history without one being “reformulated” into the other. 
 In Blumenberg’s account, by contrast, religion falls on hard times in the modern 
period,12 and “self-assertive” or scientific reason reoccupies the field of ideas and 
                                                 
11 See Löwith’s Meaning in History (Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1949) for the classic articulation of the 
secularization thesis against which Blumenberg is reacting. 
 
12 Blumenberg does not investigate the reasons for the waning power of the church, even though this is a 
necessary part of the historical mechanism of reoccupation that he proposes. Undoubtedly the same 
“reason” that tries to reoccupy the field of religion is partly responsible for theology’s decline, but the 
scientific narratives that replace theology are not same ones that may have weakened religion in the first 
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concerns laid out by religion. This is a subtle but profound distinction. Historically, 
scientific reason arises to serve purposes entirely different from those of theology,13 and 
it is unnatural for it to take on religious questions, as it does in the 18th and 19th centuries, 
about the meaning of history, the nature of “spirit,” and so forth. It responds to “residual 
needs” left by the decline of religion, but it is not adapted to fill those needs. Blumenberg 
argues that history—in this case a millennium and a half of Christian history—creates 
intellectual “positions” that need to be filled, and a foundational shift (like that from 
theological reason to scientific, self-assertive reason) does not automatically erase the old 
positions, at least not quickly. A 19th-century scientific atheist like Marx is still filling the 
position of eschatological expectation within his doctrine of an impending proletarian 
revolution and communist paradise. 
Important for our purposes is an implication of Blumenberg’s argument rather 
than the argument itself. If scientific reason reoccupies religious positions, then it does 
not negate religion. Instead of evolving into reason, religion is sidelined, and continues to 
operate in an independent albeit diminished capacity. Faith and reason therefore can be 
entertained simultaneously, since there is no historical or dialectical logic that forbids it.14 
                                                 
place. Charles Taylor’s theory of secularization compliments Blumenberg’s by showing that much of the 
weakening of religion came about through changes in the social order, and not through direct intellectual 
challenges at all. See footnote 14. 
 
13 The modern rational/scientific tradition rises, in Blumenberg’s view, in response to the theological 
absolutism of medieval nominalism. The argument in brief is this: since God creates everything—including 
the principles of reason and the laws of nature—out of nothing, philosophy can no longer be of any use in 
talking about the highest, self-abiding reality. In another world, reason could be structured differently, and 
reach different conclusions. The whole point of human thought, therefore, can only be to help us get along 
in this world. Its goal becomes practical, or in modern terms: “scientific.” 
 
14 This point is greatly reinforced by Charles Taylor’s A Secular Age, where he does not see modern 
“exclusive humanism” arising from a necessary process of Enlightenment, but rather from a less tidy 
process in which a transcendently grounded moral order is replaced by an immanent moral order in which 
mutual benefit is the principle value. This change in social thinking robs religion of one of its most 
 13 
It is thus to be expected that some thinkers, such as Hölderlin, entertain an intrinsically 
incoherent, cross-pressured attitude about God, since the environment they inhabit is 
historically cross-pressured between traditional attitudes of faith and the rationalism of 
“reformulated” religion. With the “classic” secularization thesis, incoherent double-
mindedness is more difficult to imagine. 
 Blumenberg’s more complex historical explanation of modern consciousness is 
essential to the reading of Hölderlin that I will be undertaking. I have already said that 
my reading is “symptomatic,” which means that there must be a “disorder” of some kind 
that is causing the symptom. The disturbance in question occurs in the tension between 
the poet’s religious Denkformen and the “scientific” view of the divine that he inherits 
from Kant, Schiller, Herder, Fichte, Schelling, among others. I see Hölderlin’s poetry as a 
stage on which religious ideas (such as faith, hope, Rührung, Heiligung, Heilsgeschichte) 
and their secular doubles freely intermingle, often in such a way that no one—including 
the stage director—can always be sure which is which. Sometimes characters will appear 
(Freude, for example, or Dank) for whom there is no secular double, although this may 
not be immediately obvious. Both troupes (i.e., religion and reason) can play on a single 
stage because the second does not “negate” the first; it merely shares or “reoccupies” the 
stage on which the first, religion, used to perform exclusively. 
 My work differs, then, from most other Hölderlin criticism by viewing his work 
as a historical struggle between belief and self-assertive reason rather than an inter-
rational or philosophical struggle between reflection and truth. Philosophy does not 
account for Hölderlin’s general attitude toward the divine, which includes love, gratitude, 
                                                 
important functions, and this, rather than “enlightened” scientific atheism, lays the groundwork for the 
(accidental) incompatibility (for some) of religion and modern life. 
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humility, and a significant dose of faith. He has no impious, but very rational, pretension 
to “identity” with the divine. His contemporary Novalis is not afraid of erotic 
consummation with the absolute (“zehre mit Geisterglut meinen Leib, dass ich luftig mit 
dir inniger mich mische und dann ewig die Brautnacht währt“),15 but Hölderlin finds „der 
Wink genug.“ Rather than pursuing self-deification through a philosophy of identity, 
Hölderlin waits patiently for God relying on what can only be called a religious trust.  
 
„Die kalte vom Herzen verlassene Vernunft“ 
 
To give a concrete sense of what the cross-pressure or double-mindedness about faith and 
reason looks like in Hölderlin, let us turn to a few lines from the draft of a sermon 
delivered to his fellow seminarians in 1790 at the age of twenty,16 and also look at a 
section of the letter to his mother to which he appended this sermon. These texts provide 
a concrete example of potentially conflicting philosophical and theological discourses 
working side by side in Hölderlin’s writing. We know that Hölderlin had a devout 
religious upbringing, which was only interrupted by his graduation from the Württemberg 
seminary at the age of twenty-three. His early letters and poems make his religious 
mindset (orthodox Lutheran flavored with pietistic notions of Heiligung and Rührung) 
abundantly clear.17 By the age of twenty, Hölderlin had already encountered philosophy 
                                                 
15 From the first of the Hymnen an die Nacht. See Werke, ed. Gerhard Schulz, 4th ed. (München: Beck, 
2001), p. 42. 
 
16 When we compare the draft from which this quote is taken with the longer, more polished sermon drafts 
of Hegel, we see that it is only a sketch. But as the letter to his mother quoted below suggests, it accurately 
represents what he must have said. 
 
17 I pass over the poems and letters from Hölderlin’s teenage years, when his religious voice is all too clear 
and thus, perhaps, naive. It may be useful, nevertheless to get a glimpse of the unabashed religiosity that 
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and embraced its way of thought, but this does not mark a trade-off between the 
“immaturity” of belief and the “maturity” of reason in his life. Such a “subtractionist” 
view, as Charles Taylor calls it, is rarely adequate to the historical reality of 
secularization. The religious and the philosophical tendencies are not held apart in the 
sermon or the letter, but rather forced into such tight proximity, that they seem to merge, 
however awkwardly. We see this merging in the opening lines of the sermon: 
Seit Anbeginn ehrte nichts die Menschheit so, wie die Menschwerdung Christi. 
Das Wesen, welches das Leben in ihm selber hatte, dessen Dasein einzig 
unabhängig war, dessen Allmacht unzäliges Leben hervorbrachte, dieses Wesen 
wird Lehrer der Menschen nicht blos dadurch daß es sich als Schöpfer und 
Regierer der Welt offenbart, sondern in menschlicher Gestalt unterrichtend es die 
Menschen vom besten Wege zu Glückseligkeit.... (MA 2: 43) 
 
How are we to take this confession from Hölderlin that Christ is “Schöpfer und 
Regierer der Welt”? Is it the sincere statement of a believer, or the ironic performance of 
a philosopher? Is it faith or false consciousness? A credo or a school exercise? Perhaps it 
                                                 
recurs in these writings. Take, for instance, the following stanzas from the 1786 poem, “Die Meinige,” in 
which the 16-year-old poet recalls a religious experience with his brother Carl. 
Guter Carl!—in jenen schönen Tagen 
Saß ich einst mit dir am Nekkarstrand. 
Fröhlich sahen wir die Welle an das Ufer schlagen, 
Leiteten uns Bächlein durch den Sand. 
Endlich sah ich auf. Im Abendschimmer 
Stand der Strom. Ein heiliges Gefühl 
Bebte mir durchs Herz; und plötzlich scherzt’ich nimmer, 
Plötzlich stand ich ernster auf vom Knabenspiel. 
 
Bebend lispelt’ ich: wir wollen beten! 
Schüchtern knieten wir in dem Gebüsche hin. 
Einfalt, Unschuld wars, was unsre Knabenherzen redten— 
Lieber Gott! die Stunde war so schön. 
Wie der leise Laut dich Abba! nannte! 
Wie die Knaben sich umarmten! himmelwärts 
Ihre Hände strekten! wie es brandte— 
Im Gelübde, oft zu betten beeder—Herz! 
The Pietists call an experience like this a Rührung, and Hölderlin uses the phrase “gute Rührungen” in his 
earliest extant letter, which is addressed to his childhood pastor, the Pietist Nathanael Köstlin. For a 
discerning summary of Hölderlin’s relation to pietism, see Priscilla Hayden-Roy’s “Zwischen Himmel und 
Erde: der junge Friedrich Hölderlin und der württembergische Pietismus” in Hölderlin-Jahrbuch 35 (2006-
2007), pp. 30-66. The physicality of rühren will be important for us in chapter three. 
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is best to take it the way Hölderlin told his mother to take it. In a letter dated February 
1791 that accompanied the sermon draft, he speaks rather openly about his spiritual trials 
and discoveries. I quote at length, since I think the cross-pressure between theology and 
philosophy manifested in this letter is a critical justification for identifying religious 
Denkformen in the later work: 
Hier haben Sie meine gestern (als am Sonntage) abgelegte Predigt. Ich war 
dißmal ein wenig weitläufiger, als in meiner ersten. Ich führte gerne eine Materie 
aus, deren genaue und richtige Erkenntniß mir täglich wichtiger wird. Derjenige 
Theil derselben in welchem gesagt wird, ohne Glauben an Christum finde, wenn 
man die Sache genau prüfe, gar keine Religion, keine Gewißheit von Gott und 
Unsterblichkeit statt, ist es, womit ich mich seit einiger Zeit anhaltender als sonst 
beschäfftige. Ich glaube, es gibt viele gute Christen, die nicht von jenem Saze 
nach seinem ganzen Umgange überzeugt sind [...] weil sie nicht in Lagen 
kommen, wo sie die ganze Nothwendigkeit der christlichen Religion von jener 
Seite kennen lernen. Erlauben Sie, liebe Mama! daß ich Ihnen sage, wie ich nach 
und nach dahin gebracht wurde. Ich studirte denjenigen Theil der Weltweisheit, 
der von den Beweisen der Vernunft für das Dasein Gottes und von seinen 
Eigenschaften, die wir aus der Natur erkennen sollen, handelt, mit einem Interesse 
dafür, dessen ich mich nicht schäme, wenn es gleich auf einige Zeit mich auf 
Gedanken führte, die Sie vieleicht unruhig gemacht hätten, wenn Sie sie gekannt 
hätten. Ich ahnete nemlich bald, daß jene Beweise der Vernunft fürs Dasein 
Gottes, und auch für Unsterblichkeit, so unvollkommen wären, daß sie von 
scharfen  Gegnern ganz oder doch wenigstens nach ihren Haupttheilen würden 
umgestoßen werden können. In dieser Zeit fielen mir Schriften über und von 
Spinoza, einem großem edeln Manne aus dem vorigen Jarhundert, und doch 
Gottesläugner nach strengen Begriffen, in die Hände. Ich fand, daß man, wenn 
man genau prüft, mit der Vernunft, der kalten vom Herzen verlassenen Vernunft 
auf seine Ideen kommen muß, wenn man nemlich alles erklären will. Aber da 
blieb mir der Glaube meines Herzens, dem so unwidersprechlich das Verlangen 
nach Ewigem, nach Gott gegeben ist, übrig. Zweifeln wir aber nicht gerade an 
dem am meisten, was wir wünschen? (wie ich auch in meiner Predigt sage). Wer 
hilft uns aus diesen Labyrinthen? —Christus. Er zeigt durch Wunder, daß er das 
ist, was er von sich sagt, daß er Gott ist. Er lehrt uns Dasein der Gottheit und 
Liebe und Weisheit und Allmacht der Gottheit so deutlich. Und er muß wissen, 
daß ein Gott, und was Gott ist, denn er ist aufs innigste verbunden mit der 
Gottheit. Ist Gott selbst. 
 Das ist seit einem Jare der Gang meiner Erkenntnisse von der Gottheit. 
(MA 2: 468-469) 
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This final phrase, “Gang meiner Erkenntnisse von der Gottheit,” captures the significance 
of the whole. The young seminarian is going through a process in which different 
epistemological authorities and methods are competing for the highest possible prize: the 
correct knowledge of God. What is compelling about this passage is the way it shows a 
public debate about religion being played out in a serious, personal way in a young 
student’s “confession” to his mother. The role of Spinoza in this inner struggle is stated 
outright, but we can also see the influence of Jacobi’s response to Spinoza (via Lessing). 
Jacobi’s epistemology distinguishes between things that we know based on analysis of 
finite givens, and things we know that could never be arrived at by the analysis of 
finitude. For Jacobi, such unmediated knowledge is a bridge to religion, and Hölderlin 
has something similar in mind when he speaks of “der Glaube meines Herzens,” which 
has an epistemological authority independent of reason.18 A pietistic sensibility is also at 
work here in Hölderlin’s association of religious knowledge with several things: warmth 
(implied by calling reason “kalt”), the heart (“Glaube meines Herzens”), the innate desire 
for eternity (“Verlangen nach Ewigem”), and the “festes kindliches Vertrauen auf Gott” 
referred to later in the sermon. In the sermon there is, furthermore, a clear Kantian 
influence in the repeated reference to the “christliche Sittenlehre” (as opposed to der 
christliche Glaube) and, possibly, in his choice to speak of the “gewisse Hofnung der 
Unsterblichkeit.” (It would be interesting to know whether Hölderlin developed the 
theme of immortality along Kantian lines in his spoken sermon. Unfortunately, the sketch 
                                                 
18 By the time he preached his sermon and wrote to his mother, Hölderlin had read Jacobi’s Über die Lehre 
des Spinoza in Briefen an den Herrn Moses Mendelssohn (Breslau: Gottl. Löwe, 1785), which, along with 
Kant’s critiques, was one the most important philosophical texts of the last two decades of the 18th century 
in Germany. Its influence was enormous, and we have a copy of the notes Hölderlin made after reading it in 
the summer of 1790. 
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doesn’t go that far, although the theme of God rewarding every virtuous deed is 
reiterated.) Next we see the influence of the “scientific” historical theology current at the 
time, which tried to stem the threat of biblical text criticism by making evidence-based 
arguments for, as Hölderlin puts it, the “unwiderlegbaren Tatsachen—[die] Wunder 
Christi und seiner Apostel, womit diese ihre göttliche Gesandschaft, jener seine 
Göttlichkeit bewies” (MA: 2, 44; my emphasis).19 Finally, we see the straightforward 
influence of Christian orthodoxy in the assignation of full divinity to Jesus, who “ist Gott 
selbst.” Orthodoxy may also lie behind the attitude that not everything can or should be 
explained: “man [muß], wenn man genau prüft, mit der Vernunft...auf [Spinozas] Ideen 
kommen, wenn man nemlich alles erklären will“ (my emphasis). There are certainly 
other ideological influences, but this is already an impressive list. 
 Sometimes it is hard to distinguish one discourse from the other. The opening of 
the sermon talks about “das Wesen, welches das Leben in ihm selber hatte, dessen Dasein 
einzig unabhängig war, dessen Allmacht unzäliges Leben hervorbrachte,“ which can be 
read as a fluid mix of orthodoxy, neo-Platonism, “vitalistic” Spinozism,20 and proto-
idealism. It is probably historically accurate to leave this ambiguity intact. This 
description of God becomes even more unwieldy when we add the second half of the 
                                                 
19 The most prominent “scientific” theologian of Hölderlin’s day was the British William Paley, whose 
“Evidences of Christianity” (1794) sought to prove the validity of the New Testament by offering various 
sorts of historical evidence. Paley’s principle work, Natural Theology (1802) defends the existence of God 
with arguments drawing on astronomy, natural history, and medicine. 
 
20 I am thinking of Herder’s appropriation of Spinoza in Gott: einige Gespräche (1787), in which the divine 
“substance” is reinterpreted as a vital principle. Herder’s theological vitalism anticipates the German 
idealist emphasis on the activity of Spirit or Self rather than its objective essence. This understanding of the 
absolute as activity rather than essence does not have roots in Jacobi, which is why Frederick Beiser has 
suggested that “the Herder text [seems] far more important than [Jacobi’s text], which has lately received 
most attention as the source of the romantic understanding of Spinoza” (The Romantic Imperative 
[Cambridge, MA: Harvard, 2003], p.182). He is specifically referring to Dieter Henrich’s analysis of 
Spinoza reception in Der Grund im Bewusstsein (Stuttgard: Klett-Cotta, 1992). 
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sentence: “dieses Wesen wird Lehrer der Menschen nicht blos dadurch daß es sich als 
Schöpfer und Regierer der Welt offenbart, sondern in menschlicher Gestalt unterrichtend 
es die Menschen vom besten Wege zu Glückseligkeit.“ Hölderlin ignores the “personal” 
division of the Trinity by making Christ the Schöpfer and Regierer, which supports the 
platonic/Spinozan/idealist view of “God” as a simple Alleinheit; but then he immediately 
contradicts this Alleinheit by making it take on human form (menschliche Gestalt) and 
teach about moral happiness (“vom besten Wege zu Glückseligkeit”). There is something 
dizzyingly unsettled about this Gottesbild, not unlike the protean theology we find a few 
years later in the writings of Novalis.21 
 Hölderlin’s religious eclecticism or syncretism has not gone unnoticed. Ulrich 
Gaier sees Plato, Hemsterhuis, Ficino, Kant, Herder, Schleiermacher, Jacobi, and Pietism 
all present in Hölderlin’s thought about the divine. “Hölderlin faßt in einem 
hochkomplexen System alle diese Elemente zusammen: Das Eins und Alles, Natur und 
Geschichte als Räume seiner Offenbarung, die Kultur...als Reich Gottes, als Vaterland 
durch die wirkende Erscheinung der Gottheit und durch die entgegenstrebende 
Kulturleistung der Menschen” (Hölderlin 3-4). Gaier repeatedly suggests that Hölderlin’s 
“hochkomplexes System” successfully integrates all these sources, and to a significant 
extent this is true. Hölderlin’s early metaphysics of beauty—“das Eine in sich selber 
unterschiedene” (StA 3: 81)22—offers us a way of thinking about different philosophies 
and theologies as so many mental expressions of a single ontological principle. 
                                                 
21 For an account of Novalis’s “precarious balance of entheism, pantheism, and irreligion” (220), see 
William Arctander O’Brien’s Novalis: Sign of Revolution (Durham: Duke, 1995), esp. pp. 216-271. 
 
22 This Heraclitean principle is the central aesthetic-metaphysical concept of the novel Hyperion. See 
especially the “Athens” letter (StA 3: 76-90). 
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But Hölderlin’s very eclecticism works against his pretension to system, or at 
least to any system that removes the problem of contingency. Gaier himself implies as 
much in a fairly recent essay on the poet’s late “hymns.” These late poems are in the 
hymnic style, but they don’t know which god they address. Their mythical vision is 
heterogeneous, and they scarcely know what to plea for or what to vow (the plea and the 
vow being constituent parts of the ancient hymnic style Hölderlin is imitating).23 This 
confusion is partly due to Hölderlin’s commitment to the notion of “Begeisterung,” 
which is a divine influx that comes erratically, as if according to God’s own personal 
timetable. Gaier tries to interpret “Begeisterung” neo-Platonically and thereby tie it into 
Hölderlin’s “hochkomplexes System,” but this does not account for the irregularity and 
gift-like quality of Begeisterung. It is more like divine grace than divine emination. Gaier 
overlooks this point, in my opinion. He suggests, rather, that through the combined force 
of science and Pietism “wurde das Bild eines persönlich waltenden Gottes geschwächt” 
(3), which puts Hölderlin at the “Übergang zu den Konzeptionen [des Göttlichen] des 19. 
Jahrhunderts, die nur noch von objektiven Prinzipien und Energien in der Geschichte 
reden” (4). I agree with Gaier’s formulation, but only if we are clear that Hölderlin is 
approaching this Übergang from the near side. His eclecticism actually secures a place 
for the “persönlich waltenden Gottes” in his quasi-dialectical reflection in divine history.  
With so many ideological sources at work in Hölderlin’s thought, it seems 
difficult to privilege one idea as its true “spirit,” especially since the composition of the 
system changes over time. My contention, therefore, is merely that the “persönlich 
                                                 
23 Gaier, Ulrich. “’Bald sind wir Gesang’—Vom Sinn des Hymnischen nach 1800.” In “Es bleibet aber eine 
Spur / Doch eines Wortes”: Zur späten Hymnik und Tragödientheorie Friedrich Hölderlins. Eds. Christoph 
Jamme and Anja Lemke. München: Fink, 2004. 
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waltender Gott,” while it may not often be deliberately foregrounded, plays a key role in 
defining the tension, or sense of “problem,” that drives Hölderlin’s work as a whole. 
There is a recurring notion that the divine has its own timetable, which is not conditioned 
by anything that happens in the human world. When it comes, the divine is an event, not 
merely an inner sense that could be accounted for philosophically. Combining these two 
notions, we may say that there is a recurring dynamic of revelation in Hölderlin’s 
representation of the divine, which prevents the “hochkomplexes System” from being a 
complete, self-contained system. 
The divine incarnation in the person of Jesus is the perfect instance of such 
revelation, and Hölderlin is accordingly—and somewhat unphilosophically—attracted to 
it. In “Der Einzige” (probably 1802), the poet is awkwardly torn between Schuld for his 
attraction to Jesus and Scham for the same feeling: 
   Ich weiß es aber, eigene Schuld 
Ists! Denn zu sehr, 
O Christus! häng ich an dir, 
Wiewohl Herakles Bruder 
Und kühn bekenn’ ich, du 
Bist Bruder auch des Eviers... 
.......... 
Es hindert aber eine Scham 
Mich dir zu vergleichen 
Die weltlichen Männer. 
(StA 2,1: 154-155) 
As a philosopher, Hölderlin should see Jesus as one myth among many, but Jesus’s 
historical reality makes him something more: an incarnation or revelation. (Strangely, 
Hölderlin calls Hercules and “der Evier,” or Dionysus, “weltliche Männer,” which seems 
to grant them historical reality while removing their spiritual meaning—which would 
make them mundane, not mythical—but “weltlich” could also refer to the fact that 
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mythical figures are merely products of human or “worldly” imagination. In one way or 
another, Jesus is the empirical intersection of the human and the divine, while Hercules 
and Dionysus are not.) What Jesus represents cannot be mastered by any ordered system, 
and so the poet’s “unruly” attachment to him is justified. 
 If the incarnate God Jesus “troubles” Hölderlin’s poetry in certain poems, the idea 
of revelation causes a more general sort of “trouble” across the poet’s oeuvre as a whole. 
Wolfgang Binder’s essay “Theologie und Kunstwerk” sees a shifting balance between 
Hölderlin’s Offenbarungspositivismus, which “hebt den Empfänger auf,” and 
Vernunftreligion, which eliminates the role of the Geber. Both religious positions can be 
at work in a single poem, but they “gehören verschiedenen Ebenen an” and cannot be 
reconciled. “Sie sind durch einen Hiat getrennt, der sich der dialektischen Vermittlung 
widersetzt, so oft sie versuch worden ist” (52). The most important shift in the priority of 
these positions occurs, in Binder’s view, after Hölderlin’s work on the verse drama 
Empedokles, when the divine becomes less a speculative process of Sichbegreifen and 
more a revelatory process of Sichzeigen, or to use more Hölderlinian terms: Sichfühlen 
and Erscheinen. Binder identifies a shift “vom göttlichen Sein zu Gott...oder vom Gott, 
der auf den Menschen, zum Menschen, der auf den Gott angewiesen ist” (63). By shifting 
its weight from the speculative to the revelatory view, the poetry subtly alters the 
representation of divine experience in a variety of ways: paradox replaces opposition, 
call-and-response replaces dialectical mediation, patience replaces action, acceptance 
replaces willfulness.24 
                                                 
24 Binder complicates this picture by not only speaking of a shift from Vernunftreligion to 
Offenbarungspositivismus, but also from Pietistic theology—whose “unmittelbare, alle Verbergung 
durchbrechende Offenbarung” (68) is not unlike the heady intellectualle Anschauungen of speculative 
philosophy—to Lutheran theology, with its sobering notion of a deus absconditus. This subsidiary thesis is 
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I should acknowledge my debt to Binder’s essay, which along with Blumenberg’s 
model of secularization provides the critical rationale for my own project. The relative 
brevity of Binder’s study does not give him the room to go into the detail that will be 
found in this study, nor does he ask all same questions that I will be asking (e.g. about the 
religious use of bodily imagery and the complexities of religious temporality). However, 
the notion of religious Denkformen—specifically those of transcendence and revelation—
“troubling” the dialectic of the poetry is something that we exactly share.  
 
Hölderlin as Poet 
 
In explaining what a “religious” reading of Hölderlin might mean, I have so far left 
untouched an important point: Hölderlin is a poet. By calling him a poet, I do not mean 
that he writes odes, elegies, and other objectively poetic texts. For Hölderlin and his 
romantic contemporaries, poetry is mode of experience and reflection, and thus more akin 
to philosophy than verse-making. Theoretical prose, on this view, can be “poetic” just as 
well—although perhaps not in the same degree—as an ode or a sonnet. The real 
distinguishing feature of poetic language is that its truth always exceeds itself, and it 
knows this. It is not like the language of speculative philosophy, which believes it can 
bear the weight of absolute knowing. Poetry always gestures to a completion beyond 
itself. The truth is always different from the medium of truth. “So wie die Erkenntnis die 
                                                 
viable, but somewhat more problematic, since recent scholarship has demonstrated the pietist influence on 
the young Hölderlin to be more limited than once believed, and did not exclude un-pietistic strains of 
Lutheran orthodoxy. Again, see Priscilla Hayden-Roy, “Zwischen Himmel und Erde: der junge Friedrich 
Hölderlin und der württembergische Pietismus.” The specific brand of theology Hölderlin is working with 
at any given moment is sometimes hard to pinpoint, which is why I begin my study (chapter two) with a 
very general, yet still historically specific, theological category: transcendence. 
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Sprache ahndet, so erinnert sich die Sprache der Erkenntnis” (MA 2: 96). Language and 
knowledge are always separated by the distance of intuition or memory. This point is 
made at greater length in another essay fragment: 
Du fragst mich, wenn auch die Menschen, ihrer Natur nach, sich über die Noth 
erheben, und so in einer mannigfaltigern und innigeren Beziehung mit ihrer Welt 
sich befinden...wenn auch wirklich dieser höhere Zusammenhang ihnen ihr 
heiligstes sei, weil sie in ihm sich selbst und ihre Welt, und alles, was sie haben 
und seien, vereiniget fühlen, warum sie sich den Zusammenhang zwischen sich 
und ihrer Welt gerade vorstellen, warum sie sich eine Idee oder ein Bild machen 
müssen, von ihrem Geschik, das sich genau betrachtet weder recht denken ließe 
noch auch vor den Sinnen liege?  
 So fragst du mich, und ich kann dir nur so viel darauf antworten, daß der 
Mensch auch in so fern sich über die Noth erhebt, als er sich seines Geschicks 
erinnern, als er für sein Leben dankbar seyn kann und mag, daß er seinen 
duchgängigern Zusammenhang mit dem Elemente, in dem er sich regt, auch 
durchgängiger empfindet... (MA 2: 53; my emphasis) 
 
Poetic representation—i.e., the Idee or Bild that we make of dem höheren 
Zusammenhang that we once experienced—does not take as its object something rational, 
“das sich...recht denken ließe.” Poetry is a figurative means of reawaking the experience 
of something that has passed, not in order to codify and possess the experience and 
thereby turn it into a philosophical “thing,” but rather to be “grateful” (dankbar) for it. 
The religious dimension of this last term emphasizes what is apparent throughout: the 
truth of poetry is greater than the poetry itself, and the attitude of poetic language is 
completely different from the attitude of scientific language.  
Poetry is thus a stance toward language, rather than a particular textual tradition 
or rhetorical style. What we usually think of as poetry—metered, lineated text that 
employs sounds and figures in evocative and suggestive ways—is not necessarily poetic 
at all, even though it is extremely well adapted to serve poetic ends. Poetry itself is a 
gesture of intimation or remembrance, and the structures of thought and language are 
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used to feel a poetic truth more purely. The craft of poetry, however rigorous it may be, 
has an almost devotional purpose. 
 How can religious meaning be found in poetry? Contrary to what one might 
expect, the thing not to do is to equate religion with poetry’s sublime truth. When we do 
this, religion loses its distinguishing positive character. Religion is to be found in the 
language that poetic reflection is built on, and more specifically in the religious concepts 
that are contextually implied by certain words or structures in the poetry. The shape of 
poetic truth only becomes apparent in relation to the specific contextual discourses that 
poetry exceeds. Many readers see Hölderlin’s poetry in dialogue only with philosophy, 
but this narrow focus diminishes the cultural significance of the poetry. A poetic truth 
beyond philosophy and theology is greater than a poetic truth beyond just philosophy. 
 To demonstrate the mechanics of Hölderlin’s poetic mode of reflection and its 
implicit dialogue with religion, let us look at Hölderlin’s use of divine nomenclature. 
God is an extremely ambiguous concept. It has been identified with a thousand 
different theological visions and philosophical “extremes of thought,” as Jean-Luc Nancy 
puts it (“Of Divine Places,” 112). The ambiguity of the concept is controlled by its use in 
context, but the outbreak of multiple meanings is always an imminent possibility. 
Hölderlin courts this danger by employing bewildering variety of God-synonyms 
throughout his poetry. He speaks of der Himmel, die Himmlischen, der Gott, die Götter, 
der Geist, die Geister, das Höchste, die Seeligen, der Herr der Zeit, Vater Aether, der 
Sohn, ein Sohn, die Helden, die Halbgötter, andere Mächte, die Verheißenen, die 
Unsterblichen, gegenwärtiger Geist, and so forth. He does this paratactically, never really 
indicating why he uses these different terms and how they are interrelated. The poet 
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seems to cross back and forth between a monotheistic and a polytheistic vocabulary, 
which seems to haphazardly generate a hierarchy of divine beings. At the top is the partly 
Christian, partly neo-Platonic/Gnostic Vater Aether or Gott; below this there are Götter, 
Himmlischen, and so forth; below them (or along side them?) are andere Mächte, such as 
those mentioned in the poem “Friedensfeier,” and below them are demigods, heros, and a 
Son (who may or may not, as we saw in “Der Einzige,” be something more divine than 
the demigods and heros). This astonishing diversity of divine representations points to a 
poetic truth beyond them all, something which no individual representation—or even the 
sum of them all—can contain.  
A philosophical reader of Hölderlin might beg to differ. He might argue that we 
can organize this bewildering array of gods according to a religious dialectic. Hegel’s 
dialectical history of religion gives us a whole range of deities, from the immanent 
powers of primitive magic religions to the incarnate God-man of the “consummate” or 
Christian religion. One way to make sense of Hölderlin’s gods would be to associate 
them with various stages in this Hegelian history of religious consciousness. The problem 
with this approach, however, is that it does not obtain with systematic regularity, as I will 
now illustrate through an example from “Brod und Wein.” 
In the second stanza of “Brod und Wein” (which we looked at earlier), the divine 
is named, and then split and renamed in order to prevent it from being reduced to nature 
or fate. 
Wunderbar ist die Gunst der Hocherhabenen und niemand 
   Weiß, von wannen und was einem geschiehet von ihr. 
So bewegt sie die Welt und die hoffende Seele der Menschen, 
   Selbst kein Weiser versteht, was sie bereitet, denn so 
Will es der oberste Gott, der sehr dich liebet... 
(StA 2,1: 90) 
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We already saw how die Hocherhabene refers to the personified Nacht of the first stanza, 
which is—not without a certain tension—both an image of transcendence and of nature. 
In any case, die Nacht is clearly identified with the divine, since she is capable of 
showing favor (Gunst), moving the world and the souls of men, and guiding the future. 
But right at this moment of apparent deification, the poet sidelines die Nacht in a strange 
way. In lines four and five we read that not even the wise know what she is preparing, but 
the reason for this ignorance has to do with a third party: der oberste Gott. This second 
God seems to determine our epistemological capabilities, which he limits, mysteriously, 
out of his love for us (“der sehr dich liebet”). 
What is the nature and purpose of this second divine figure? What is the relation 
of die Nacht to der oberste Gott? In the poet’s representation, both divinities interact with 
man, but they do not interact with each other. Der oberste Gott sets our epistemological 
limits out of love, and die Nacht “moves” the world and directs its course. Is this two-
headed divinity dialectically reconcilable? Or does it perhaps point to the potential 
double-mindedness of secularization, a simultaneity of theology (der oberste Gott) and 
idealism (die Nacht as Weltseele or Geist)? 
We may get more insight by looking at another poem where there are two divine 
heads. In the fifth stanza of the poem “Friedensfeier,” there is a relationship between Gott 
and Schicksal that seems to parallel the relationship between der oberste Gott and die 
Nacht in “Brod und Wein.” Like die Nacht, Schicksal seems to be a historical force 
distinct from God. 
   Denn schonend rührt des Maßes allzeit kundig 
Nur einen Augenblick die Wohnungen der Menschen 
Ein Gott an... 
......... 
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Und kommen muß zum heiligen Ort das Wilde 
Von Enden fern, übt rauhbetastend den Wahn, 
Und trifft daran ein Schicksal... 
(MA 1: 363) 
What we don’t get in “Brod und Wein” is the direct causal relation between God and fate. 
In “Friedensfeier,” the god “rührt...die Wohnungen der Menschen,” and this sacralizes 
the land (heiligen Ort) where a civilization will arise. Schicksal is a power that derives 
from the god’s touch. Can the double divinity of “Brod und Wein” be unified in the same 
way? Is die Hocherhabene, who “moves” the world and the souls of men, merely the 
expression of der oberste Gott as the power of fate?  
 I don’t think so. The Schicksal of “Friedensfeier” is bound to a “heiligem Ort,” 
while die Nacht transcends all earthly places. Schicksal’s power is localized in time and 
space, while die Nacht has power over history as a whole. Furthermore, a power is 
ascribed to der oberste Gott—the power to set epistemological limits—which has nothing 
to do with directing history. No specific power, by contrast, is given to the Gott in 
“Friedensfeier.” It is most reasonable, then, to say that in “Brod und Wein” we seem to 
be dealing with two kinds of divinity, which happen to do very different things. The 
second one, der oberste Gott, is the most mysterious, and he is also the one called 
directly by the name of “God” (Gott). He emerges in the text precisely at the point where 
we might be tempted to equate the first divinity, die Nacht, with history itself. He 
emerges, in other words, at the point where the theological God needs to be distinguished 
from the world-historical God. It seems difficult to get around some kind of theological 
meaning here, especially since der oberste Gott is also associated with love. 
In Hölderlin’s oeuvre, there are a few telling passages in which he attributes love 
to God in an off-hand sort of way, as if it needs to be mentioned even though it plays no 
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role in the logic of the moment. We see this in “Brod und Wein,” where God’s love is a 
small appositive note (“denn so / Will es der oberste Gott, der sehr dich liebet”) strangely 
out of keeping with the cool distance attributed to the divine in the opening stanza. We 
also see it in the poet’s “belief” at the end of “Patmos”: 
Und wenn die Himmlischen jetzt 
So, wie ich glaube, mich lieben, 
Wie viel mehr Dich...  
(StA 2,1: 171; my emphasis) 
His belief in God’s love has a parenthetical quality, which reminds us that divine love 
cannot be deduced or experienced through dialectical reflection, especially when that 
reflection is perpetually incomplete. 
Of course philosophy is not silent on the matter of love, but its definitions do not 
match what we find in Hölderlin. The dialectical drive for total unity can be labeled 
“love,” but this has no necessary connection to God or transcendence. Other models of 
love, like this taken from Schiller’s Philosophische Briefe, presuppose the capacity for 
total identification with the love object: 
Liebe ist nur der Widerschein dieser einzigartigen Urkraft, eine Anziehung des 
Vortrefflichen, gegründet auf einen augenblicklichen Tausch der Persönlichkeit, 
eine Verwechselung der Wesen. (5: 348) 
 
To love God and to be loved by God require a union, or “Verwechselung der Wesen” 
with God, but this is permanently beyond the poet’s capacity. In the ode “An die 
Deutschen,” the poet tells us that he can identify with nature (and can therefore love and 
be loved by it in the Schillerian sense), but he cannot identify at all with the god behind 
nature: 
Schon zu lange, zu lang irr ich, dem Laien gleich, 
   In des bildenden Geists werdender Werkstatt hier, 
      Nur was blühet, erkenn ich, 
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         Was er sinnet, erkenn ich nicht. 
 
Und zu ahnen ist süß, aber ein Leiden auch, 
   Und schon Jahre genug leb ich in sterblicher 
      Unverständiger Liebe 
         Zweifelnd, immer bewegt vor ihm, 
 
Der das stetige Werk immer aus liebender 
   Seele näher mir bringt, lächelnd dem Sterblichen... 
(StA 2,1: 9) 
In Hölderlin’s view, the divine mind is always beyond our reach, and we cannot 
“exchange places” with it. God is not, as Schiller says, merely “die ganze Summe 
harmonischer Tätigkeit...unendlich geteilt” in nature (5: 352), which is something we can 
identify with in moments of philosophical transport. Rather, God remains external; he is 
the “smiling” one (“lächelnd dem Sterblichen”) who brings nature ever closer to us 
without, however, betraying its mysteries. He certainly does not become nature. No 
amount of reflection illuminates (or dispels) the unverständige Liebe that we feel, and 
this love cannot be viewed in Schillerian fashion as a moment of identification. We have 
here a divine love that is different from the love of the enlightened philosophers. 
 “Brod und Wein” and “Patmos” suggest—not so much by what they say as by 
what they don’t say—that divine love is an unaccountable interpersonal experience 
between God and man. The poet knows that God loves him in a direct way, and not via 
any sort of intellectual reflection or insight. The model for this kind of love can come 
only from the Judeo-Christian tradition, specifically from a God who “so loved the world 
that he gave his only Son” (John 3:16), and whom we love we love “because he first 
loved us” (1 John 4:19). There are, as we will see in chapter three, certain kinds of 
experience in which divine love is announced or rooted, but such experiences do not 
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provide a philosophical handle for “explaining away” the Christian, personal appearance 
of this love. 
The point of the foregoing analysis of divine nomenclature was to show how 
theological elements emerge alongside philosophical ones in Hölderlin’s poetic language. 
On the one hand, the poet toys with the idea of world-historical Spirit (die Nacht), but on 
the other hand he imagines a God who retains theological characteristics (he transcends 
history and loves us in an immediate, interpersonal way). I would argue that this 
heterogeneity constitutes his poetic language, as it points to a truth that is not just 
“jenseits des Idealismus,” but beyond the competing discourses of philosophy and 
theology altogether. 
The positive character of the poetic Beyond is unavailable to us, since we can 
only think of it in terms of what it exceeds. Its ontic character is also uncertain. Poetry 
necessarily proceeds as if the Beyond is something “real,” but since it is unthinkable we 
can also view an ideal or “regulative” concept. The latter option is more productive for 
criticism, since it puts the emphasis on the elements being regulated by poetry, which are 
immanent, historical, and thinkable. In Hölderlin’s case, these concrete elements are (or 
at least include) philosophical and theological ideas, which, as we have seen, stand in 
historical tension in the late 18th century and therefore require some kind of regulation. 
So whether or not Hölderlin’s poetry helps us arrive at an experience of the Beyond, it is 
valuable for the way it brings religion and philosophy into communication. 
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Philosophy and the Criticism of Poetry 
 
I now want to approach the issue of Hölderlin as a poet from a different angle. In the 
preceding section I defined poetry a form of discourse that puts its truth beyond itself, 
and can only “intimate” or “remember” this truth (or act on the intimation or memory) 
through an aesthetic coordination of other, positive discourses. Hölderlin’s poetic truth 
emerges specifically from the play between religious and philosophical discourse. 
Modern philosophical readers of Hölderlin have understood the poetry differently, 
however. Specifically, they do not make poetic truth depend on discursive heterogeneity, 
but attempt rather to illuminate the poetry exclusively in terms of Dasein, Geist, or a 
postmodern ontology of difference. Because of their historical importance in Hölderlin 
criticism, I want to review some of these modern theories of poetry and identify where 
they fall short. 
 The philosophical reception of Hölderlin begins in earnest with the Erläuterungen 
of Martin Heidegger. For Heidegger, poetry is a “founding” (stiftende) use of language. 
Poetry opens up or “clears” (lichten) a world-space out of the unformed darkness of 
Being. This “cleared” space provides the background structure for determinate existence 
(das Seiende), and in clearing a world poetry both reveals and conceals Being. This is the 
logic of aletheia, or the actualization of Being through the very beings that conceal it. 
Poetry brings us right to the threshold of Being because it is the place where the clearing 
and populating of the world first occur, and where Being is only thinly veiled by the 
clarity of the clearing (Licht des Lichtens). Heidegger would thus read the famous 
opening lines of “Patmos”—“Nah ist / Und schwer zu fassen der Gott”—as a way of 
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naming the nearness to Being that enables poetic Stiftung. He also understands the elegy 
“Heimkunft” in this way:25 
Freilich wohl! das Geburtsland ists, der Boden der Heimat, 
   Was du suchest, es ist nahe, begegnet dir schon. 
The Geburtsland or Boden der Heimat represents the awakening of Dasein (i.e., human 
being, or the being that knows Being) into history, and to revisit this “ground” is to return 
to the quasi-sacred moment of Being’s initial disclosure.  
 Heidegger changes the direction of the relation of poetry to truth. Instead of 
reflecting on a truth that exceeds its own language, poetry actualizes the truth (Being) in 
its language. Hölderlinian poetry reaches beyond the world, while Heideggerian poetry 
founds a world. The problem with Heidegger’s reading is that it seems to ignore poetic 
form. For many critics, poetic form is what signals the exceptionality of poetry and first 
puts the idea in our heads that poetry might conceal a special meaning. Heidegger seems 
to jump over this technical issue of form and hasten right to the meaning itself. (This is 
why, I suppose, he chooses to describe his work as Erläuterung rather than 
“interpretation” or “criticism.”) The neglect of poetic form raises our suspicion. Is 
Heidegger practicing a divinatory criticism? 
 Heidegger’s divinatory criticism gets turned on its head by poststructuralists who 
effectively replace Being with Difference, if not Nothingness. In a poststructural universe 
we fall back onto the instability of form in the absence of any absolutely stable content. 
The first to read Hölderlin in this light was Maurice Blanchot, whose essay “La parole 
‘sacrée’ de Hölderlin” appeared shortly after World War II. In this essay, he inverts 
                                                 
25 See Heidegger’s exegesis of “Heimkunft / An die Verwandten” in Erläuterungen zu Hölderlins 
Dichtung, 6th expanded ed. (Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 1996). 
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Heidegger’s interpretation of Hölderlinian terms like “das Offene,” “das Leuchtende,” 
“das Tagen,” such that instead of pointing to the aletheic gesture of clearing, these terms 
play out language’s struggle against a metaphysical emptiness. For Blanchot, Heidegger 
bottoms out into Nietzsche. Manfred Koch summarizes Blanchot’s essay in this way: 
“Wer jenes Aufgehen der poetischen Sprache bei Hölderlin erfährt, werde von einer 
Bewegung ‘dans le néant’...ergriffen, die dichterische Existenz sei die Bezeugung einer 
kruzialen ‘impossibilité’...der Dichter—‘suspendu dans le vide même’—bewohne seine 
Sprache nur, indem er sie zerstört.”26 This “radicalized Heideggerianism,” which turns 
the encounter with Being via language into an encounter with le néant, characterizes 
much of the French Hölderlin criticism of the past fifty years. Just as Heidegger draws on 
Hölderlin to define his systematic philosophy of Being, so do the French (e.g. Blanchot, 
Foucault, Derrida, Lacoue-Labarthe, Nancy) draw on Hölderlin do define their 
overcoming of Heidegger and systematic philosophy generally.27 They pay close 
attention to the systemic problems of language, which is precisely what Heideggerian 
Erläuterung seems to neglect. 
 But the initially salutary focus of French poststructuralism on linguistic form 
gradually narrows the scope of our theoretical understanding of Hölderlin, at least in 
                                                 
26 Hölderlin-Handbuch: Leben—Werk--Wirkung, ed. Johann Kreuzer (Stuttgart: Metzler, 2002), p. 455. 
Blanchot’s essay appears in La part du feu (Paris: Gallimard, 1949), pp. 115-132. 
 
27 As an indicator of his importance to the French, it should be noted that Hölderlin was the second German 
(after Goethe) to be included in the canon-setting Bibliothèque de la Pléiade. For additional examples 
(beyond Blanchot) of the postmodern French use of Hölderlin, see Jean Laplanche’s Lacanian analysis, 
Hölderlin et la question du père (1961), Michel Foucault’s positive review of Laplanche, “Le ‘non’ du père 
collected in Dit et écrits I (Paris: Gallimard, 1994); Foucault’s Madness and Civilization (New York: 
Pantheon, 1965); Jaques Derrida’s “La parole soufflée” in Writing and Difference (Chicago: U of Chicago 
P, 1978); Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe’s “Caesura of the Speculative,” Glyph: John Hopkins Textual Studes 4 
(1978), 57-84; and Nancy’s “Of Divine Places” in The Inoperative Community (Minneapolis: U of 
Minnesota P, 1991). The collection edited by Aris Fioretos, The Solid Letter: Readings of Friedrich 
Hölderlin (Stanford: Stanford UP, 1999) contains further essays by Lacoue-Labarthe, Nancy and other 
French or French-inspired critics. 
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France and the United States. We can already detect this danger in Blanchot’s reference 
to le néant, but it becomes more acute along the American path blazed by Paul de Man’s 
essay, “Heidegger’s Exegeses of Hölderlin.”28 De Man “credits” Heidegger (sincerely 
and ironically) with having gotten Hölderlin exactly backwards. 
Hölderlin says exactly the opposite of what Heidegger makes him say.... It can 
indeed be said that Heidegger and Hölderlin speak of the same thing [i.e., the 
experience and representation of Being]; whatever one may otherwise reproach in 
Heidegger’s commentaries, their great merit remains to have brought out 
precisely the central “concern” of Hölderlin’s work; and in this, they surpass other 
studies. Nonetheless, they reverse his thought. (255) 
 
The way in which Heidegger has it “exactly backwards” relates to the “temporality” or 
belatedness of language. Heidegger, according to de Man, is so caught up in the idea that 
poetry “states the presence of Being” that he misses the linguistic point: the poetic word 
“cannot establish [Being] for as soon as the word is uttered, it destroys the immediate and 
discovers that instead of stating Being, it can only state mediation” (259). Heidegger (as 
de Man reads him) thus mistakes the poet’s “awakening of history” for the “superhuman 
task of ensuring...the mediation between Being and the consciousness of Being, its law 
founded in the Word.” The poet will necessarily fail at this superhuman task of divine 
mediation, since “the restoration of Being to consciousness is effected at the cost of 
necessarily denying its ineffable all-presence and the no less necessary acquisition of the 
finite and alienated character of Dasein” (262). Hölderlin, de Man claims, understands all 
this, and that is why the poet employs images of the failure and destruction (such as the 
Semele metaphor) that Heidegger fails to appreciate.29 By not taking the finite poetic 
                                                 
28 Although first published in French (“Les Exégèses de Hölderlin par Martin Heidegger,” Critique [1955]), 
this essay, like de Man’s scholarship generally, was most influential in the United States. 
 
29 De Man does not address the fact that Heidegger also offers an account of the poet’s fear and trembling. 
One of the five “Leitworte” structuring Heidegger’s essay, “Hölderlin und das Wesen der Dichtung” are 
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voice, the “conscious prayer that achieves self-consciousness in its failure” (263), into 
account, Heidegger crucially misunderstands the poem as a whole. 
 This is a compelling analysis, despite the fact that de Man’s understanding of 
Heidegger is questionable.30 De Man’s reading reminds us of human finitude and the 
inadequacy of human language, but in doing it ignores the guiding passion of Hölderlin’s 
entire oeuvre: to “remember” in some concrete, albeit indirect way, the encounter of the 
finite and the infinite.31 (Contrary to de Man’s claim, the wish to “state Being” is not the 
wish of Hölderlin or Heidegger.) Whether or not this divine experience—this Erlebnis 
eines höheren Zusammenhangs—is something the poet has personally experienced or 
only a poetic ideal, Hölderlin retains a belief in poetry’s ability to revive or approach it. 
De Man, I would argue, simply doesn’t believe in Hölderlin’s poetic metaphysics, and he 
therefore substitutes his own linguistic project and metaphysical agnosticism. His implicit 
suggestion that Hölderlin had a proto-deconstructionist awareness of the hopelessness of 
languages does not hold up against Hölderlin’s own poetic theory and poetic practice. 
                                                 
these lines: “Darum ist der Güter Gefährlichstes, die Sprache dem Menschen gegeben...damit er zeuge, was 
er sei...” The god-like power of stiftende Sprache can be experienced as a crushing burden.  
 
30 See, for example, Hent de Vries’s puzzlement at de Man’s “curious” suggestion that Heidegger 
understands Hölderlin’s poetry as a “placeholder for Being.” (“’Winke’: Divine Topoi in Hölderlin, 
Heidegger, and Nancy” in The Solid Letter [Stanford UP, 1999], especially pp. 108-112.) De Man seems to 
think that Being is something we reach by “transcending” our everyday consciousness, and he explicitly 
evokes Hegelian “transposition” and “transcendence” when talking about the experience of Being (262). 
But Heideggerian Being lies behind rather than beyond human consciousness, and poetry can at most signal 
a proximity to it. In Heidegger’s view of poetry, there is no “stating” or containing Being, which in any 
case is not a “thing” that can be stated or contained. De Man claims that Heidegger’s poet “immediately 
experiences Being,” but this sort of phraseology seems to be a straw man. Heidegger never uses it. He does 
say things like: “Kein Mittelbares, es sei ein Gott oder ein Mensch, vermag deshalb je das Unmittelbare 
unmittelbar zu erreichen” (61); but this seems to be the opposite of what de Man is putting in Heidegger’s 
mouth. 
 
31 This goal of “remembering” the human-divine interaction through the particular form of poetic reflection 
is clearly expressed in the “Fragment philosophischer Briefe” (quoted earlier) and in the essay “Wenn der 
Dichter einmal des Geistes mächtig...” Hölderlin presupposes a metaphysics which compensates for the 
intrinsic inadequacy of language. 
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The shortcoming of deconstructionist interpretation is on full display in Peter 
Fenves’s bleak essay, “Measure for Measure: Hölderlin and the Place of Philosophy.” 
The deep truth of Hölderlin’s poetry, for Fenves, is that it seduces the reader into 
“taking” the poem as a “measure” of some kind of human-divine meaning. Specifically, 
we fill in the enigmatic, often elided pronouns of the poem (e.g. “so riefs und flog von 
Zunge zu Zunge,” “des Menschen Maas ist’s”) with a significance that we bring to it. But 
when we try to make this assigned meaning work systematically in the poem, it 
necessarily fails. Fenves’s point is that the poem does not arise from anything “real” that 
would guarantee a consistent interpretation. The true “measure” of the poem—the one 
that really does reside in the text itself and is thus “poetic”—is the measure of 
meaninglessness: 
The attraction to [Hölderlin’s] poetry expresses itself in a taking: one measure—
“the measure of man”—is taken in favor of another measure. Although the other 
measure has been called a “poetic” one, this perhaps says too much: the other 
measure is poetic only insofar as it is linguistic, and it is linguistic only if 
language is no longer the medium in which the human measures itself against the 
divine; the other measure, the nonhuman one, is a measure of language’s 
contraction from the divine-human interplay. (42; my emphasis) 
  
Fenves shows us how looking closely—too closely, perhaps—at the language of the text 
can undermine any meaning-work that the text, or our reading of the text, might try to 
accomplish. But did this point need to be made in 1999? Fenves’s reading is dissatisfying 
not only because its principle argument is overly familiar, but also because it simply 
ignores the historical work that the poem is undertaking. All it sees is the naked 
mechanism of language, which can always be seen to withdraw from meaning.32 My 
                                                 
32 In her reading of Hölderlin’s late poem “Patmos,” Alice Kuzniar offers a more historically sensitive 
poststructural approach that acknowledges the discourse of “spirit”: “As the ending of ‘Patmos’ inherently 
suggests, we cannot exclude the possibility that language can become petrified and fixed when the spirit 
departs. Although writing arises in divine absence, it can also become endangered by the extended void—
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approach is to invert Fenves’s valution of the poetic as “withdrawal” and see it instead as 
an excess. In doing so, however, I am not content to merely say that poetic language 
exceeds other language “in general”; I am interested in precisely what positive 
foundations poetry exceeds, and where the need for poetry arises between these 
foundations. In Hölderlin’s case, these foundations are (or include) the philosophical and 
theological accounts of divine history, and the need for poetry arises at the point where 
philosophy denies and theology asserts transcendence. 
In his Hölderlin essay “Parataxis,” Adorno resists the implosive 
deconstructionism manifest in Fenves’s interpretation. Adorno begins by arguing that 
there is something “dark” in between the form and content of a poem that requires 
illumination. He speaks of this as the “der Philologie sich entziehende Moment” of the 
poem: 
Was die philologische Erklärung wegzuräumen gehalten ist, verschwindet 
dennoch nicht aus dem, was Benjamin zuerst und später Heidegger das Gedichtete 
nannte. Dies der Philologie sich entziehende Moment verlangt von sich aus 
Interpretation. Das Dunkle an den Dichtungen, nicht, was in ihnen gedacht wird, 
nötigt zur Philosophie. (3: 159) 
 
Adorno is building on the argument in Peter Szondi’s essay, “Über philologische 
Erkenntnis,” in which Szondi chides the “philologists” (with special reference to 
Hölderlin scholars) for neglecting the unique elements of poetry that cannot be accounted 
for by sources. We need to consider not only what a poem is made of, but also how it 
functions. We need to consider the poem as a historical Individualität rather than a mere 
                                                 
by the lack of any possibly correct referent. The watchful poet never abandons faith in the potentiality of 
his language, the belief that it might evoke presence. The poet can slacken in his vigilance thus in two 
ways: he can harbor the delusion that he can grasp God in his fullness or he can forget the very existence of 
divinity” (169). I am not sure that the poet is ever trying to “evoke presence,” but he is at least trying to 
establish a true memory or anticipation of the divine. Certainly, the “existence of divinity” is a given part of 
the logic of the poem; it is not that from which the poem withdraws. 
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Exemplar of its historical context. In other words, we need to consider the specific form-
content relation of the poem, and not just the form and content in isolation. The reference 
to Benjamin’s Gedichtete carries a similar thrust. Benjamin speaks of the Gedichtete as a 
Grenzbegriff between the Begriff of the poem and the Begriff of the poetic “task” 
(Aufgabe) calling the poem into existence. The Gedichtete, then, refers to the way in 
which the poem becomes a reality. It is a particular form of communication between life 
and art, which no amount of philology can illuminate. Szondi and Benjamin are both 
concerned with the “way” rather than the “what” of the individual poem, and Adorno has 
something similar in mind when he speaks of das Dunkle in between the form and 
content. 
 Szondi and Benjamin only call for the identification of the Individualität or 
Gedichtetes of the poem while Adorno goes a step further and tells us that we need to 
apply philosophy to it: “das Dunkle an den Dichtungen...nötigt zur Philosophie.” 
Criticism identifies things, but philosophy brings their meaning to light. Criticism can 
identify instances and patterns of form-content opposition, but only philosophy can detect 
a meaningful narrative unfolding in this opposition. Adorno, for example, draws from 
Hölderlin a narrative of counter-Hegelian Geist, which he calls “genius.” 
Genius aber ist Geist, sofern er durch Selbstreflexion sich selbst als Natur 
bestimmt; das versöhnende Moment am Geist, das nicht in Naturbeherrschung 
sich erschöpft, sondern ausatmet, nachdem der Bann der Naturbeherrschung 
abgeschüttelt ward, der auch den Herrschenden versteinern macht. Er wäre das 
Bewußtsein des nichtidentischen Objekts. (3: 205-206) 
 
Poetry represents an act of Spirit by which the megalomania of the subject is shaken off, 
and Spirit knows itself “als Natur” instead of Naturbeherrscher. The dialectic of genius 
opens up consciousness to a Verlorenes, a natural truth unavailable to an aggressively 
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rational Geist. “Treue, die Tugend des Dichters,” says Adorno, “ist die zum Verlorenen” 
(3:165), and “die ‘Waffen des Worts,’ die dem Dichter bleiben, sind überschattete 
Erinnerungsspuren” (3: 166). 
 Adorno involves himself in a productive contradiction at this point. He begins his 
essay by criticizing Heidegger’s philosophical reading for its inattention to poetic form, 
which undercuts the latter’s conclusions. Heidegger reads the poetry as a collection of 
“statements” (Aussagen), and not as an aesthetic artifact in which form modifies content. 
Then, of course, Adorno provides his own philosophical reading based on the 
metaphysics of genius. The irony is that Adorno’s reading is vulnerable to the same 
aesthetic critique that he leveled against Heidegger. Peter Fenves points this out: “Nature 
and spirit, matter and rationality are reconciled [in Adorno’s reading], but since this 
reconciliation takes place in a poetic medium, it never sheds its illusory, scheinhaft 
character. The poems claim to be nothing more than models of true reconciliation” (29). 
Fenves pulls the same card on Adorno that Adorno pulled on Heidegger: poetic form 
undercuts the apparent truth of the poem. Hölderlin’s poetry cannot really represent “das 
versöhnende Moment am Geist,” because poetry is merely a symbolic proposition, just 
“words on a page.” Does this make Fenves’s thesis about the impossibility of poetic 
meaning the best way of approaching Hölderlin? Is the effective nihilism of 
poststructuralism a more illuminating philosophical stance to bring to bear on Hölderlin’s 
poetry than Adornian dialectic or Heideggerian Seinsphilosophie?  
 I have already expressed my opinion that this is not the case, but the grounds for 
rejecting Fenves’s reading are not philosophical. Within the bounds it sets for itself—i.e., 
the bounds of structural linguistics—Fenves’s reading is fully legitimate. Adorno’s 
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reading is much more compelling, however, because it shares a historical connection to 
Hölderlin that Heidegger and the poststructuralists do not. Philosophy, Adorno tells us, is 
required to illuminate das Dunkle an den Dichtungen, but I would suggest that what 
“illuminates” in Adorno’s reading is the historical affinity between his dialectic of Genius 
and the speculative dialectic of the German idealists. Adorno does not just bring any old 
philosophical perspective to bear on Hölderlin, but takes a “negative dialectical” 
approach that “uses the strength of the [epistemic] subject to break through the deception 
of constitutive subjectivity.”33 This is simply the self-overcoming of German idealism, 
which is something that Hölderlin was arguably the first to attempt. Adorno’s thought, 
then, is a “cousin” to Hölderlin’s own, and they belong to the same historical framework 
of “dialectical” thought. This is not true of Heidegger or de Man, who reject the form and 
substance of the philosophy of Spirit.  
 This being the case, the real argument made by Adorno’s essay is this: das Dunkle 
an den Dichtungen created by the tension between form and content requires illumination 
at the hands of a truth-discourse (not necessarily “philosophy”) historically attuned to the 
context from which the poem arises. This modified argument, which puts the emphasis 
on the historical rather than the philosophical, is in line with Adorno’s thinking in “Rede 
über Lyrik und Gesellschaft,” where he suggests that lyric needs to be understood in its 
dynamic relation to a social context, if its individuality is to be captured at all. Even the 
expressivist demand for an “overflow” of individual feeling, “diese Forderung...des 
jungfräulichen Wortes, ist in sich selbst gesellschaftlich. Sie impliziert den Protest gegen 
einen gesellschaftlichen Zustand, den jeder Einzelne als sich feindlich, fremd, kalt, 
bedrückend erfährt, und negative prägt der Zustand dem Gebilde sich ein” (1: 78). 
                                                 
33 Negative Dialectics, trans. E. B. Ashton (New York: Seabury Press, 1973), p. xx. 
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“Private” lyrical expression is only ever possible in relation to the collective and in terms 
that can be understood by the collective. 
There is, then, no real “outside” and “inside” of the poem, but only an 
outside/inside dynamic, a tension between individual and collective that can never be 
overcome in one direction or the other. This dynamic of individuation is at work not only 
on the level of the poetic image (lyrisches Gebild), but also on the level of poetic 
language in general. Whenever language seems to be fully at the service of some original, 
private experience, it is always also generalizing this experience. 
Denn die Sprache ist selber ein Doppeltes. Sie bildet durch ihre Konfigurationen 
den subjektiven Regungen gänzlich sich ein; ja wenig fehlt, und man könnte 
denken, sie zeitigte sie überhaupt erst. Aber sie bleibt doch wiederum das 
Medium der Begriffe, das, was die unabdingbare Beziehung auf Allgemeines und 
die Gesellschaft herstellt. (1: 85) 
 
None of this means that poetry can be “deduced” from its context, since the context is 
only finally determined in the spontaneous emergence of the individual poem. It does 
mean, however, that a poem represents a historical possibility, which can only be 
understood against a specific historical horizon. 
 Once we associate the meaning of the poem with the historical dynamic of 
individuality, there is no longer any reason to privilege philosophy as the truth-discourse 
specially adapted to illuminate a poem’s individuality. The rift between form and content 
can, in theory, be explained by economic, political, or religious means. The same 
common language (in Hölderlin’s case: German) weaves through all these heterogeneous 
and competing discourses, and it is because of this common language that “das Ganze 
einer Gesellschaft, als einer in sich widerspruchsvollen Einheit, im Kunstwerk erscheint” 
(1: 76). Strictly speaking, all of these areas must be brought into play if a poem’s 
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individuality is to be fully illuminated. Certainly they all share an equal standing a priori 
as perspectives from which poetry can acquire meaning. As I have demonstrated, religion 
and philosophy have equal authority in the mind of Hölderlin the twenty-year-old 
seminarian, and religion retains some of its power in poems as late as “Der Einzige” and 
“Patmos.” Both of these discourses of meaning—philosophy and religion—play a critical 
role in Hölderlin’s immediate social context, and a proper sensitivity to the poetic 
medium will not fail to register the one as well as the other. Adorno’s theory of poetry, 
then, implicitly legitimates a religious reading, or at least a reading that draws religion 
into the dynamic of meaning. 
To conclude this chapter, I want to look at two essays that demonstrate how 
religion can automatically surface in the criticism of Hölderlin’s work.34 If, as Adorno 
says, the poem is an individual crystallization of das Ganze einer Gesellschaft, this 
should not come as a surprise. Religion is part of the whole, and for that reason cannot be 
selectively excluded. Both essays address aspects of the Hölderlinian notion of tragedy, 
and draw on theoretical as well as formally poetical writings. In Hölderlin’s case, I think 
it is permissible to lump both sorts of writing under the rubric of “poetry,” since the 
theoretical writings remain fragmentary, elusive, and closely bound to Hölderlin’s poetic 
practice.  
 In the first essay, Anja Lemke demonstrates how the location of the divine 
“wanders” from language, to history, to time itself over the course of several “tragic” 
texts spanning Hölderlin’s productive years. She begins with the first two versions of the 
                                                 
34 Both essays are taken from the collection, “Es bleibet aber eine Spur, Doch eines Wortes: zur späten 
Hymnik und Tragödientheorie Friedrich Hölderlins, eds. Christoph Jamme und Anja Lemke (München: 
Fink, 2004). 
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drama Empedokles, where the “Wunsch nach Vereinigung” that characterized the novel 
Hyperion has been replaced by the “Sühnetod für die Übertretung der Differenz zwischen 
den zwei Sphären [i.e the human and divine]” (404). Unlike Hyperion, Empedocles has 
actually experienced the divine Alleinheit, and he must pay for this experience with his 
life. The crucial question concerns the way this achieved experience of the divine relates 
to representation. The first versions of Empedokles speak of the divine as something 
capable of being harnessed by language: “die Götter waren / Dienstbar mir geworden, ich 
allein / War Gott, und sprache im frechen Stolz heraus” (404). The “Versprachlichung 
des Vereinigungsprozess” is a problem, because it allows Empodocles, who is the ruler of 
Agrigento, to transmit the divine to his people, and thus threaten the distinction between 
heaven and earth. Empedocles’ death, therefore, is a (self-)punishment for hubris, and not 
the immediate effect of divine glory (as in the Semele metaphor that Hölderlin often 
uses). 
In the prose text Grund zum Empedokles, which Hölderlin wrote in preparation 
for the third version of the play, we find a profound shift. The status of the figure 
Empedocles changes from one who experiences metaphysical reality to one who directly 
symbolizes or carries out that reality. The symbolized reality in this case is not a Platonic 
vision of the completed Vereinigungsprozess, but the dynamism of the process itself. 
Empedocles is “chosen” as the vessel of this dynamic Schicksal, which can only result in 
Empedocles’ death. The important thing to note here, for Lemke, is that the divine is 
“nicht mehr das Andere zur Zeit” reached by a speculative transcendence of the finite (as 
with the first Empedocles), but rather “das in der Geschichte wirkende Antriebsmoment 
im Prozeß des Werdens und Vergehens.” Consequently, in moments of historical 
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transformation, God reveals himself as a “Herr der Zeit,” as it is put in the third version 
of the play. Hölderlin’s essay “Das untergehende Vaterland” builds on the idea of a God 
indissolubly linked to time by showing, says Lemke, “daß es keinen gesicherten Standort 
außerhalb der Zeit mehr gibt, der es erlauben würde, den geschichtlichen Prozeß als 
Einheit in den Blick zu nehmen” (413). 
The God of Time is dealt with most profoundly in the commentary Hölderlin 
appends to his translations of Sophocles, where God is no longer found beyond time or in 
time, but as time itself, the “Vorstellung selber” of time. This representation must resist 
any integration into the speculative whole, which means that it cannot have any positive 
connection to any other representation; it must be “=0,” as Hölderlin puts it, a “Zäsur” in 
the dialectic of experience. It neither completes nor collapses speculative dialectic, but 
merely brings it to a standstill. The God of Time can only be represented as the “Gesetz 
der unaufhebbaren Scheidung” (413). 
Admittedly, there is nothing overtly theological here, but the trajectory of the 
development that Lemke traces has seems to be theologically motivated. Essentially, 
Hölderlin is trying to pull the divine—which as Alleinheit or Geschichte can easily be 
reconciled to a philosophical metaphysics—away from anything that can be controlled, 
understood, or identified with the human. At first the divine is something capable of 
intellectual mediation or “Versprachlichung,” then it is raised to something that can only 
be lived out over time, and finally it is the incomprehensible Vorstellung selber of time or 
the Herr der Zeit. God becomes the non-identical rift in the world, which one might 
argue is merely the “view from below” of theological trancendence. In the last sentence 
of her essay, Lemke subtly acknowledges the religious dimension of her object of 
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investigation: “Die göttliche Gabe, jene Erfahrung der Grenze in der zeitlichen Zäsur, 
tritt als gegenrythmische Unterbrechung im ‘reinen Wort’ der Zäsur hervor” (418; my 
emphasis). According to the argument that I am presenting, the religious trajectory 
emerging from Lemke’s analysis should come as no surprise, since theology informs 
Hölderlin’s poetry just as immediately as philosophy. 
 We get more insight into the relationship between time and theology in the second 
essay, where Rodolphe Gasché tries to understand the epistemological character of the 
tragic caesura by returning to Kant. Drawing on several suggestive parallelisms, Gasché 
assumes that Hölderlin’s understanding of time is based on his reading of the first 
critique, where Kant says the most basic experience of time is the instant (Augenblick) in 
which sensation is internalized to produce feeling. “Für Kant [ist] der Augenblick das 
spezifisch Zeitliche der Zeit. Augenblicklichkeit ist die zeitliche Form, in der sich 
Empfindung, die das Ergebnis der Affizierung des inneren Sinns durch äußere Dinge ist, 
ereignet” (432).35 This Augenblick and its attendant feeling are what signal that a given 
impression constitutes a distinct representation (434). If we can imagine turning our 
attention to this temporalizing process itself, such that the process becomes the 
impression “affecting our inner sense,” then we end up with the representation of time 
itself. Its content equals zero (=0), because it is time representing itself to itself. This is 
how Gasché wants to understand Vorstellung selber of time that Hölderlin associates with 
the Zäsur of tragedy. 
The problem with reading Hölderlin’s Zäsur in this way, of course, is that it does 
not account for the metaphysical significance that Hölderlin attaches to the caesura. What 
                                                 
35 Gasché is paraphrasing Gerhard Krüger, “Über Kants Lehre der Zeit,” in Philosophie und Moral in der 
kantischen Kritik (Tübingen: Mohr, 1967). 
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is divine about the experience of time as a pure Augenblick? To respond to this, Gasché 
offers the following: “die flüchtige ‘Augenblicklichkeit’ der Affizierung des inneren 
Sinns, wird als die Form verstanden, in der etwas, das von einer kantischen Perspektive 
nicht erfahrbar ist, für einen Moment erfaßbar wird, das aber ebenso...in diesem 
Vorstellungsprozeß sofort verendlicht wird” (435; my emphasis). This concession to the 
“something” which enters mysteriously through the null-point of Augenblicklichkeit does 
not support a reading of Zäsur as part of a speculative dialectic, since what falls out of 
this moment (what is “verendlicht,” as Gasché says) will have no immanent connection to 
the chain of representations surrounding it. It will have broken through from without. 
From the perspective of dialectic, the divine Augenblick appears only as an intractable 
rupture in the course of things. The rupture in time from beyond time is a formula for 
revelation in all but the name. 
We have, then, a demonstration of how Kantian philosophy can describe the place 
of revelation without filling that place. Jean-Luc Marion has argued for a similar relation 
between phenomenology and revelation. Countering accusations that his philosophy is 
crypto-religious, Marion says: 
Phenomenology describes possibilities and never considers the phenomenon of 
revelation except as a possibility of phenomenality, which it would formulate 
thus: if God manifests (or manifested) himself, he will make use of a paradox in 
the second degree; Revelation (of God by himself, theo-logical), if it takes place, 
will assume the phenomenal figure of the phenomenon of revelation, of the 
paradox of paradoxes, of saturation in the second degree.36 
 
It is not necessary to precisely understand Marion’s “saturation in the second degree” in 
order to see his point, which is that by accounting for the form of experience philosophy 
                                                 
36 From Etant donné: Essai d’une phénoménologie de la donation (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 
1997), p. 329; quoted in translator’s introduction to Marion’s The Idol and Distance (New York: Fordham 
UP, 2001). 
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can anticipate the manner in which revelation could possibly present itself. 
Phenomenology does not say anything about the content that might be transmitted 
through a revelatory event, but only where and how this content might be transmitted, if 
it were to be transmitted. Logically, the relation between phenomenology and revelation 
in Marion is the same kind we see between Kantianism and revelation in Gasché’s 
analysis (and, as we will see in chapter three, in the religious theory of Fichte). 
 But why does Gasché point out the contact point between philosophy and 
revelation at all? Doesn’t this put a “hole” in his Kantian analysis? The answer is simply 
that he has to. At the heart of Hölderlinian tragedy—and virtually all of Hölderlin’s 
poetry—is an exchange between heaven and earth, and it is not enough to describe the 
form of the tragic caesura without allowing any divine content to pass through it. The 
religious force of Hölderlin’s ubiquitous “gods” is too great for any criticism to ignore. 
Since the experience of the Augenblick as Augenblick is an empty representation (=0), it 
has no hermeneutical value for Hölderlin criticism until it is understood as a conduit for 
the gods.  
To summarize poetically, we can say that both Lemke and Gasché cannot but 
bend the knee to the Herr der Zeit beyond the tragic caesura. Lemke takes note of the 
phrase “Herr der Zeit” in the third version of Empedokles, and it reappears in 
unmistakably theological garb in “Friedensfeier”: 
   Denn längst war der zum Herrn der Zeit zu groß 
Und weit aus reichte sein Feld, wann hats ihn aber erschöpfet? 
Einmal mag aber ein Gott auch Tagewerk erwählen, 
Gleich Sterblichen und teilen alles Schicksal. 
(MA 1: 364) 
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The phrase “Herr der Zeit” is not a mere rhetorical flourish here. It is one of the roles 
played by a God who is “too great” to be limited to just this role. Consequently, he 
sometimes chooses (erwählen) to act differently, such as when he descends into history to 
share the fate of mortals (“Tagewerk erwählen, / Gleich Sterblichen und teilen alles 
Schicksal”). This sounds much more like Christology than dialectic, and it clearly 
suggests that the tragic Zäsur is more than a negative space. 
 In the chapters that follow, I will try to focus on the positive marks of theology in 
Hölderlin’s work. Instead of merely acknowledging that something, das von einer 
kantischen (or idealist) Perspektive nicht erfahrbar ist, might play a role in Hölderlin’s 
poetic conception, I will try to identify concrete evidence of theological influence. 
 In chapter two I will look at the structure of transcendence in Hölderlin’s work. 
My analysis will be facilitated by a contrast with Hegel’s philosophy of religion, which 
ultimately understands transcendence as an illusion of imperfect consciousness. All spirit 
is subjective, for Hegel, which means that there can be no “outside” spirit, such as a 
transcendent God. Hölderlin, by contrast, is compelled by the idea that the divine is 
something that comes and goes. It is not a self-projection, but an encounter, which 
necessarily points beyond philosophy to theology. 
 In chapter three I look at the representation of divine as revelation, i.e., as an 
empirical event within history, rather than an intellectual event within “spirit.” The 
justification for taking the category of revelation seriously is Fichte’s well-received 1792 
work, Versuch einer Kritik aller Offenbarung, in which the author attempts to ground the 
possibility of revelation a priori. The only element of revelation that cannot be 
“secularized” is its empirical facticity, and this core notion leaves it mark in Hölderlin’s 
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poetry as a kind of “kinetic” internal energy that is neither merely intellectual nor merely 
sensual.  
 In the fourth chapter I shift gears and look at the temporality of religious 
experience. Specifically, I consider two paradoxes: first, how the divine resists being 
incorporated into any rational scheme of history even though it seems to call for such a 
unity; and second, how the divine is represented as a material event (as I propose in 
chapter three) but also as something ahistorical (i.e., an intellectual “event”). Both of 
these paradoxes can only be “resolved,” I suggest, by seeing them as the expression of an 
irreducible tension between the historical discourses of religion and philosophy. 
 
  
 
Chapter 2 
 
Identity and Difference in the God of Hegel and Hölderlin 
 
Hölderlin is inseparable from the history of German Idealism. Hegel and Schelling were 
his roommates in the theological seminary of Württemberg in the early 1790s, and the 
famous “Ältestes Systemprogramm des Deutschen Idealismus” (1795 or 1796), a kind of 
manifesto for post-Fichtean idealism, has been variously attributed to all three men. 
Dieter Henrich has demonstrated, furthermore, that Hölderlin was a decisive intellectual 
influence on Hegel turning him from Kantianism in the direction of a 
Vereinigungsphilosophie that “binds nature and freedom, subject and object, in such a 
way that each remains what it is and yet merges with the other in an inseparable unity” 
(131). An important difference remains: Hölderlin thought of the “inseperable unity” as 
the function of a third element beyond the oppositions of consciousness, while for Hegel 
the unity was the immanent manner of relation within consciousness (137-138). 
Hölderlin’s metaphysical picture is thus vaguely more religious than Hegel’s, since it 
leaves open a third space, which has structural similarity to the theological space of 
transcendence.  
 The theological potential of Hölderlin’s brand of idealism becomes apparent when 
we think about the “third” as a site of action. In Fichtean-Hegelian idealism, the Ich or 
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Geist do not do things in the world so much as drive the world itself. From a theological 
perspective, this does not look very different from naturalism, since it denies God the 
possibility of intervention. William James made this point: 
Transcendental idealism, of course, insists that its ideal world makes this 
difference, that facts exist. We owe it to the Absolute that we have a world of fact 
at all. “A world” of fact!—that exactly is the trouble. An entire world is the 
smallest unit with which the Absolute can work, whereas to our finite minds work 
for the better ought to be done within this world, setting in at single points. (567) 
 
The idealist “God” can at most be a Prime Mover, and thus has virtually no importance or 
value for a consciousness caught up in history. Hölderlin, however, has more room for 
the gods in his philosophical model, which has an “outside” space from which the divine 
can enter history in a “piecemeal” (James’s term) and personalized way. Any 
metaphysics that permits God to enter history is no longer philosophy but theology. The 
“outside” space in Hölderlin’s metaphysical imaginary also gives the gods a place to 
withdraw, which is an equally theological behavior. In the language of the poem 
“Mnemosyne,” God can 
  täglich 
Es ändern. Kaum bedarf er 
Gesez, wie nemlich es 
Bei den Menschen bleiben soll. 
(StA 2: 193) 
 My specific principle claim in this chapter is that Hölderlin’s God inhabits, at 
least in part, a theological space that vanishes in mature idealism as we find it Hegel’s 
Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion. Of course, Hegel did not want to be known as the 
man who “killed” God, as Nietzsche and others later came to see him. On the contrary, 
Hegel wanted to keep God very much alive inside of his philosophical system, since that 
would secure its legitimacy. But a comparison with Hölderlin helps us to see that Hegel’s 
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God is an emaciated God modeled on (neo-)Spinozism rather than the Bible. Hegel’s God 
becomes indistinguishable from reason, while Hölderlin’s is semi-rational at best. The 
poet continues to represent the divine as an independent principle, and this marks him (at 
least in this respect) as more traditional than some of his philosophical contemporaries. 
To see exactly how this works, we will first look at Hegel’s theory of religion as laid out 
in his 1827 Lectures, and then read Hölderlin’s poetry against this theory.1 
 
Hegel’s Philosophy of Religion 
 
For Hegel, all knowledge begins with “certainty,” of which there are two kinds: that of 
the senses (the point of departure for Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit) and that of the 
spirit (his point of departure for the Lectures). “Certainty” is an “immediate relation 
of...content to myself” (134), which means that when we are “certain,” we are acquainted 
with something (e.g. sensation or spirit) without any intervention of reflection. Certainty 
is a form of experience anterior to thought, representation, and even feeling, all of which 
emerge from and always refer back to something immediately given. Spiritual certainty is 
the “immediate relation” of God and myself, of divine spirit and human spirit, a relation 
                                                 
1 All citations will be from Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion: One-
volume Edition: The Lectures of 1827, ed. Peter C. Hodgson (Berkley: U of California P, 1988), which 
includes extensive footnotes comparing the 1827 lectures to changes in the other versions (1821, 1824, 
1831). My justification for comparing poetry from around 1800 to a text from the 1820s lies in the view, 
articulated by Hodgson, that Hegel’s lectures on religion are not philosophically innovative; they are an 
outworking of what was implicit in the Phenomenologie des Geistes (1807) and the work on logic in the 
1810s. Perhaps the reason Hegel’s religious work came late in his career is that the concept of philosophy 
of religion did not yet exist. Kant had written on religion “within the boundaries of mere reason” in 1793, 
but a full account of religion from a philosophical perspective was a new thing. Schleiermacher’s 1799 
“speeches” to religion’s “cultured despisers” offers a theory of religion, but it is deliberately not a 
“philosophy.” The immediate motive for Hegel’s innovation, according to Hodgson, was almost certainly 
the impending publication of Schleiermacher’s On Christian Doctrine in 1821, which Hegel anticipated 
with distaste. 
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constituting religious consciousness. This consciousness is immediate, but it is also 
mediate because it is a relation, i.e. a consciousness of God. In keeping with the 
relational nature of religious consciousness, the history of God is always simultaneously 
a history of man’s elevation to God and of God’s descension into the world. What is most 
important for our immediate purposes, however, is simply the fact of religious 
consciousness, i.e. the fact of our immediate relation to God prior to any acquired 
religious experience. It is entirely normal, for Hegel even more so than for Hölderlin, to 
know that God exists without being able to assert anything about God. For Hegel, this 
state of proto-knowledge is “faith.” 
But who or what is Hegel’s God? It is difficult to give a pat answer to this 
question, since Hegel becomes rather gnomic when defining deity. God, he says, is a 
“universality having being in and for itself, outside me and independent of me” (134). 
(This language of “outside and independent of me” seems to contradict the notion of God 
as an immediate datum of consciousness, but it does not; God is immediate in 
consciousness, but in himself is self-contained and independent. God and our thinking 
about God do not yet know themselves to be the same thing.) God is “what is closed in 
itself” (das in sich Verschlossene) (117), or truth in a hermetic, abstract state. Hegel also 
calls God a “substance,” from which all distinction emerges and which persists in all 
distinction as its negation (121-122). Since it is intrinsically dynamic, this substance is 
not a “being” in the sense of a supersensible entity, but rather an “absolute actuality” 
(absolute Wirklichkeit) generating the ideas (including supersensible being) that 
constitute experience.2 God can negate himself through determination (Spinoza’s 
                                                 
2 See Hodgson’s introduction to the Lectures, p. 12. 
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determinatio est negatio) and then restore himself through a long and many-phased 
negation of the negation, which is the stuff of religious history. 
To make further headway into understanding Hegel’s God, we need to note that it 
is a Trinitarian God. (Things are never single or dual for Hegel, unless we continue on to 
a third moment uniting “one” and “two.”) The God given as a simple certainty in 
consciousness is the first aspect of the Trinitarian God, or God the Father. That same God 
is determined in the world—through mythology, theology, philosophy, worship—and this 
is God’s second aspect, or God the Son. Finally, God reveals himself as the process of 
self-determination, and in this revelation becomes the unity of the process, the negation 
of the negation, the return of the Son into the Father. This process is Spirit. 
It is important to understand this process for two reasons. First, it shows us that 
Spirit is the highest God-term. The “God” given immediately in consciousness is only the 
first moment of Spirit, the moment of the Father. Spirit is “God” and more than “God”; it 
is the full reality of the Godhead. Keeping this in mind helps avoid terminological and 
conceptual confusion. Second, it shows us that Spirit is a process (not a product) of 
thought. God is determined through human thinking about God, until thinking finally 
comes to understand itself to be the very life of God, i.e. to be Spirit.  
God, then, is born in and through the thought of God. God is not created in the 
image of man so much as in man (even though the concept “God” places him “outside me 
and independent of me”—at least initially). God is not so much “substance,” as Spinoza 
would say, but rather “spirit” (Geist), just as our mind (Geist) is spirit. God and mind are 
the same stuff: 
the highest or religious content discloses itself to the human being in the spirit 
itself, that spirit manifests itself in spirit, in this my own spirit, that faith has its 
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root in my inmost core is inseparable from it.... The impetus can certainly come 
from without, but the external origin is unimportant. That I believe is due to the 
witness of my own spirit. (86-87) 
 
In this passage Hegel starts off with two semantically distinct things—“the highest 
religious content” (God) and “the human being” (myself)—only to elide the difference by 
substituting both terms with the same word: spirit and spirit. It is hard not to think that 
Hegel has molded metaphysical reality to fit the epistemological faculty: God is spirit 
because we are spirit and know spiritually.3 Hegel gives a fleeting acknowledgment to the 
possibility of an “impetus” to faith “from without”—i.e. the possibility that God is (also?) 
other than spirit—but then immediately bars this passage to transcendence by stating that 
the external origin is “unimportant.”4 The divine spirit conforms perfectly—too perfectly, 
one suspects—to my own spirit, and the witness of God becomes indistinguishable from 
the “witness of my own spirit.” 
Because thinking about God and the being of God are the same thing, Hegel can 
collapse the distinction between belief and knowledge: 
Faith is set in opposition to knowledge, but this is a vacuous antithesis because 
what I believe, I also know—it is a content in my consciousness. Knowledge is 
the universal, whereas belief is only a part of knowledge. If I believe in God, then 
God is in my consciousness, and I also know that God is. (135; my emphasis) 
                                                 
3 The convergence of God and human thought lies near the heart of the so-called “Spinoza-Streit” that 
erupted with Jacobi’s Über die Lehre des Spinoza in Briefen an den Herrn Moses Mendelssohn (1785), a 
work that profoundly influenced an entire generation of German intellectuals. In Spinoza’s philosophy, 
thought (like “extension”) is an “attribute” of God, with the consequence that our thinking will never be 
anything other than an expression of God. Conversely, God (at least in his intellectual aspect) will never be 
otherwise than our thinking, although we may have to order our thoughts before this becomes apparent. 
The important point for our purposes is that Spinoza sets the precedent for Hegel’s identification of God 
and mind. In Jacobi’s Briefe, see especially pp. 128-157 (1st ed). 
 
4 This half-hearted openness to positive revelation (i.e. the intervention of an extramundane divinity into 
finite history) is a common feature of romantic-age thinkers. Fichte’s Versuch einer Kritik aller 
Offenbarung (1792), as we will see in the next chapter, is a protracted exercise in making a space a priori 
for positive revelation, while at the same time dictating that nothing can be gotten from revelation that 
cannot be gotten directly from reason. Similar ambivalence is found in Kant, Coleridge, and other religious 
thinkers of the period. 
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Although he does not actually say it in this passage, Hegel unavoidably gives the 
impression that it is impossible not to believe in God. Believing in God and having God 
in my consciousness seem to be equated, and we can flip Hegel’s formula around without 
significantly altering its meaning: “If God is in my consciousness, then I believe in God, 
and I also know that God is.” Since it does not seem possible for God not to be in 
consciousness—God, we remember, is one of the two certainties—it is not possible not to 
believe in and know God. This rather startling theology that categorically rules out 
agnosticism and atheism can only obtain, however, when God is a subject, and not just 
any subject—he must be the transcendental subject, i.e. the very life and movement of all 
consciousness.  
If God is the transcendental subject dwelling in all empirical subjects, what is the 
point of religion? Can it give us anything? We already have God within us. Hegel 
believes (and here he opposes himself to the “theology of immediacy” in Jacobi and 
Schleiermacher) that our certainty of God is only the beginning of religion. The challenge 
in religion is the same as the challenge in philosophy: to analyze and understand—to 
“think”—what we know only immediately. A philosophy of religion knows that God is 
an unactualized unity, which must be realized through division and reconciliation, a 
subjective movement carried out by thinking. Without moving on to a concrete cognition 
of God, the vague feelings associated with religious certainty would scarcely serve to 
distinguish us from animals. Hegel states that “if human religion grounds itself in a 
feeling, then the best Christian would be a dog...the dog also knows the feelings of 
salvation, when his hunger is satisfied with a bone.”5 Thus religion does not consist in a 
                                                 
5 Quoted in Franz Wiedmann, Hegel (Reinbek: Rowohlt, 1999), p.74. My translation. 
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mystical certainty of God’s existence, but in the demonstration, elaboration, and 
concretization of this existence in thought. 
Since thought plays the central role in the progress of religion, it is not surprising 
that Hegel regards religion and philosophy as mutually implicated if not identical: 
The object of religion, like that of philosophy, is the eternal truth, God and 
nothing but God and the explication of god. Philosophy is only explicating itself 
when it explicates religion, and when it explicates itself it is explicating religion. 
For the thinking spirit is what penetrates this object, the truth.... (79) 
 
The “thinking spirit” is the real focus of both religion and philosophy, and it is in such 
thinking (if we can anticipate the trajectory of Hegel’s philosophy) that divine spirit and 
human spirit eventually lose their distinction. God and human consciousness eventually 
merge into the selfsame thing. “[Divine] spirit manifesting itself in [human] spirit” 
becomes “Spirit”—a single entity—engaged in self-reflection. 
One final point worth making is that our knowledge of God (beyond our 
experience of his immediacy) is “speculative.” By speculative I mean that it is not made 
up of Kantian judgments, nor is it like a Kantian idea of reason, such as “infinity.” God 
cannot be known in either of these ways (i.e. as the object of judgment or a Kantian idea), 
because God is a process whereby what is in concrete opposition rises to an abstract 
unity.6 After the unity has been established, it can be subjected to reflection and analysis, 
but the unity itself cannot be discovered by reflection and analysis. This requires a 
spiritual faculty, which we know as religious, aesthetic, or philosophical “sense.” God is 
                                                 
 
6 Or rather Spirit is this process, and God comes to be understood as Spirit. The definition of God as the “in 
sich Verschlossene” I cited earlier is the understanding of God in primitive religion. This is the “Father” 
element of the triune God. The “Spirit” is the final and truest aspect of the triune God ushered into human 
history by the “ascension” of Christ, and Hegel uses the name of this third aspect to designate the whole, 
because it is the comprehensive aspect of God, the reconciliation of the Father and the Son. 
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an “identity in difference,” which can only be intuitively felt, not seen.7 The value of 
speculative philosophy is that it allows us to talk about the historical development of the 
mind, while Kant’s critical philosophy (to pick a prominent counter-example) must 
attribute the same mind to all people in all times and places. Hegel’s speculative 
philosophy not only allows us to think historically, but in fact requires us to do so, so that 
we can “see” the emergence of Spirit over time and thereby justify philosophy’s 
presupposition of Spirit. Strictly speaking, this justification is complete only when Spirit 
reaches the end of its development, and we can verify that all parts of human 
development fit into the logic of Spirit. Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit aspires to be 
precisely as this kind of completion and verification. 
 
Hegel and Hölderlin 
 
Now it is time to see close up how Hölderlin’s notion of God compares with Hegel’s. To 
begin, let us look at a subtle but significant phenomenological difference. In Hegel’s 
view of religion, God is a simple certainty that rests in itself. Thought, to be sure, “is the 
locus of this universal, but, to begin with, this locus is absorbed in the One, the eternal” 
(121). It is important to note that thought is “absorbed” in God, and religion only begins 
when thought pulls away from God and puts distance between itself and its object. Only 
through this mediating distance can God possibly begin to manifest itself. This pulling 
away is always already accomplished before we can notice it, since religion is by 
definition (for Hegel) a consciousness of God, i.e. the relation of a subject to an object. 
                                                 
7 See Hodgson’s introduction to Lectures, p. 63. 
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Thus “immediacy itself,” Hegel says, “is essentially mediated” (157). Religion thus 
begins in the movement of thought away from God, so that it can then return to God as 
prayer, mythology, theology, or some other form of religious thinking. This separation 
from God enabling religious consciousness has not been imposed on the human spirit in 
the manner of a divine judgment; rather, thought has alienated itself from absolute 
universality through its own power. Because consciousness moves away from God, and 
not vice versa, the human spirit controls this separation making it a relation to God rather 
than a break with God. “The true or the divine,” Hegel tells us, “does not get lost” (213). 
 I do not want to misrepresent Hölderlin by denying any similarity with Hegel’s 
self-caused alienation and reunification with God. I think that the elegy “Der Wanderer,” 
for example, is amenable to such a reading. The “wandering” alluded to in the title of the 
poem is the poet’s journey away from his home to look in distant lands for signs of God. 
The poet learns that God cannot be found outside of the self and returns home. When he 
arrives home, however, things have undergone a subtle change. The intervening death of 
his parents and the estrangement of his friends afflict him with a feeling of isolation and 
sorrow. Nevertheless, the elegy does not end sorrowfully. The loss of his loved ones 
becomes a religious victory as the poet discovers that love does not perish with the love 
object. Love is grounded in the higher reality of universal spirit, a truth that the poet 
understands only through the disappearance of his loved ones: 
  Ich dünk ihnen gestorben, sie mir. 
Und so bin ich allein. Du aber, über den Wolken, 
   Vater des Vaterlands! mächtiger Aether! und du 
Erd und Licht! ihr einigen drei, die walten und lieben, 
   Ewige Götter! mit euch brechen die Bande mir nie. 
Ausgegangen von euch, mit euch auch bin ich gewandert, 
   Euch, ihr Freudigen, euch bring ich erfahrener zurück. 
(StA 2,1: 83) 
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The poet recognizes that the union he had felt amongst family and friends is not 
abolished with the loss of those persons, because unity is a principle that goes deeper than 
any particular unity. By “negating” a particular love attachment, he is able to “elevate” 
himself to love as a universal or “ethereal” substance. This elevation through negation of 
the particular is a very “Hegelian” move, even if it does not, in this specific case, result in 
the highest religious consciousness, in which case God would come down from the 
“aether” and dwell inside of man.  
 Poetry, however, is art, and art is a form of play even when it is most serious. The 
Hegelian pattern adhered to in one poem can be subverted in the next. Often, the poet 
does not advance in his knowledge of God by pulling away from God. Rather, the divine 
often comes to mankind from without, and reveals itself only in passing. 
...nicht geweissagt war es, sondern 
Die Locken ergriff es, gegenwärtig, 
Wenn ihnen plötzlich 
Ferneilend zurück blickte 
Der Gott... 
(StA 2,1: 169) 
In this process, the human spirit is passive. This sudden divine seizure (Griff) of the 
subject cannot be brought about or “foretold” (geweissagt) by any intentional activity, 
such as reflection. We may long for God, but we cannot force his hand; we must await 
him. All of the poet’s efforts to precipitate a revelation of the divine come to naught 
leaving the poet to wonder (as in “Brod und Wein”) “wozu Dichter in dürftiger Zeit,” and 
feel it would be “better to sleep” until the gods come. When the gods do come, the 
experience is registered physically: “die Locken ergriff es, gegenwärtig.” A physical 
experience is far more dependent on the external and contingent than a reflective or 
“spiritual” experience. This is a crucial difference from Hegel, for whom religious 
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experience is primarily intellectual. Hölderlin’s physical experience of God is sudden and 
discontinuous, while Hegel’s intellectual experience of God is dialectical and integral. In 
a dialectic there may be dramatic moments of negation, but the “before” and “after” of 
such moments are logically unified. All dialectical experience is therefore a single 
experience without irruption from or into the outside. The outside plays a minor role in 
idealism.8 For Hölderlin, the outside plays a central role in the problem of religion, and it 
is often associated with sensory reality, which in effect keeps knocking the progress of 
Spirit back to ground zero. (“Sense-certainty” is the beginning of consciousness in the 
Phenomenology). The gods do not behave as they should. They do not fit our rational 
conceptions of religion. They come and go when and how they will, and this can result in 
something unrepresentable: “niemand weiß, von wannen und was einem geschiehet von 
ihr.”   
The dark side of this dependence on the contingency of the outside is best 
expressed in one of Hölderlin’s poems that makes no mention of God at all. The first 
stanza of “Hälfte des Lebens” presents an exquisite image of “yellow pears,” “wild 
roses,” and “sacred swans” leaning into a sea of “the holy-sober water” (heilignüchternes 
Wasser). The second half of the poem shifts tone abruptly: 
Weh mir, wo nehm ich, wenn 
Es Winter ist, die Blumen, und wo 
Den Sonnenschein, 
                                                 
8 Minor, but not unimportant. Fichte stumbles up against an outside “check” (Anstoß) to the Ich in his 
Wissenschaftslehre, which is necessary in order to turn the Ich back on itself and bring about self-
consciousness. He cannot say anything more about this “check,” and so he does not dwell on it. The 
material world continues to serve as a “check” to the subject throughout idealist philosophy, but never 
presents anything of consequence that cannot be assimilated by the subject into its own rational terms. The 
meaning of the dialectic is that the outside can always be conformed to the inside. (Another possibility is 
that the outside and inside can be conformed to something beyond them both: the absolute.) In this respect, 
Hölderlin—for whom the outside can resist the inside, or at the other extreme seize upon it—parts ways 
with idealism. 
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Und Schatten der Erde? 
Die Mauern stehn 
Sprachlos und kalt, im Winde 
Klirren die Fahnen. 
(StA 2,1: 117) 
This poem is unusual for Hölderlin, since it only makes a single shift from bliss to 
despair. It marks, as Eric Santner explains, a loss of Hölderlin’s signature “narrative 
vigilance” (i.e. the commitment to a dialectical narrative of redemption) in the face of a 
paratactic experience of the world (84). Instead of a series of oppositions and attempted 
reconciliations, this poem has only one opposition—moving tragically from good to 
bad—without the slightest hint of reconciliation. We should not make too much of the 
pessimistic thrust of this poem, since other short poems (e.g. “Der Winkel von Hardt”) 
conclude on a very different note. But “Hälfte des Lebens” unquestionably represents a 
problem that is at least latent or potential in all of Hölderlin’s work: “wo nehm ich, wenn 
es Winter ist, die Blumen?” This is a temporal problem. Just as life changes with the 
march of the seasons, so does the divine come and go according to some external, non-
human temporality. The divine can be lost. The poet’s ability to capture the divine 
remains—“wo nehme ich”—but sometimes (in “winter”) there is nothing to be captured. 
For Hegel this could never be a problem, since Spirit only ever “takes” (nehmen) what it 
is has given in the first place; it invests the world with its own inner truth, and then 
reclaims what it has given. God is an existential certainty. There is no radical risk here. 
Not so in Hölderlin, for whom the divine comes (by grace? by chance?) as an intrusion 
into the interior. 
In order to see this extrinsic divine at work in greater detail, let us spend some 
time with the elegy “Brod und Wein.” In the opening stanza, the poet stands outside the 
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city observing the fall of night. The commotion of day gradually disappears, and the 
particular fades into a universal calmness. The poem’s focus begins in the empty 
marketplace and trails off into the distance along several paths: he catches the sound of 
music in distant gardens, he contemplates the image of a lone man lost in memory, he 
gazes at the wonders of the night sky. The religious significance of this contemplative 
movement is evident from the description of the night as the “Erstaunende...[die] 
Hocherhabene[, die] bewegt...die Welt und die hoffende Seele der Menschen.” By 
design, this stanza is a gradual elevation from the human to the divine, which in Hegelian 
terms would be a movement from the determinate to the universal. At the site of the 
universal, however, we find strangeness: “die Nacht kommt, / Voll mit Sternen und wohl 
wenig bekümmert um uns, / Glänzt die Ertaunende dort, die Fremdlingin under den 
Menschen” (my emphasis). The poet is “elevating” himself up to God, as Hegel would 
put it, but all he finds is strangeness. Why? 
 This strangeness occurs because Hölderlin’s God is not in the same place as 
Hegel’s God. Hegel says that God is an immediate certainty of consciousness, an 
“empirical datum,” and thoughtful introspection should be able to reveal this to us. When 
Hölderlin turns inward, however, he finds the negative pull of desire rather than the 
positive kernel of the absolute. The first six lines of “Brod und Wein” represent a 
movement toward mental quietude: “Rings um ruhet die Stadt,” “Satt gehn heim...zu 
ruhen die Menschen,” “ruht der geschäftige Markt.” This quieting of the spirit heightens 
the poet’s attentiveness to perception: the sounds of departing wagons, the stillness of the 
marketplace, the faint music of strings, the sound of a fountain, the wind in the trees, the 
brightness of the moon. All of these perceptions are unified precisely as perceptions, they 
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are all equally ambiguous and yet pregnant with meaning. Along with this unreflected 
sensual unity, there should, for Hegel, also be an unreflected spiritual unity, a feeling that 
everything shares a common being in God. Hölderlin’s poem never finds this foundation, 
however, and instead gives us images of emptiness. At first this emptiness is external: 
“rauschen die Wagen hinweg,” “leer steht von Trauben und Blumen...der Markt.” 
External emptiness forces the poem to turn inward, but in the human interior there is even 
more emptiness. We are confronted with images of transience and nostalgia, in which the 
truth is always elsewhere or “elsewhen”:  
Aber das Saitenspiel tönt fern aus Gärten; vielleicht, daß 
   Dort ein Liebendes spielt oder ein einsamer Mann 
Ferner Freunde gedenkt und der Jugendzeit... 
(StA 2,1: 90) 
The image of the Saitenspiel represents music, an object that cannot be apprehended as a 
whole because of its temporal distension. Music can only be appreciated by waiting it 
out, and the end of music is only the end—it is not an accumulation of the whole. 
Likewise, Hölderlin’s meditative withdrawal into stillness does not lead him back to 
some immediate concept of God as much as to a stream of religious desire and memory. 
God is something that comes to us from the past or is yet to come in the future: “Dorther 
kommt und zurück deutet der kommende Gott.” There is no real stillness, no timeless 
unity on which the movement of thought and feeling comes to rest, but only traces of this 
unity leading away beyond our temporal horizon. God is not a place immediately given in 
consciousness, but rather a place into which consciousness fades, a past where the divine 
once was. God is a trace of certainty, a trailing away into a previous or future 
knowledge. This is not an atheistic absence, since the trace—the memory, the desire—is 
a real connection. It is found to exist precisely in the quietude where we anticipated the 
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divine. This trace, which is a flowing away from the divine and a flowing toward it, an 
absence-toward-presence and a presence-toward-absence, is represented by the image of 
the spring: “und die Brunnen / Immerquillend und frisch rauschen an duftendem Beet.” 
The spring is a place of origin, but all we get from the spring is a flowing, a movement 
that has left the origin. The primal is lost, but only because it is always flowing towards 
us or away from us. Such a loss is an epistemological burden, but not a metaphysical 
tragedy (like the Winter in “Hälfte des Lebens”). 
 The divine is a receding into the past or future, but it can also fix itself squarely in 
the present. The next two lines of the stanza introduce a subtle tension in the temporal 
fabric of the lyric: 
Still in dämmriger Luft ertönen geläutete Glocken, 
   Und der Stunden gedenk rufet ein Wächter die Zahl. 
(StA 2,1: 90) 
The “still” ringing (“Still...ertönen”) of the bells at twilight points to arrestment of time in 
quietude, while the cry of the time-conscious watchman (“der Studenden gedenk”) 
suggests the intrusion of time into quietude. We thus have a gentle shift from the 
suspension of time to the awareness of time. This awareness (captured by the deliberate 
zahlen implicit in “die Zahl”) intrudes on consciousness precisely as consciousness is 
losing itself in the still abyss of time. 
This is important because the mind was not losing itself in time for lack of 
anything better to do. It was tracking something primal: a past happiness amongst “ferner 
Freunde,” a hidden joy of “Jugendzeit,” the heart of “ein Liebendes,” the subteranean 
source of “die Brunnen / Immerquillend.” This constellation of distant and forgotten 
realities creates the “stillness” of time, its gentle sinking back to “time zero,” which is 
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reached in line eleven with the “still” ringing of the church bells. And they are almost 
certainly church bells that ring, making this beginning time also a sacred time. For 
countless religious traditions, sacred time is the time of the founding of the world, which 
unlike linear time can be accessed again and again through ritual or other means.9 In 
“Brod und Wein,” sacred time is accessed through a meditative withdrawal from the 
external world into distant memories and feelings. What makes this passage extraordinary 
is the sudden emergence in the conscious present of the sacred thing being sought in 
consciousness’s primal past. The divine slips in through the backdoor, as it were. With 
his face turned, the poet does not see the divine. He only feels its presence as a breeze 
against his skin:  
Jetzt auch kommet ein Wehn und regt die Gipfel des Hains auf, 
   Sieh! und das Schattenbild unserer Erde, der Mond, 
Kommet geheim nun auch; die Schwärmerische, die Nacht kommt,... 
(StA 2,1: 90) 
The image of wind here is profoundly important. Rather than finding the divine 
already within consciousness, the poet suddenly perceives it “blowing into” 
consciousness as a new experience. This experience is a movement (wehen), but it is not 
a Hegelian movement. It is not like the movement of spirit out of itself in order to reflect 
on itself. On the contrary, thought remains passive, and the divine enters consciousness 
from somewhere else as if by its own volition. This externality of the divine is 
emphasized in the metaphor: a breeze only moves external, natural objects (e.g. “die 
Gipfel des Hains”) and stops at the human skin, the barrier to the “inner” space housing 
the spirit.  
                                                 
9 See Mircea Eliade, The Sacred and the Profane: The Nature of Religion (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 
1959). 
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There is something distinctly Biblical about this image of the breeze: “The wind 
blows where it chooses, and you hear the sound of it, but you do not know where it 
comes from or where it goes. So it is with everyone who is born of the Spirit” (John 3:8); 
“When the day of Pentecost had come, they were all together in one place. And suddenly 
from heaven there came a sound like the rush of a violent wind, and it filled the entire 
house where they were sitting” (Acts 2:1-2). The Holy Spirit is likewise an external spirit 
that moves past us or penetrates us, and thus testifies to God’s difference from our spirit. 
In Hegel, by contrast, the knowledge of God is a movement within an interior system; it 
is not a negotiation between inside and outside: It is “inwardly a movement,” as in 
Hölderlin, but it is my movement, my “elevation to God.” This elevation is a mental 
process, a “passing over from one content to another,” by which “we relate ourselves to 
the absolute, infinite content” (162, my emphasis). 
Let us pause briefly in our reading of “Brod und Wein” to consider how the 
emerging difference between Hegel’s internal and Hölderlin’s external divine relate to 
theological notions of God. We have already seen how Hegel’s embraces (with 
adaptation) the idea of a divine Trinity, since it allows him to subsume human spirit and 
divine spirit under a third head: Spirit (with a capital “s”). Human spirit and divine spirit 
are merely two “moments” of spirit in general. There is no fundamental difference 
plaguing the relation between heaven and earth. 
This Trinitarian model is metaphysically and epistemologically neat and leaves no 
mess, since everything communicates so nicely: 
The highest or religious content discloses itself to the human being in the spirit 
itself, that spirit manifests itself in spirit, in this my own spirit; that faith has its 
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root in the inner self or in what is most my own, that my inmost core is 
inseparable from it.” (86)10 
 
God, my spirit, and the testifying spirit all blur into one. This Trinitarian monism may be 
the result of Hegel succumbing to a convenient epistemological circularity: God is in the 
form of my own spirit, because it is my own spirit that knows God. My spirit consists of 
“certainties” and thoughts, therefore God exists as certainty and thought. If God were not 
in these forms, there would be no God for me to talk about. In keeping with this 
epistemological circularity, Hegel defines religion as the “connection in general” between 
the immediate certainty of God and the “inseparability of consciousness from this 
content” (88), i.e. God is my thinking about the certainty of God. The story of religion is 
the story of how this “connection” or thinking about God evolves over several thousand 
years from primitive nature-religion to Christianity. It is not surprising when Hegel 
finally tells us that the human and the divine are the same spirit (or Spirit), because the 
subject matter of religion is not the dealings of God with men, but rather our thinking 
about God. Thinking about God is the entire matter of religion, and eventually Hegel 
reveals to us that thinking is God, as long as we understand God in the active, progressive 
sense of Spirit.  
At first glance, certain passages in Hölderlin seem to suggest a similar 
epistemological circularity, in which the divine can only exist in and as the normal forms 
of human spirit. For example, “Der Rhein” speaks of the gods being inert unless they can 
feel through a human being: 
Es haben aber an eigner 
                                                 
10 Hegel is invoking Jacobi and Schleiermacher here, who argue for a religious faculty that gives us divine 
knowledge directly. Hegel criticizes these writers, but not on this point. He only faults their failure to move 
beyond immediate religious intuition and consider the role of reflection in religious knowledge. 
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Unsterblichkeit die Götter genug, und bedürfen 
Die Himmlischen eines Dings, 
So sinds Heroen und Menschen 
Und Sterbliche sonst. Denn weil 
Die Seligsten nichts fühlen von selbst, 
Muß wohl, wenn solches zu sagen 
Erlaubt ist, in der Götter Namen 
Teilnehmend fühlen ein Anderer... 
This image of the gods feeling through human beings suggests that the gods can only 
exist within the human and as the human, similar to what Hegel suggests. But the lines 
that immediately follow make it clear that the human spirit and the divine spirit are not 
two pieces of the same, since the gods mean death to mortals: 
  ...jedoch ihr Gericht 
Ist, daß sein eigenes Haus 
Zerbreche der und das Liebste 
Wie den Feind schelt und sich Vater und Kind 
Begrabe unter den Trümmern... 
(StA 2,1: 145) 
With this image of Oedipal self-destruction, Hölderlin counters the Hegelian idea that 
thinking about God and the being of God are the same. Religion must be more than our 
thinking about God, since no amount of religious thinking would drive a man to “break 
his own house” and “bury father and child.” The divine must include something other 
than what my consciousness contains. The divine is represented as a power that 
overpowers self-interest (and thinking is always self-interested). The evidence of 
transcendence often comes the form of tragedy and death, since these most conflict with 
human interests and thereby suggest the intervention of an external power. 
If we return now to “Brod und Wein,” we see once again this dissimilarity 
between the divine and the human, although in this case it produces estrangement rather 
than death. 
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    Zwar leben die Götter, 
   Aber über dem Haupt droben in anderer Welt. 
Endlos wirken sie da und scheinens wenig zu achten, 
   Ob wir leben, so sehr schonen die Himmlischen uns. 
(StA 2,1: 93) 
Ironically, this incompatibility of the divine and the human becomes a ground of relation 
between them. The gods show their compassion for men by withholding their destructive 
presence—“so sehr schonen die Himmlischen uns.” We see this idea repeated in 
“Friedensfeier.” 
Auch wär uns, sparte der Gebende nicht, 
Schon längst vom Segen des Herds 
Uns Gipfel und Boden entzündet. 
(MA 1: 363) 
The divine must exercise restraint, which means that the divine must be a distinct agency 
separate from the human, and the divine-human relation must be represented with an 
ethical dimension. The divine must be considerate of humanity, and revelation must be 
mercifully measured and adapted to human capacities. In turn, the human attitude toward 
the divine must be one of supplication and gratitude.  
Vieles bat ich, zu lieb dem Vaterlande, damit nicht 
   Ungebeten uns einst plötzlich befiele der Geist. 
(“Heimkunft,” StA 2,1: 97) 
This ethical relation between God and man is more like a simple monotheism than a 
Hegelian Trinitarianism, because it does not have a mediating power that merges the 
identity of human spirit and divine spirit. If there were a merging, identifying power, 
there would be no ethical relation, because there would only be one agent (Spirit) having 
a self-relation. But Hölderlin sticks with two agencies. He knows there is more than just 
the human spirit, but he is not willing to let the human spirit be “absorbed” into a 
Trinitarian spirit, which in effect collapses everything back into a spiritual monism. 
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Hölderlin is not a spiritual monist. He wants God and the soul (or the lyrical subject), and 
he does not want to blur the distinction through some transcendental process of self-
relation. Thus in Hölderlin’s metaphorics, God himself is the “wind” that “blows where it 
chooses”; the wind is not the Holy Spirit of Self-Relation blustering dialectically about. 
Similarly, God does not “pour himself into our hearts through the Holy Spirit” (Rom. 
5:5), which would erase the ontological distinction between the human and divine spirit. 
He does not “pour into” or “dwell in” us, but touches us from without. He interacts with 
the world; he does not engulf it. 
In summary, the path to the divine in Hölderlin is a double one. It can be found as 
a vanishing point on the horizon of contemplative consciousness; or it can be found in the 
spontaneity of the present, in which the divine can physically announce itself as the 
external God. Either scenario is fundamentally dissimilar to Hegel’s characterization of 
religious consciousness. At the root of consciousness, Hegel finds an innate certainty (not 
a vanishing point) that he calls God. The Hegelian “encounter” with God is really a self-
encounter of the thinking spirit. This self-encounter may not initially know itself to be a 
self-encounter, but eventually it will. This transition from encounter to self-encounter 
never occurs in Hölderlin. The poet’s encounter with God brings to light an entrenched 
spiritual dualism (divine spirit and human spirit without a third term), and because of this 
dualism it becomes possible to speak of an ethical dimension (Dank, Schonen, Bitten, 
etc.) in the human-divine relation. In Hegel, by contrast, the divine encounter is a 
monistic self-reflection lacking the very possibility of an ethical dimension.  
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Divine History and the Lyrical Subject 
 
In comparing Hölderlin to Hegel, I have thus far focused on a religious phenomenology 
of individual consciousness. I have suggested that the divine itself is generally not 
immediate, but only a trace leading off into the past or future. Sometimes the divine is 
immediate, but then only as something extrinsic introduced into consciousness. It is 
important to acknowledge, however, that Hölderlin goes beyond the realm of individual 
consciousness in his search for the divine. Indeed, he seems most hopeful when looking 
for it in the collective experience of human history, because the gods—so the poet 
believes—operate on a scale matched only by the broad sweep of history: “Groß ist ihr 
Maß, es mißt gern mit der Spanne der Mensch.” History provides a means of “zooming 
out” in order to view the larger “measure” of the divine. It is the poet’s hope that this 
“bigger picture” will reveal a recognizable, rational pattern, i.e. something that looks like 
knowledge. 
 In taking this historical view, the poet is not on the lookout for just any pattern, 
since pattern alone cannot be evidence of the divine. For example, if we see history as a 
recurrent cycle, this does not show us the hand of God as much as the hand of nature. A 
divinity that is distinct from nature will likely carry some form of subjectivity. Hölderlin 
thus tends toward the subjectivist stance in the “Spinoza-Streit” in late 18th-century 
Germany, which was essentially a debate whether the highest truth was, in Schelling’s 
terms, an “absolute subject” (the position of German idealism) or an “absolute object” 
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(the neo-Spinozan position defended by Herder).11 Was God “self” or “substance”? 
Hegel, we know, viewed God (or rather “Spirit”) as subject, and defined what he means 
by “subject” through the symbol of the Trinity. The Trinitarian God realizes himself by 
moving out of himself and then reconciling the outer and the inner selves. The pattern: 
unity—division—reconciliation is the meaning of Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, 
respectively. By moving out of himself and returning to himself, God accomplishes two 
things: first, he imprints himself on the world (thereby bringing divinity into the world) 
and second, he comes to know himself. Just like all subjects do on some level, God is 
always testifying of himself to himself and thus becomes ever more self-knowing.12 
Accordingly, when the poet turns to history, he should see more than just the fixed 
dualities of nature: matter and energy, birth and death, unity and division, attraction and 
repulsion, etc. He should also see the ongoing self-relation, self-knowing, and self-
consciousness of a divine subject. 
Let us consider more precisely just how the Hegelian divinity reveals itself to 
itself, since this will give us something concrete to look for in Hölderlin. Hegel says that 
in accordance with its subjective character, Spirit must express itself “for itself.” The 
only way to bring about this self-expression is for Spirit to divide itself, which is just 
what the duality of God and man represents. Human consciousness is the “othering” of 
                                                 
11 For a history of late German Enlightenment thought structured around the Spinoza-Streit, see Frederick 
Beiser, The Fate of Reason: German Philosophy From Kant to Fichte (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard UP, 
1987). 
 
12 This subjective pattern is especially evident in a Trinitarian reading of the Gospel of John, where God is 
one (“Whoever has seen me has seen the Father. How can you say, ‘Show us the Father’? Do you not 
believe that I am in the Father and the Father is in me? [14:9-10]), and yet constantly testifies of himself to 
himself in order to fully be himself: “the Father who sent me has himself testified on my behalf” (5:37); 
“when the Advocate come, whom I will send to you from the Father, the Spirit of truth who comes from the 
Father, he will testify on my behalf” (15: 26); “I have made your name known to those whom you gave me 
from the world” (17:6). 
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Spirit from itself in order to know itself. Spirit knows itself as Spirit (and thereby 
confirms its subjectivity) when it is known as Spirit by human consciousness, because 
human consciousness is a moment in Spirit itself. Put more simply, when human beings 
know themselves as Spirit, Spirit is reconciled with itself. Of course it is only at the end 
of the reconciliation process—or the end of history as we know it—that the identity of 
the human and the divine can be recognized and verified. This end point of history, it 
turns out, is philosophized Christianity, i.e. a Christianity that posits God as man (Jesus) 
and man as God (via the Holy Ghost and the Church), and that most importantly 
understands these “crossovers” as a single, unified movement of Spirit. Instead of 
thinking about the soul and God, as theology does, philosophized Christianity thinks 
about the soul as (the self-reflection of) God. The soul becomes the site of divine self-
consciousness. 
The development of religion toward divine self-consciousness is a slow one. 
Hegel’s analysis of religious history covers thousands of years. Consequently, it is really 
only in the succession of nations and cultures that we can see God and man progressing 
toward reconciliation. It would thus be more accurate to speak of the collective soul (e.g. 
of a nation) as the site of divine self-consciousness. Religiously, the individual is a 
product of his or her time, and relies on culture for its relation to God. Until, that is, we 
reach the end of history. 
Religious history terminates in the moment of philosophical Christian 
consciousness, when we replace the replace the dualistic mythology of God and the soul 
with the monistic mythology of Spirit. Religious history comes to an end because the 
Christian community and God have become indistinguishable. In this millennial moment, 
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the difference between the slow crawl of history and the brief span of human life is 
overcome as an epistemological obstacle to knowing God, because now we are God. Or 
more precisely, God and man together are Spirit. God is reconciled to man in man’s own 
spirit, because God’s spirit and man’s spirit are the same spirit: Geist. They are two 
moments of the same thing. With this insight, Hegel opens the gate to the New Jerusalem, 
where the saints “reign for ever and ever” with God (see Rev. 22:4-5). There is little or 
no distinction between the power of God and the power of man because God is fully in 
man and man is fully in God. The one is inert and unthinkable without the other. 
 Let us make the historiographic significance of the theology of Spirit very clear. If 
my self-awareness as a Christian is the same thing as Spirit’s self-consciousness, then I 
am in an extremely good position when it comes to the task of identifying God in history. 
I know what God is because I am a moment in the triune God, and I can therefore 
recognize God’s self-emergence wherever I look for it. It is, after all, my self-emergence 
as well. The whole of history will be a single progression toward the self-conscious triune 
God, the God-man, which I, the self-aware Christian, am. From this standpoint, self-
analysis and historical analysis are identical endeavors. We do not turn to history to 
discover whether there is a God at work in the world, but only how this God specifically 
manifested himself up until the present moment of full manifestation in myself. The 
(Hegelian) historian already knows where his history is taking him, and he knows 
(because God is a unified self-manifesting spirit) that everything in the past will 
contribute to establishing the present. The historian of the divine can thus proceed with 
metaphysical and epistemological confidence. Knowing God after Hegel is like finding 
one’s way through a maze with a bird’s eye view: seeing the beginning and end from the 
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outset, it is not too difficult—given a bit of trial and error—to find the single path that 
connects them. 
In the case of Hölderlin, we are seeing the maze from within the maze, which 
makes it far more difficult to navigate. Not seeing the end, we cannot even be sure there 
is one. We have already encountered the philosophical reason for this un-Hegelian 
blindness: the absence of a structure comparable to Spirit. For Hegel, my self and God’s 
self fall together in Spirit, and this is the enabling principle of Hegelian historiography. 
When there is no falling together of divine and human self, we lose personal access to the 
historical past, since it is no longer identical with our individual past via Spirit. We might 
say that the cost of lyric individualism—the “I” that can never disappear from poetry—is 
historical isolation. The lyrical “I” would have to yield itself up to the transcendental “I”, 
which can only be done in the impersonal idiom of philosophy. Even the late “hymns,” 
which according to Peter Szondi are impersonal praises of the gods,13 we find the feeling, 
confusion, and desire of the poetic individual: 
Halbgötter denk ich jetzt 
Und kennen muß ich die Teuern, 
Weil oft ihr Leben so 
Die sehnende Brust mir bewegt. 
(„Der Rhein,“ StA 2,1: 146) 
 
Was ist es, das 
An die alten seligen Küsten 
Mich fesselt, daß ich mehr noch 
Sie liebe, als mein Vaterland? 
(„Der Einzige,,“ StA 2,1: 153) 
 
Darum, ihr Gütigen! umgebet mich leicht, 
Damit ich bleiben möge, denn noch ist manches zu singen, 
Jetzt aber endiget, seligweining, 
                                                 
13 See “Der andere Pfeil: Zur Entstehungsgeschichte des hymnischen Spätstils,” in Hölderlin-Studien 
(Frankfurt a.M.: Insel, 1967). 
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Wie eine Sage der Liebe, 
Mir der Gesang, und so auch ist er 
Mir, mit Erröten, Erblassen, 
Von Anfang her gegangen. Doch alles geht so. 
(„Am Quell der Donau,“ StA 2,1: 129) 
 To be a lyrical self is to be an alienated self this side of heaven. The gods stir our 
“desiring breast” often (oft), which is to say they are not always with us in as Spirit. In 
the passage from “Am Quell der Donau,” we get a clear sense of a physical withdrawal, 
like the departure of a beloved (“wie eine Sage der Liebe”) leaving us physiologically 
disordered (“mit Erröten, Erblassen”). This physical language (“die sehnende Brust mir 
bewegt,” “mich fesselt,” “Erröten, Erblassen”) frequently accompanies the appearance of 
the lyrical “I” in Hölderlin’s longer poems. The work of reflective unification going on in 
the poem stops dead in its tracks before the flesh of the poet. The Gesang ends and takes 
its spiritual achievements with it as soon as the poet’s body asserts itself. The poet is left 
on the sidelines, and he may even feel (at least in Hölderlin’s early work) that it would be 
better to die with his song than to keep re-entering his unredeemed historical existence. 
Nur einen Sommer gönnt, ihr Gewaltigen! 
   Und einen Herbst zu reifem Gesange mir, 
      Daß williger mein Herz, vom süßen 
         Spiele gesättiget, dann mir sterbe. 
(“An die Parzen,” StA 1,1: 241) 
The image for the human-divine unity that Hölderlin desires is nature. We find a 
perfect image of divinely saturated nature in the opening stanza of “Mein Eigentum”: 
In seiner Fülle ruhet der Herbsttag nun, 
   Geläutert ist die Traub und der Hein ist rot 
      Vom Obst... 
(StA 1,1: 306) 
 79 
The vineyard and the orchard are physically impregnated with the power of the “Licht,” 
which is named two stanzas later. In stanza seven the poet identifies the poet’s spirit with 
the vegetable world, and the image of divine saturation suddenly disappears: 
Denn, wie die Pflanze, wurzelt auf eignem Grund 
   Sie nicht, verglüht die Seele des Sterblichen, 
      Der mit dem Tageslichte nur, ein 
         Armer, auf heiliger Erde wandelt. 
(StA 1,1: 307) 
Like a plant “auf eignem Grund...nicht” (which could mean the plant is either uprooted or 
planted in inhospitable soil), the soul withers away. It lives with the “Tageslicht” and 
perishes with nightfall. It wanders over the sacred earth (“auf heiliger Erde”) but does not 
put down roots. This wandering on the “sacred earth” is like Tantalus standing beneath 
the fruit trees in hell: the object of desire is constantly before us, but we can never make 
it our own. Confronted with an insatiable desire, the poet languishes (verglühen).  
 Hegel might respond to all this by saying that separation—like that between the 
divine and the human in Hölderlin—is an essential moment in Spirit. The universal is 
“negated” in the particular—it “dies,” in a sense—but this negation is only a stopping 
point on the circular journey back (on a more abstract level) to the source. Some kind of 
resurrection always follows on the heels of death. Death is always progressive. Hegel’s 
choice of natural metaphor—water—conveys this optimism. Like the plant, water can be 
broken down and in a sense “die.” But by decomposing it participates in higher life 
functions, like the formation of crystals or muscle fibers (128). We cease to recognize it 
as water, but only because it participates in a higher form of life. 
Hölderlin’s plant, however, perishes and does not go on to participate in some 
higher form of life. Hölderlin never takes any personal comfort in palingenesis. But in 
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“Mein Eigentum” he need not speculate on the post-mortem fate of his soul, because he is 
not yet dead. He is perishing ("verglüht") but has not perished, and while he perishes he 
wanders (“auf heiliger Erde wandelt”). The verb “wandeln” refers ambiguously back to 
both Pflanze and der Sterbliche—the metaphor and its referent—since “Tageslicht” in the 
third line implicitly extends the plant metaphor into the second half of the stanza. A 
“wandering” plant, needless to say, is an odd image. It suggests an unnatural intervention, 
the hand of a gardener who has torn the “human plant” from its natural place. Although 
he recognizes his organic affinity with the “heiliger Erde,” man has been uprooted. He is 
on the earth, but only in an unstable, ambulatory way. As a “plant,” he feels the organic 
need for the earth, but as a “wandering” plant, he finds himself oddly out-of-place. He is 
in Eden with his hands tied. 
Nevertheless, the poet tries his best to insert his individual experience into a 
divine narrative. A poem like “Brod und Wein” deals immediately with the relation of the 
divine to human history, but unfortunately everything happens over the head or under the 
feet of the individual. At most the divine brushes by or passes through the subject.  
Vater Aether! so riefs und flog von Zunge zu Zunge 
   Tausendfach, es ertrug keiner das Leben allein; 
Ausgeteilt erfreut solch Gut und getauschet, mit Fremden, 
   Wirds ein Jubel... 
(StA 2,1: 92) 
When the god reveals himself, it is unbearable. The divine must be diffused to thousands 
(Tausendfach) before it can benefit (erfreuen) the individual. The divine is a kinetic, 
physical power (“riefs,” “flog,” “ertrug”) until it passes beyond the individual into society 
(“ausgeteilt...und getauschet, mit Fremden”). Only then, as a collective experience, does 
it take on a rational character and become something recognizably positive (Gut). 
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Initially, however, the divine plunges us into Dionysian unconsciousness unlike any of 
the concrete states of consciousness generated by the dialectic of Spirit. 
Eventually, humanity does seem to come around to understanding and naming the 
divine gift: “es sorget mit Gaben / Selber ein Gott für ihn, kennet und sieht er es nicht. / 
Tragen muß er, zuvor; nun aber nennt er sein Liebstes.” Thus it would seem that after an 
initial shock, man is back on the Hegelian track toward divine self-recognition. But this is 
only an apparent progress. Humanity never comes to identify with the divine. What is 
gained in the moment of naming can also be lost. (Hegel, remember, said “the divine is 
never lost.”) We see this in the example of ancient Greece: 
Drum in der Gegenwart der himmlischen würdig zu stehen, 
   Richten in herrlichen Ordnungen Völker sich auf 
Untereinander und baun die schönen Tempel und Städte 
   Fest und edel, sie gehn über Gestaden empor— 
Aber wo sind sie? 
(StA 2,1: 93) 
The chosen people finally comes to know its gods, and rather than responding with 
“Dank”—the Hölderlin’s signature attitude toward the gods—it goes one step further. 
The Greeks wish to “stand worthily” in the presence of the gods. “Worthiness” is an 
ambiguous value. On one hand it suggests deference, but on the other it suggests a 
presumption to equality. In being “worthy” of something, our ultimate goal is to raise 
ourselves to its level and become like it. For Hegel this is entirely appropriate. This is just 
what Jesus Christ means: God becoming man and man becoming God. For Hölderlin, 
this self-deification latent in the idea of “worthiness” is hubris: “Fest und edel, sie gehn 
über die Gestaden empor.” Humans attempt to make the divine concrete through their 
own action. This is exactly what man should do in Hegel, but it is exactly what the gods 
will not abide in Hölderlin. 
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When the Greeks raise themselves to this height, the gods depart: “Aber wo sind 
sie?” This question occurs after an abrupt break in syntax marked by a dash. Hölderlin 
uses the dash very rarely, which makes it all the more symbolic of the metaphysical and 
epistemological rupture that occurs at this moment. This dash is not, as far as we can tell, 
a Hegelian negation, which will in turn be negated by some reconciliation. After the fall 
of Greece and after the death of Christ we do not enter the age of the Holy Spirit, where 
God is the universal-in-the-particular or particular-in-the-universal. Instead of God’s 
post-mortem reconciliation with man, Hölderlin gives us an abiding death, a genuine 
night in which one can only await the gods’ return: 
Indessen dünket es mir öfters 
   Besser zu schlafen, wie ohne Genossen zu sein, 
So zu harren, und was zu tun indes und zu sagen, 
   Weiß ich nicht.... 
(StA 2,1: 94) 
When the individual becomes tired of waiting and seeks the gods on his own 
initiative, he must look for them in this “night,” where man ceases to see altogether: 
Aber sie muß uns auch, daß in der zaudernden Weile, 
   Daß im Finstern für uns einiges Haltbare sei, 
Uns die Vergessenheit und das Heiligtrunkene gönnen, 
   Gönnen das strömende Wort... 
(StA 2,1: 91) 
If we are to receive and retain anything out of this divine darkness, it must pass through 
“forgetfulness” and “holy inebriation.” In these enthusiastic states, self-consciousness is 
once again lost, and the divine and the human are thus not reconciled, since the rational 
self is erased. What the gods give us (gönnen) is indeed the “good gift,” but we cannot 
receive it without sacrificing our identity. 
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Encompassing this moment of self-obliteration, however, is a state of special 
awareness from which “the streaming word” issues forth. This poetic “word” does not 
name anything positive, since poetry is always different from itself. Like the Brunnen 
earlier in “Brod und Wein,” this “streaming word” is essentially a referring away from 
itself. It points to its subterranean origin and infinite destiny, and we only experience it as 
a passing over the horizon that shields the divine from our view. The streaming word can 
only offer thought a flowing to or flowing from, but not a stable representation. It thus 
performs no dialectical work. 
 The principle insight we gain from the Greeks in “Brod und Wein” is that the 
social group is an inevitable byproduct of the divine—“es ertrug keiner das Leben 
allein”—but in the final analysis it is only a byproduct, and not the vehicle of the divine. 
The history if society is not the history of God’s self-manifestation, and it does not bring 
about a self-conscious unity of God and man. Rather, history is the abiding evidence of 
man’s difference from the divine. Attempts at “worthiness” before the gods fail, and any 
gift we receive from them can fully be received only through the “forgetfulness” and 
“holy inebriation” of self-erasure. 
 It is, perhaps, possible that God and man could yet achieve some form of 
reconciliation in Hölderlin’s universe, but none can say when or how or why. Such 
reconciliation would not, in any case, be a Hegelian self-reconciliation of Spirit, because 
Hölderlin is wedded to a spiritual dualism (i.e. divine spirit and human spirit) that cannot 
be collapsed or folded into a spiritual monism. There is no permanent, inborn “certainty” 
at the heart of religion, as in Hegel, since there is nothing permanent and inborn about the 
divine. In Hölderlin’s version of the human experience, certainty comes experientially as 
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if from without. Consequently, it is not for us to say how or even if God will “play 
himself out” through history. As I said earlier, Hölderlin confronts the maze of divine 
history from within, and for all he knows there is no way out. 
This is an epistemologically pessimistic position, but it is not necessarily a 
religiously pessimistic one. As we have seen, the ontological rupture between the human 
and the divine prepares the way for encounter and exchange between the individual and 
his God. Because God and man are radically distinct, and not just two parts of a self-
relating monism, a whole range of ethical attitudes become possible between them: 
gratitude, mercy, supplication, and most importantly love. 
Und wenn die Himmlischen jetzt  
So, wie ich glaube, mich lieben, 
Wie viel mehr Dich, 
Denn Eines weiß ich, 
Daß nämlich der Wille 
Des ewigen Vaters viel 
Dir gilt. 
(“Patmos,” StA 2,1: 171) 
If there is one thing that is most important to Hölderlin about the external God, it is his 
love, which would be an illusion if God and man were two moments in Spirit’s self-
relation. The God of love—rather than the (self-)love of God—sets Hölderlin apart from 
his philosophical contemporaries.  
 
  
 
Chapter 3 
 
The Kinetic Divine 
 
Denn das Reich GOttes stehet nicht in Worten, sondern in Kraft. (1 Cor 4:20) 
 
“We get a beautiful picture of an express train supposed to be moving, but where in the 
picture, as I have heard a friend say, is the energy or the fifty miles an hour?” 
 —William James, speaking of the “movement, the vital element” of religion 
  The Varieties of Religious Experience, p. 546. 
 
O du, des Aethers Tochter! erscheine dann 
   Aus deines Vaters Gärten, und darfst du nicht, 
      Ein Geist der Erde, kommen, schröck, o 
         Schröcke mit anderem nur das Herz mir. 
(“An die Hoffnung,” StA 2,1: 59) 
 
 
 
In the preceding chapter we looked at two spatial representations of the divine in Hegel 
and Hölderlin. For Hegel, God is an interiority that externalizes itself in order to know 
itself; for Hölderlin, God is an exteriority that irrupts into the interior—sometimes subtly, 
sometimes dramatically—without, however, becoming the interior. In this chapter we 
will look more closely at the language the poet uses to talk about this God. In contrast to 
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the way that Hegel’s interior God reveals himself to the interior part of man (i.e., “spirit 
witnesses to spirit”), Hölderlin’s exterior God reveals himself to the body. Or more 
precisely, Hölderlin resorts to a rhetoric of physicality to articulate divine experience, 
although it is not necessarily true that the divine is actually a physical event. This 
ambiguous position between realism and metaphor allows the poet to speak concretely 
about the divine without, however, confining the divine to a material event. 
The sense that will interest us most in the second half of this chapter is touch. We 
will see that the divine is not (merely?) a literal “touch,” but it is most like a touch. 
Rudolf Otto would say that touch is an “ideogram” of the particular quality of divine 
experience. Otto warns against making the mistake, “den schon der Mythus begeht: de[n] 
nämlich, daß ‘natürliche’ Prädikate, die nur als Ideogramme für ein ineffibile gebraucht 
werden dürfen, auf das Irrationale real übertragen und daß Symbole des 
Gefühlsausdrückes für adäquate Begriffe und für Grundlagen ‘wissenschaftlicher’ 
Erkenntnisse genommen werden” (25). In other words, the divine is never just like the 
words, ideas, and experiences we use to express it, because if it were, the divine would 
become these things and cease to be “das ganz Andere.” Like Schleiermacher, Otto bases 
his theory of religion on the assumption that there is a uniquely and specifically religious 
kind of experience unlike all other kinds of experience, whether rational or physical.1 
Otto’s description of the divine “Moment des ‘Energischen’” closely parallels 
what we find in Hölderlin: 
Endlich aber befassen die Momente des tremendum und der majestas noch ein 
drittes Moment mit in sich das ich die Energie des Numinosen benennen möchte. 
Es ist besonders in der “org e” lebhaft fühlbar und drückt sich in den 
                                                 
1 See Marting Jay, Songs of Experience: Modern American and European Variations on a Universal 
Theme, especially the chapter “The Appeal of Religious Experience: Schleiermacher, James, Otto, and 
Buber.” 
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Ideogrammen von Lebendigkeit Leidenschaft affektvollem Wesen, von Wille 
Kraft Bewegung Erregtheit Tätigkeit Drang aus. Diese seine Züge kehren 
wesensmäßig wieder von den Stufen des Dämonischen an bis hin zur Vorstellung 
des “lebendigen” Gottes. Sie sind dasjenige Moment am numen das, wo es 
erfahren wird, das Gemüt des Menschen aktiviert, zum “Eifern” bringt, mit 
ungeheuerer Spannung und Dynamik erfüllt.... Sie sind dasjenige irrationale 
Moment der Gottesidee das überall am meisten und am stärksten den 
Widerspruch gegen den “filosophischen” Gott bloß rationaler Spekulation und 
Definition geweckt hat. Wo man es ins Feld führte haben es die “Filosofen” 
immer als “Anthropomorfismus” verurteilt. Mit Recht, sofern seine Verteidiger 
selber zumeist den bloß analogischen Charakter dieser Ideogramme die sie dem 
menschlichen Gemüts-bereiche entlehnten, verkannt haben. (27; my emphasis) 
 
Again Otto again points out the necessarily analogical character of any description of the 
“numinous,” but energetic terms like “power,” “excitement,” “movement,” and 
“pressure” are nonetheless very much like the divine in some way. Hölderlin agrees, and 
in order to emphasize the “energetic” quality of the divine, the poet sacrifices the unity of 
his poem. Because of the divine trauma, Hölderlin’s poetry rarely achieves the 
appearance of aesthetic, philosophical, or libidinal closure.2 The movement and pressure 
of the divine comes from who-knows-where for who-knows-what purpose thereby 
opening the poem up to pure possibility, or “das Offene.” 
 To provide context for Hölderlin’s attention to the physical and the “energetic,” I 
want to compare his view of revelation with the views of three of his contemporaries. 
First we will look at the most famous statement on revelation from a German philosopher 
during the 1790s: the Versuch einer Kritik aller Offenbarung (1792) of Johann Gottlieb 
Fichte. This text establishes the physical event of revelation as a source of potential 
                                                 
2 One exception to this poetry of disruption is the ode “Blödigkeit,” at least as interpreted by Walter 
Benjamin. In this ode, Benjamin tells us, the Gedicht and the Gedichtete converge, the Gedichtete being a 
“synthetische Einheit der geistigen und anschaulichen Ordnung,” in which “kein Element irgend bezugsfrei 
sich aus der Intensität der Weltordnung, die im Grunde gefühlt ist, herausheben [kann]” (22, 28). This 
study takes the view that “Blödigkeit” (as read by Benjamin) should not be held up as exemplary, because 
in Hölderlin’s most characteristic poetry the Gedichtete is riven by the Undichtbare. This means that his 
poetry is ultimately a religious endeavor, rather than an aesthetic one. 
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interference by a non-rational, theological God, an idea that Hölderlin will explore in his 
use of the body to represent the divine. After looking at Fichte, we will compare 
Hölderlin’s and Hegel’s attitudes toward the physical side of religious experience, and 
see how once again they diverge on the matter of spiritual monism. We will then take up 
the physicality of the divine in Schleiermacher and see how Hölderlin, unlike the 
romantic theologian, resists a tempting epistemological shortcut that obscures the 
ontological difference between revelation and reason. After treating Schleiermacher, we 
will be prepared to look more closely at the significance of Hölderlin’s rhetorical use of 
tactility (as opposed to visuality) as a means of ensuring the divine its ontological 
independence. 
 
The Word Made Flesh: The Empirical Moment in Religious Knowledge 
 
Of all Hölderlin’s philosophical contemporaries, Fichte comes closest—if only for a 
moment—to granting God an existence outside of human reason. This is ironic, since 
Fichte is among the least interested in supporting a religious way of thinking. He was, 
after all, expelled from Jena in 1799 as an “atheist.” He nevertheless upheld (as least for a 
time in the early 1790s) the idea of a literal, interventionist God, because there was no 
way to avoid this God and retain the concept of revelation at the center of his Versuch 
einer Kritik aller Offenbarung (1792). In this work, Fichte asks whether there is anything 
that philosophy can say a priori about the concept of revelation. Can its necessity be 
argued a priori? Can we say anything a priori about the content or form of revelation? 
Fichte concludes that revelation is a necessary possibility under certain circumstances, 
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such as when a nation (Fichte cites Israel) is too depraved to listen to the inner voice of 
reason, and there is no chance of acquiring this skill from its neighbors. In such cases, the 
God of reason would need to intervene empirically in order to be consistent with his own 
moral nature. 
From a theological perspective, Fichte’s argument is obsolete. Since the 
Nominalism of the late middle ages, theologians had ceased to think of God in terms of 
any immanent principle of order, such as “reason,” since that would limit his infinite and 
omnipotent nature. God creates ex nihilo, which means that everything created—
including human reason—comes after God and is not binding on him. (The only a priori 
principle allowed in analyzing the nature of God is non-contradiction). God may uphold 
the physical and rational laws of this world, but they do not uphold him.3 Blumenberg 
characterizes this as a turn from Christian Aristotelianism to a subtle form of modern 
Gnosticism.4 The only thing that is binding on God in this post-Nominalist view is God’s 
own word. In this theological light, Fichte’s a priori deduction of revelation is 
unproductive regardless of its conclusions, since it uses a standard (reason) for talking 
about the divine which has no binding force on the divine. 
Why does this matter? Because it makes it even stranger that Fichte writes a 
critique of revelation at all. No major philosopher that I am aware of sticks his or her 
                                                 
3 A related theological question was at stake in the famous Clark-Leibniz exchange about the Newtonian 
universe. Clark defended Newton’s idea of a God who willfully intervened to “hold up” or regulate the 
clockwork-universe, while Leibniz’s God, as Jeremy Campbell puts it, “is less willful, less wedded to 
power, and he seems to be more intelligent…[the Newtonian] God is a little more unpredictable, a shade 
less rational than the fastidious one of Leibniz’s scheme. There is an aesthetic quality to Leibniz’s 
divinity…Leibniz repeatedly uses the word ‘beauty’ in his rebuttal of Newton’s theology.” Leibniz’s God 
is closer to being identical with—and therefore replaceable by—the intelligible pattern or “beauty” evident 
in nature. See The Many Faces of God (New York: Norton, 2006), p. 96. 
 
4 See Blumenberg, pp. 145-179. 
 
 90 
neck out for the empirical or “miraculous” view of revelation after Fichte’s 1792 Kritik. 
Kant—the only authority whom Fichte acknowledges in the Versuch—never suggests 
that revelation should be salvaged. (Kant’s Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der bloßen 
Vernunft, where such a suggestion might—but does not—appear, was not written until 
1793.) In The Statemen’s Manual, Coleridge hesitatingly acknowledges the legitimacy of 
the New Testament miracles,  but he clearly states (in a Fichtean spirit) that they served 
only “to overthrow the usurpation in and through the senses,” and that “inspired writings 
render miracles superfluous” (10). The sense that we have outgrown the “childish” need 
for miracles is central also to Lessing’s Erziehung des Menschengeschlechts. A related 
attitude toward miracles is implicit in modern “integralist” theology (such as Latin 
American liberation theology), which holds that “every person has always already been 
worked upon by divine grace, with the consequence that one cannot analytically separate 
‘natural’ and ‘supernatural’ contributions to this integral unity.”5 Most philosophers (and 
many theologians) today oppose the idea of “hard” miracles altogether, including the 
canonical miracles of the Bible. Fichte himself will have no place for them in the ego-
philosophy that he begins to profess in 1794. Even the 1792 Versuch comes across as 
very strained, as if revelation were a concept that only a philosophical virtuoso could 
force into a Kantian framework. So why does Fichte write his Versuch at all?  
 It is partly to display his virtuosity, but it is also, I believe, a reflection of the 
religious habits of thought and feeling that were still strong in the 1790s, even among the 
increasingly skeptical intellectual elite. True, every elite at the end of the eighteenth 
century understood that the Bible was textually unreliable, which, along with an increase 
                                                 
5 John Milbank, Theology and Social Theory, p. 206. See all of chapter 8, “Founding the Supernatural: 
Political and Liberation Theology in the Context of Modern Catholic Thought.” 
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in “scientific spirit,” made the authenticity of biblical revelations and miracles—and all 
revelations and miracles, for that matter—a point of uncertainty and discussion. But this 
discussion did not only generate skepticism; it also helped people identify what they 
really did believe, and in Fichte’s case it resulted in a rational defense of the possibility of 
revelation. Of course, only two years after the publication of the Versuch Fichte began 
preaching subjective idealism, which laid the groundwork for the complete elimination of 
the transcendent God. The juxtaposition of the 1792 Versuch and the 1794 
Wissenschaftslehre could be viewed as mileposts in Fichte’s loss of faith, or they could 
be seen as evidence that Fichte was both Christian and philosopher. (It should be noted 
that the 1794 Jena lectures are deeply influenced by biblical rhetoric and set up a 
typological relation the primitive Christian and the modern scholar; the religious 
influence does not vanish, even if the revelation theology is absent.) The mounting 
secularism that we perceive between the 1792 and 1794 texts is not necessarily something 
that Fichte would have acknowledged. And why should he have? It was not yet common 
knowledge that God was “dead,” as Nietzsche’s madman points out in section 125 of Die 
fröhliche Wissenschaft. Fichte and his idealist contemporaries were just beginning to kill 
him. The Versuch is thus not merely a case of scientific reason “reoccupying” a 
theological position in response to a “residual need” left by the vacancy of that position. 
It can be seen, rather, as a case of reason supporting the theological “position” of 
revelation. Both faith and philosophy are present in the Versuch, which makes it a cross-
pressured, double-minded, or “half-secularized” text, as opposed to a fully “secularized” 
text like Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit or Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion.  
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 When philosophy borrows its object from theology, there are silent consequences 
that should be spelled out. Fichte argues that the same practical logic requiring us to 
believe in God also requires us to believe that he will reveal himself empirically under 
certain circumstances. If we think about this carefully, we see that it invites an insoluble 
paradox. If the possibility of revelation ever becomes an actuality—and according to 
Fichte we must necessarily believe that it can—then the line between the realms of 
practical and theoretical reason is crossed, and we have to think about God in a new way. 
No longer just a necessary “idea” of reason, God undergoes an ontological transformation 
into an object of the sensory world. When revelation occurs, God is no longer a being 
who must behave in a certain way (a practical idea), but rather does behave in a certain 
way (an empirical object). But once we grant God an objective nature, we must also grant 
him all the rights and privileges of an object. Specifically, we must accept that God has a 
hidden essence we cannot know—a thing-in-itself—over which reason has no regulative 
power. If God-in-himself has agency—and Fichte certainly describes him this way—then 
it is impossible for us to say that God will not sometimes act outside his role as a Kantian 
moral lawgiver. As a thing-in-itself he has this power; a priori reasoning cannot regulate 
the action of God in the Sinnenwelt, which is outside the realm of rational ideas. Once 
God acts outside his Kantian role, we lose all a priori foreknowledge of what divine 
revelation will look like. We don’t know if we will even be able to recognize it. The only 
thing we can say is that if the non-Kantian God operates in the world, this operation will 
leave an empirical trace. 
 Fichte understands that this non-Kantian God—or this non-Kantian dimension of 
God—is lurking offstage in his theory. He knows that reason can lay down a priori laws 
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about divine communication, but reason cannot be that communication.6 (Hegel, in 
contrast, does think of revelation the product of thought, and his critics in the 1820s duly 
attack him as a “pantheist” or “atheist.”7) When God becomes active in the world, 
philosophy loses control over him. Once he becomes “real,” God, instead of admonishing 
us to be moral, might reveal gnostic formulas or practice statecraft. Rather than denying 
this, Fichte directs our attention away from it: 
Jede Offenbarung soll Religion begründen, und alle Religion gründet sich auf den 
Begriff Gottes, als moralischen Gesetzgebers. Eine Offenbarung also, die uns ihn 
als etwas anderes ankündigt, welche uns etwa theoretisch sein Wesen kennen 
lehren will, oder ihn als politischen Gesetzgeber austellt, ist wenigstens das nicht, 
was wir suchen, sie ist nicht geoffenbarte Religion. Was sie sein könne, und ob sie 
nicht unter irgendeiner Bedingung möglich sei, gehört nicht in den Plan der 
gegenwärtigen Untersuchung. Jede Offenbarung also muß uns Gott als 
moralischen Gesetzgeber ankündigen, und nur von derjenigen, deren Zweck das 
ist, können wir aus moralischen Gründen glauben, daß sie von Gott sei. (74; 
original emphasis) 
 
This is essentially a scare tactic. He wants to close off any speculation about other kinds 
of revelation (which he does not discredit a priori as false or impossible) by denying them 
the title of “religion.” In reality, he opens up a mysterious and intriguing possibility: 
“non-religious” revelation about which the only thing we know a priori is that it occurs—
if it occurs—empirically. It is an event. The means of understanding this revelatory event 
are entirely contained in the revelation itself. Or there may be no means provided for its 
interpretation, in which case the revelation is merely an event. Revelation is then like the 
                                                 
6 The deus ex machina that Fichte relies on to perform the revelation anticipated by reason reappears in a 
subtler form in the Wissenschaftslehre, where the “positing” force of the primal self requires an external 
“Anstoß” in order to turn back onto itself and bring about self-consciousness. This Anstoß is a rational 
necessity (like revelation), but whether or not this Anstoß will actually occur is completely out of the 
control of the positing self. It is a radically independent—one might even say transcendent—reality. 
 
7 See Lectures, p. 159-160, where Hegel interprets revelation as the content of religious instruction rather 
than as the source of the content of of religious instruction. See also Hodgon’s introduction, p. 21-22 on the 
attacks being leveled against Hegel’s speculative rather than “positive” approach to Christian history. 
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Johannine wind that “blows where it chooses, and you hear the sound of it, but you do 
not know where it comes from or where it goes.” At most it might leave an affective 
trace, as when Hölderlin writes: “Törig rede ich. Es ist die Freude.” 
 This philosophically impenetrable God of the event is a specter that necessarily 
accompanies the idea of revelation. Hegel understood this and avoided revelation almost 
altogether in his mature philosophy. Fichte knows that a concept of revelation 
unregulated by a priori principles threatens “aller Schwärmerei Tor und Türe zu öffnen” 
(34). Hölderlin, however, is attracted by its hidden depths, and he does not seem to share 
any of Fichte’s anxiety about Schwärmerei. The reason is simple: unlike Fichte, 
Hölderlin does not hasten to resolve the revelatory event into a meaning. He feels no need 
to call it “Schwärmerei,” “the moral law,” “self-assertion of the positing subject,” “self-
mediation of Spirit,” “intuition of the universe,” or even the “word of God.” It remains a 
moment of irruption into the material world. I now want to shift my focus to Hölderlin, 
and show how he represents the divine event through images of bodily experience, which 
in turn suggest an irrational, transcendent source for revelation.  
The first point to make is that Hölderlin rejects the God of moral reason. When 
the moral God speaks, his voice is indistinguishable from reason, and the revelatory event 
vanishes beneath this identity of the immanent and the transcendent. If Hölderlin is to 
investigate the divine event in any sustained way, he must do away with the God of 
reason. 
It turns out to be very easy to dissociate Hölderlin from the moral God, since 
nowhere in Hölderlin’s poetry does the divine communicate moral knowledge or ally 
itself with moral principles. Indeed, the great mystery of religious history—the 
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disappearance of the gods in the modern age—apparently has little or nothing to do with 
a moral error on the part of humanity. God has simply disappeared, and man is left with 
mere threads from which to reconstruct a divine motive. Furthermore, the poet never 
expects to be rewarded as he might from a moral God. On the contrary, the poet prays 
that God will stay away: “Vieles sprach ich zu ihm...Vieles bat ich, zu lieb dem 
Vaterlande, damit nicht / Ungebeten uns einst plötzlich befiele der Geist” (StA 2,1: 97). 
This is because we cannot handle God: 
Auch wär’ uns, sparte der Gebende nicht, 
Schon längst vom Seegen des Herds 
Uns Gipfel und Boden entzündet. 
(MA 1: 363) 
God’s bounty can be a curse in its very excess. Although the poet is convinced of his 
benevolence, God is an unprincipled power that quickly becomes incompatible with 
human existence. It is too powerful and strange. So why does Hölderlin cling to this 
strange God and not flee to the God of reason? He seems to have no choice. The 
irrational God, in Hölderlin’s eyes, is the one responsible for religious history and poetic 
genius, and in his absence we are impotent: “Indessen dünket mir öfters / Besser zu 
schlafen...wozu Dichter in dürftiger Zeit[?]” (StA 2,1: 94). Again and again we are 
reminded that the Greeks thrived because the gods lived among them, while today the 
gods have left us and we have sunk into an enfeebling darkness, a “night” of the gods. 
 Hölderlin’s God is thus not the God of Kantian philosophy, nor is it the God of 
early idealism, which does not acknowledges the category of transcendence. Since he is 
not relying openly on the Christian tradition, the poet is left without an established 
language for his representation of revelation. The poem does not know what divine 
communication will look like or contain, just as Fichte described in his discussion of non-
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rational revelation. The gods live “über dem Haupt droben in anderer Welt” and we 
cannot force their appearance. The gods come strangely, paradoxically: “Unempfunden 
kommen sie erst.” We are forced to wait them out—“harren,” as it is put in “Brod und 
Wein.”  
The problem with waiting is that we do not know what we are waiting for. 
Without a priori guidelines to help us identify non-moral revelation, we may not even 
know that it has occurred, although we may, in a sense, experience it occurring. This is 
suggested by the use of the present tense in the line from “Brod und Wein”: 
niemand / Weiß, von wannen und was einem geschiehet von ihr… 
A thing is only real—it only become complete or “perfect”—when it has occurred (“ist 
geschehen”), but such completion never comes in Hölderlin’s poetry. The most dramatic, 
and yet most subtle, example of this divine incompletion may be the topological poem 
Andenken. Here God is never mentioned by any name, and yet there is something vaguely 
divine in certain of its images: 
  Mancher 
Trägt Scheue, an die Quelle zu gehn; 
Es beginnet nämlich der Reichtum 
Im Meere. 
.... 
  Es nehmet aber 
Und gibt Gedächtnis die See... 
(StA 2,1: 189) 
These pregnant images are not commented on in the poem, but an awareness of their 
conspicuous fullness announces itself in the last line of the poem: 
Was bleibet aber, stiften die Dichter. 
(StA 2,1: 189) 
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The implication is that there is something about the objects of memory that exceeds the 
mere recollection of them. The Dichter can only capture a fragment (“Was bleibet”) of 
this, perhaps nothing more than the awareness of the excess. What the poets establish 
(stiften) is thus not a rational knowledge of the divine, but a sensitivity to divine 
presence. Poetry is a way of experiencing the divine; it is never a finished experience.  
 The reader experiences the ever-materializing but never-materialized God as a 
difficulty in isolating the “where” and the “what” of the divine in a passage where the 
divine is nevertheless physically at work. For example, where and what is the divine in 
the following passage from “Friedensfeier”? 
Leichtatmende Lüfte 
Verkünden euch schon, 
Euch kündet das rauchende Tal 
Und der Boden, der vom Wetter noch drönet, 
Doch Hoffnung rötet die Wangen, 
Und vor der Türe des Hauses 
Sitzt Mutter und Kind, 
Und schauet den Frieden 
Und wenige scheinen zu sterben, 
Es hält ein Ahnen die Seele, 
Vom goldnen Lichte gesendet, 
Hält ein Versprechen die Ältesten auf. 
(MA 1: 365) 
This passage seems straightforward, and we might think that the “where” and “what” of 
the divine are not far to be found. The “where” is nature, and the “what” is the divine 
infusion that so often accompanies nature. The “gods” seem to play no role in this 
pantheistic moment. True, in the second line and third line we have the word “euch,” 
which is a reference to the “Unsterblichen” mentioned in the preceding stanza. But after 
this initial God-reference, which is already softened into a mere pronoun, there is no 
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mention of the gods at all. Divinity seems to settle directly into nature. We are not far 
from a Wordsworthian “blessed mood,” when 
Almost suspended, we are laid asleep 
In body, and become a living soul: 
While with an eye made quiet by the power 
Of harmony, and the deep power of joy, 
We see into the life of things.8 
The “life of things,” opened up to us by the “power of harmony” and the “power of joy,” 
is nothing less the God of pantheism, the “one life within us and abroad,” the single 
“motion,” as Wordsworth says, coursing through the setting sun and the mind of man. 
The “life of things” is Life itself. Isn’t this what Hölderlin means in the lines: “Und 
wenige scheinen zu sterben / Es hält ein Ahnen die Seele?” 
 Worsdworth’s blessed mood, however, feeds into a modern psychologizing 
approach to religion. It can, for instance, be “explained away” as an “oceanic feeling,” 
which Freud exposes in Civilization and its Discontents as a remnant of infantile 
narcissism.9 Or, looking to Hölderlin’s contemporary Friedrich Schleiermacher, the 
blessed mood could be the feeling generated by a special religious “faculty,” which 
doesn’t require transcendence at all. Is the revelatory event in Hölderlin reducible after all 
to an immanent “spiritual” process fully accounted for by theory? What about the 
physical irruption into the world by an outside power?  
                                                 
8 Wordworth, William and S.T. Coleridge, Lyrical Ballads (1798), ed. W.J.B. Owen, 2nd ed (Oxford: 
Oxford UP, 1969), p. 113. 
 
9 “…originally the ego includes everything, later it separates off an external world from itself. Our present 
ego-feeling is, therefore, only a shrunken residue of a much more inclusive—indeed, an all-embracing—
feeling which corresponded to a more intimate bond between the ego and the world about it…the ideational 
contents appropriate to it would be precisely those of limitlessness and of a bond with the universe—the 
same idea with which my friend elucidated the ‘oceanic feeling.’” Freud Reader, ed. Peter Gay (New York: 
Norton, 1989), p. 724-725. 
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 A closer reading of this passage suggests that the “blessed mood” and the 
psychological approach miss something. Specifically, there are various elements in the 
passage that dislocate the divine temporally, placing it outside the here-and-now in which 
the blessed mood occurs. For example, the word “verkünden” in the second line puts the 
divine (however we understand it) into the future, and thus distinguishes it from the 
“Leichtatmende Lüfte,“ „das rauchende Tal,“ and „der Boden, der vom Wetter noch 
drönet,“ which would be the incarnations of God in a pantheist philosophy. The words 
“Ahnen” and “Versprechen” perform the same kind of temporal dislocation. We intimate 
something that is not yet there, and a promise points to something that is not yet the 
case.10 
The “Versprechen” distances the divine from the present scene in yet another 
way. The “Versprechen” is “sent from the golden light,” which tells us that the 
“Versprechen” is not the direct experience of the divine. Rather it mediates the “golden 
light,” which, it turns out, is also not the divine, since light is something generated and 
not something self-generating. It, too, must have a source. With these multiple 
mediations, we become aware that however exalted the immanent scene is, something 
central to its meaning is tucked away beyond our temporal and spatial horizon. Even in 
this blessed mood, we remain conscious that the divine is hidden from us. 
 So why does this passage feel saturated with the divine, if the divine is elsewhere? 
The answer comes in the role played by the body. The first thing to understand is that the 
                                                 
10 This sense of promise and anticipation is similar to the temporality of the “future perfect” that Alice 
Kuzniar discusses in her reading of German romanticism. The divine is neither a future point in time 
(futurus) nor a divine interruption of time (adventus), but a negotiation between the two. It is an immediate 
presence whose fullness is paradoxically deferred. If we could somehow get beyond time (the “future”), we 
would then in retrospect (the “perfect”) perceive the hidden nature of divine experienced in time. See 
Delayed Endings: Nonclosure in Novalis and Hölderlin (Athens, GA: U of Georgia P, 1987), esp. 68-71. 
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body can relate to experience in two ways: first, it can be the direct source of experience, 
as when I feel a breeze; second, it can react to an intellectual experience, as when I cry at 
a sad movie. In both cases the body is bound to our emotions, but not in the same way. In 
the first case, an emotion follows a merely bodily experience (i.e., feeling the breeze) 
alerting us to a meaning in the experience; in the second case (i.e., crying at a sad movie) 
the emotion has no epistemological value; it is merely part of the body’s reaction to the 
mind, which already knows (we’ll assume) that the movie is sad. 
Now, the “blessed mood” is an intellectual experience, a kind of intense aesthetic 
perception of beauty. Wordsworth tells us that “Almost suspended, we are laid asleep / In 
body, and become a living soul” when we sense the divine. If emotion and bodily 
sensation were to play a role in Wordsworth’s representation of the divine, they would be 
of the second kind: a follow up to the intellectual event that takes place during bodily 
“suspension.” Hölderlin, in contrast, gives the body a primary role. He gives us bodily 
and emotional language (“Hoffnung rötet die Wangen,” “Es hält ein Ahnen die Seele,“ 
„Hält ein Versprechen die Ältesten auf“), but as we have just seen, this is not because the 
divine has been intellectually given. God is temporally and spatially displaced from the 
poet’s representation of nature. What we get, then, is an intellectually unmediated 
flushing of the cheeks with hope, gripping of the soul with anticipation, and „holding up“ 
(aufhalten) of the elderly with a sense of promise. All of this happens at once, as if in 
response to the same intellectual event, but it turns out that this bodily-affective response 
is the event. There is no Wordsworthian „life of things“ unveiling itself to the poetic 
mind; rather, the divine reveals itself directly to the body and the emotions, as if to ensure 
that God not be confused with reason. 
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 Now, just because the bodily-affective experience is not intellectually mediated 
does not mean that the intellect plays no role in this story. The terms Hoffnung, Ahnen, 
and Versprechen push the affective component of the divine experience right to the 
threshold of thought. This turns out to be crucial, since without this intellectual follow-up 
we would never know to speak of the experience as “divine.” The feelings of Hoffnung, 
Ahnen, and Versprechen tell us two things: 1) because they point to a completion beyond 
themselves, they suggest a source that is also beyond the immanent; 2) since the 
transcendent source/object of experience inspires hope and a sense of promise, it must be 
good. This combination of transcendence and goodness is what first gives us the warrant 
to talk about the „divine“ in this stanza. 
Through this admittedly very subtle example, we see that Hölderlin wants the 
experience of the divine to retain an empirical basis, which brings us back full-circle to 
the point made about revelation in Fichte. God can reveal himself as the Kantian moral 
Lawgiver, or he can reveal himself in some other way. The only thing we can be sure of 
when God chooses “another way” is that the revelation will be an empirical event, and 
any further knowledge about the divine (e.g. that it is good and transcendent) will have to 
come from the revelation itself (e.g. the feelings of Hoffnung, Ahnen, Versprechen). Later 
in this chapter we will look at less minimalist representations of revelation as a physical 
event, but before doing so we need to look at Hegel’s and Schleiermacher’s treatment of 
the bodily experience of God. 
 Hegel’s God, as we have seen, is subjective, and the idea of encountering him 
empirically may seem strange, but Hegel is canny enough to know that his philosophy of 
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religion will be less convincing without an account of the visceral experience of God. So 
he does his best.  
Not unlike Hölderlin, Hegel wants to imagine a feeling of God independent of any 
prior notion of God: “When I know God...then consciousness has made its entrance, and 
with it a parting or division that was not yet in feeling. Consciousness is the ejection of 
the content out of feeling...” (140). In other words, there is a pure, undivided feeling of 
God preceding any consciousness of God. It is, moreover, a bodily feeling, the kind that 
could potentially announce the empirical event of revelation: 
the particularity of our own person is its corporeality so that feeling pertains also 
to this corporeal side. With aroused feelings, the blood becomes agitated and we 
become warm around the heart. That is the character of feeling.... It is required 
not only that we know God...but that [he] should be in our feeling, in our hearts. 
(138) 
 
So far this seems like it could be a bodily-affective revelation of the divine similar to the 
one we just looked at in Hölderlin, but Hegel’s view of the event is actually very 
different. Although Hegel’s God-feeling precedes any consciousness of God, this does 
not mean that the subject does not already know God. Indeed, as we have already seen in 
the previous chapter, the subject—at least in its transcendental aspect—contains God. 
God is not introduced in experience, but only discovered. The distinction between the 
power of God and the presence of God falls flat in Hegel, because God is quite literally 
present “in our feeling, in our hearts.” God and the feeling are the same thing. God does 
not cause the feeling, because he is the feeling. Being non-philosophers, we just are not 
yet aware of the fact. 
Hegel goes even further. Even though God is in the heart, the heart does not cease 
to be the seat of subjectivity. The heart is still identified with the subject, and what really 
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happens in religious feeling is that the God-in-the-heart and the subject become identical: 
“we, as subjects, are supposed to have identified ourselves with such content [i.e., the 
God-feeling]...the phrase ‘religion of the heart’ expresses this identification of the content 
with the subjectivity and personality of the individual” (139; my emphasis). In religious 
feeling, an ontological blurring of God and subject begins to take place. This blurring will 
be temporarily stalled during the mythological or “representational” stage of religious 
history (during which we represent God as something outside of ourselves), but the 
identity of God and self returns and culminates in the idea of Spirit. 
 In the last chapter we saw that Hölderlin understands God quite differently. God 
is fundamentally external, and not just apparently so during the “representational” phase 
of religious development. Religious feeling is therefore not a “warmness around the 
heart” ready-made to be identified with the subject. The divine is too diverse and 
unpredictable for that. Sometimes Hölderlin’s God strikes like a thunderbolt. Sometimes 
he announces his coming, but never arrives (i.e., “der kommende Gott” of “Brod und 
Wein”). Sometimes he stops for a moment and then trails away. Sometimes he distresses 
the heart terribly as if God and man were completely incompatible. Sometimes he 
abandons us without explanation. Sometimes he just stands before us as something 
strange. Never does he settle down into and become the human heart.  
 Hegel upholds the identity of God and the subject by explaining the 
representational stage of religion, in which God is placed outside of us, as a passing 
negation of an underlying sameness. Hölderlin negotiates the relationship between divine 
feeling and divine representation in a different, non-Hegelian way, which is captured in 
the image of “der kommende Gott.” This God, who is coming but has not arrived, evokes 
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the anxiety of anticipation—a feeling—but this particular feeling only makes sense in 
connection with a certain representation: God as a thing-over-there poised to move over 
here. The feeling demands the representation of difference, and the representation of 
difference only makes sense in relation to the feeling. By making representation—which 
divides the subject from the object—immediately attendant on the divine feeling, 
Hölderlin suggests that there will be no identity of God and the subject at any level of 
religious development. Both Hölderlin and Hegel see religion beginning with a sense of 
divine certainty, but only Hegel attributes this certainty to our inward possession of God. 
This possession is confirmed by feeling, temporarily negated by representation, and 
regained by thought.11 For Hölderlin, our divine certainty is acquired through 
experience—an event—which means that representation is potentially involved from the 
very beginning. Because our religious certainty is mediated through physical experience 
(or to be more exact: most like something mediated physical experience), our certainty 
will never equal God, as it does for Hegel. We have experience with God, but not 
experience of God.  
 The Hölderlinian encounter with God has its closest parallel in our third figure: 
the romantic theologian Schleiermacher. The principle thesis of Schleiermacher’s highly 
influential and controversial first book, On Religion: Speeches to its Cultured Despisers 
(1799)—which Hölderlin owned and read—is that religion boils down to a certain kind 
of intuition (Anschauung) in which the subject is annihilated before the totality of the 
universe. The distinction between God and our religious experience is explicit: “ob [ein 
Mensch] zu seiner Anschauung einen Gott hat, das hängt ab von der Richtung seiner 
                                                 
11 The precise order of Hegel’s evolution of religious consciousness as outlined in Part One, Sect. B of the 
1827 Lectures on Religion is: immediate knowledge—feeling—representation—thought. 
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Fantasie” (245). God is ancillary to religion, and an atheist can be just as genuinely 
religious as a theist. (“[A]uf meinem Standpunkt und nach meinen Euch bekannten 
Begriffen [kann] der Glaube ‘kein Gott, keine Religion’ gar nicht statt finden” [243]). 
What matters is the quality of the intuition, rather than the concepts framing it. Like the 
empiricists and the post-Kantians, Schleiermacher is placing epistemology before 
metaphysics. In simpler terms, he is putting the question of how we experience before the 
question of what we experience. The imagination steps in after the fact to put some kind 
of content (often God) into the intuition. All of this is not unlike what I have been 
describing in Hölderlin. 
 There is an important difference between Hölderlin and Schleiermacher, however, 
which gets us to the real uniqueness of Hölderlin’s discourse on the divine. To illuminate 
this difference, we first need to look at a key passage (known as the “love scene”) from 
Schleiermacher’s Speeches. This passage gives us a step-by-step commentary on the 
process of religious experience. Notice the gradual movement from the divine being a 
physical sensation (Schleiermacher calls it an “Erscheinung” and a “Begebenheit”) to the 
divine being a contemplable form: 
Jener erste geheimnißvolle Augenblik, der bei jeder sinnlichen Wahrnehmung 
vorkommt, ehe noch Anschauung und Gefühl sich trennen, wo der Sinn und sein 
Gegenstand gleichsam in einander gefloßen und Eins geworden sind, ehe noch 
beide an ihren ursprünglichen Plaz zurükkehren—ich weiß wie unbeschreiblich er 
ist, und wie schnell er vorüber geht, ich wollte aber Ihr könntet ihn festhalten und 
auch in der höheren und göttlichen religiösen Thätigkeit des Gemüths ihn wieder 
erkennen.... Flüchtig ist er und durchsichtig wie der erste Duft womit der Thau die 
erwachten Blumen anhaucht, schamhaft und zart wie ein jungfräulicher Kuß, 
heilig und fruchtbar wie eine bräutliche Umarmung; ja nicht wie dies, sondern er 
ist alles dieses selbst. Schnell und zauberisch entwikelt sich eine Erscheinung eine 
Begebenheit zu einem Bilde des Universums. So wie sie sich formt die geliebte 
und immer gesuchte Gestalt, flieht ihr meine Seele entgegen.... Ich liege am 
Busen der unendlichen Welt: ich bin in diesem Augenblik ihre Seele, denn ich 
fühle alle ihre Kräfte und ihr unendliches Leben, wie mein eigenes, sie ist in 
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diesem Augenblike mein Leib, denn ich durchdringe ihre Muskeln und ihre 
Glieder wie meine eigenen, und ihre innersten Nerven bewegen sich nach meinem 
Sinn und meiner Ahndung wie die meinigen. Die geringste Erschütterung, und es 
verweht die heilige Umarmung, und nun erst steht die Anschauung vor mir als 
eine abgesonderte Gestalt, ich meße sie, und sie spiegelt sich in der offnen Seele 
wie das Bild der sich entwindenden Geliebten in dem aufgeschlagenen Auge des 
Jünglings, und nun erst arbeitet sich das Gefühl aus dem Innern empor, und 
verbreitet sich wie die Röthe der Schaam und der Lust auf seiner Wange. Dieser 
Moment ist die höchste Blüthe der Religion. (221-222) 
 
Schleiermacher (not unlike Wordsworth and Blake) suggests that every perception can 
potentially be the source of a religious experience (“bei jeder sinnlichen Wahrnehmung 
vorkommt”). There is subtle indecision in this passage, however, as to whether the stuff 
of religion is found in the perception or in the reflection on the perception. Hegel will 
argue that religion—like everything—only begins with reflection, since God only appears 
as my thinking about God. Schleiermacher obviously approaches the matter differently. 
He celebrates the experience of an immediacy that is unmediated by thought, an “erste[r] 
geheimnißvolle[r] Augenblik...ehe noch Anschauung und Gefühl sich trennen.” Put this 
way, the “mysterious first moment” sounds a lot like Hegel’s “un-parted,” “undivided” 
feeling prior to consciousness. (Hegel made sure this was the case, since he trying to 
overcome Schleiermacher and Jacobi by situating their theories within his own more 
comprehensive system.) But Schleiermacher’s feeling has a different “story” than 
Hegel’s; it comes more like a miraculous intervention than a gestation of Spirit. It is 
sudden, unpredictable, and overwhelming. As in Hölderlin, it may be there one moment, 
and not the next. It is not the middle stage of a subjective process—as in the Hegelian 
progression: certainty, feeling, representation, thought—but a real event.  
Nevertheless, Schleiermacher does transform religious intuition into something 
over which he can take rational mastery. In the “love scene,” Schleiermacher quickly 
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makes a division between the “fleeting and transparent” (“flüchtig...durchsichtig“) feeling 
that “schnell...vorüber geht,” and the “Bilde des Universums” that “steht...vor mir als 
eine abgesonderte Gestalt.” The form of religion only emerges when the initial contact—
the “Erscheinung...Begebenheit” of the divine “anhauch[en]...Kuß...Umarmung”—is past 
and gone. The emergence of the divine form from the ashes of the divine contact initiates 
a second physical encounter of a very different sort. We are still in the realm of the erotic, 
but whereas the Anhauch, Kuß, and Umarmung of the first contact are tender, the second 
contact is violent and narcissistic: “Ich liege am Busen der unendlichen Welt: ich bin in 
diesem Augenblik ihre Seele, denn ich fühle alle ihre Kräfte und ihr unendliches Leben, 
wie mein eigenes, sie ist in diesem Augenblike mein Leib, denn ich durchdringe ihre 
Muskeln und ihre Glieder wie meine eigenen, und ihre innersten Nerven bewegen sich 
nach meinem Sinn und meiner Ahndung wie die meinigen.” Religion is no longer about 
dissolution, but domination. “[I]ch durchdringe ihre Muskeln und ihre Glieder wie meine 
eigenen, und ihre innersten Nerven bewegen sich nach meinem Sinn und meiner 
Ahndung” is clearly an act of colonization. The poet rises above nature, masters it, and 
conforms it to his own image, and this colonization is called the “höchste Blüthe der 
Religion.”12  
The only reason that the religious subject can ravish the divine the second time 
around is that the divine is now treated as a thing rather than an event or encounter. 
Schleiermacher represents the divine not as difference (“der kommende Gott”), but as a 
finished object waiting to be seized. In Martin Buber’s terms, Schleiermacher allows the 
                                                 
12 Schleiermacher would likely be horrified to hear his religious theory described in this way, but the 
author’s “intention” and the implications of his rhetoric are at odds. His subjective “colonization” of the 
religious object is not unrelated, in any case, to Kant’s subjecivization of the sublime, and thus in keeping 
with the historical moment. 
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world of “relation” (Beziehung), or the “Duwelt,” to collapse into the world of 
“experience” (Erfahrung), or the “Eswelt.” Rather than a “kiss” or “embrace,” the divine 
is now an “image” or “form.” This form is created by the human subject’s imagination, 
and becomes its intellectual possession. When we consider that such forms become (in 
Schleiermacher’s theory) the template for religious worldviews, religion starts looking a 
lot like “enlightened” reason: both subject the irrational (nature or the divine) to the shape 
of human thought. In order to do this, thought must treat the irrational like a “thing.” 
Neither reason nor religion seems to have much patience for “events” and “encounters,” 
which resist being hefted, sorted, and stacked within conceptual schemas. 
Let us now contrast Schleiermacher’s reifying “love scene” with a passage from 
Hölderlin’s “Friedensfeier” that we encountered in chapter one. Here there is also a 
seminal divine moment (Augenblick), which plays itself out very differently.   
Denn schonend rührt des Maases allzeit kundig 
Nur einen Augenblik die Wohnungen der Menschen 
Ein Gott an, unversehn, und keiner weiß es, wenn? 
Auch darf alsdann das Freche drüber gehn, 
Und kommen muß zum heilgen Ort das Wilde 
Von Enden fern, übt rauhbetastend den Wahn, 
Und trifft daran ein Schiksaal, aber Dank, 
Nie folgt der gleich hernach dem gottgegebnen Geschenke; 
Tiefprüfend ist es zu fassen. 
(MA 1: 363) 
Hölderlin describes something much simpler than Schleiermacher’s birth of the religious 
image. God “rührt...Nur einen Augenblick die Wohnungen der Menschen” (analogous to 
Schleiermacher’s “mysterious” fleeting moment), and the power of this touch lingers 
without being resolved into a “thingly” form. Instead, it becomes a “Schiksaal,” an 
invisible religious reality that has an inscrutable influence on us. Only by thinking deeply 
(“tiefprüfund”) can Schicksal be translated into form. Such deep thought, however, 
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cannot be carried out in a single sunny afternoon, as in Schleiermacher; it requires all of 
history—from the pre-civilized “Wilde” to the “tiefprüfend” thinkers of Hölderlin’s own 
day—to bring it about. It is the task of the poet to grasp (“zu fassen”) the god-given gift. 
It is an ongoing, perhaps interminable, labor. 
In “Friedensfeier” the poet is talking about the “normal” human subject, i.e., the 
one who progresses historically from the “Wilde” to the “tiefprüfend” philosopher. 
Punctuating the history of “normal” subjectivity, however, are prophetic geniuses, like 
the eponymous subject of the ode “Rousseau,” and Hölderlin also reflects on their 
relation to the divine. Instead of mindlessly colliding with Schicksal, as do “das Freche” 
and “das Wilde,” or turning his intellectual powers loose on it, as does the “deep 
thinking” philosopher, the prophet attempts to view Schicksal by rising above history. 
Such an individual is favored by the gods and in a rare moment 
....siehet über die eigne Zeit, 
   Ihm zeigt ein Gott ins Freie. 
(StA 2,1: 12) 
From the bird’s eye view of the prophet, the mystery of Schicksal appears merely as a 
blank page: “das Freie.” Although “das Freie” sounds like something positive—it takes 
“freedom,” after all, to operate as a moral being—its formlessness renders it 
epistemologically worthless. It might as well be “das Nichts.” “Das Freie” gives the poet 
nothing that can be shared or implemented once he descends from his visionary altitude. 
Consequently, the prophet finds himself disappointed and estranged—doubly so—upon 
descending from “das Freie” into the human world: 
   ...doch sehnend stehst 
      Am Ufer du, ein Ärgernis den 
         Deinen, ein Schatten, und liebst sie nimmer, 
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Und jene, die du nennst, die Verheißenen, 
   Wo sind die Neuen, daß du an Freundeshand 
      Erwarmst, wo nahn sie, daß du einmal, 
         Einsame Rede, vernehmlich seiest? 
 
Klanglos ists, armer Mann, in der Halle dir, 
   Und gleich den Unbegrabenen irrest du 
      Unstät und suchest Ruh... 
(StA 2,1: 12) 
The Rousseau-figure is estranged from his fellow men, amongst whom he moves as a 
“shadow,” and he is also estranged from the gods, who do not compensate him for his 
loss. The “Verheißenen”—the beings populating the prophet’s religious vision—are just 
as shadowy as the prophet himself has become. The attempt to see the divine has failed, 
because the divine is not the kind of thing can be seen. It has no “thingly” qualities. It is 
only—at least to human eyes—“das Freie.” The “Verheißenen” never materialize 
because no such “thing” was ever really promised (verheißen): the “armer Mann” 
promised them to himself. 
In both “Friedensfeier” and the “Rousseau,” language gestures towards a 
formalization (e.g. an image, a definition) of the divine, but in the end this formalization 
fails. In the first poem the poet works from “below” or “within,” while in the second he 
works from “above,” and between the two perspectives we come to understand that the 
divine is not something to be “seen” from any perspective. It is more like time, which is 
lived, than space, which is seen. We know it as a Schicksal guiding us mysteriously 
through time, rather than an image of life fixed somewhere outside of time. Truth is not 
the formal object of Platonic vision, but the lived quality of a sacred experience, as we 
will discuss more thoroughly in the next chapter. 
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Instead of giving us “eyes to see,” the “touch” of God confronts us with our 
religious blindness. This blindness should be compared to Schleiermacher’s “highest 
flowering of religion,” which is a vision of the “image of the universe...the beloved and 
ever-sought-for form.” Hölderlin categorically rejects the translation of a divine event 
into a divine form, while Schleiermacher lingers on the illusion that such a translation is 
possible. I say “illusion” because Schleiermacher makes it clear that the contact with the 
divine (the “caress,” “kiss,” “embrace,” etc.) is severed in order to produce the divine 
form. The divine form lives parasitically off the afterglow of the divine perception. 
Because this afterglow inevitably fades, religion must continually be reborn, as 
Schleiermacher argues later on in the Speeches. Perhaps the greater “purist,” Hölderlin 
never swaps the “blind,” physical language of originary revelation (rühren, bewegen, 
ergreifen, treffen, etc.) for the visual-conceptual language of theology (Schleiermacher’s 
“image of the universe”). Privileging the physical has its advantages and disadvantages: it 
heightens the sense of divine immediacy, but it also confounds the understanding. 
To give an example, Hölderlin would never translate this: 
Drum sandt er ihnen 
Den Geist, und freilich bebte 
Das Haus und die Wetter Gottes rollten 
Ferndonnernd über 
Die ahnenden Häupter, da, schwersinnend, 
Versammelt waren die Todeshelden, 
 
Itzt, da er scheidend 
Noch einmal ihnen erschien. 
(“Patmos,” StA 2,1: 168) 
into this:  
die ursprüngliche Anschauung des Christenthums...ist keine andere als die des 
allgemeinen Entgegenstrebens alles Endlichen gegen die Einheit des Ganzen, und 
der Art wie die Gottheit dieses Entgegenstreben behandelt, wie sie die Feindschaft 
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gegen sich vermittelt, und der größer werdenden Entfernung Grenzen sezt durch 
einzelne Punkte über das Ganze ausgestreut, welche zugleich Endliches und 
Unendliches, zugleich Menschliches und Göttliches sind. 
(Reden, 316) 
The difference is not so much one of poetry and prose, or “art” and “theory,” as much as 
experience and thought. Both passages are dealing with the mystery of Christ. In the lines 
from “Patmos,” Hölderlin describes the physical trauma of the Pentecost (displaced onto 
the scene of Christ’s first resurrected appearance to his disciples), while Schleiermacher 
describes “die geliebte und immer gesuchte [conceptual] Gestalt” that is extracted from 
this cosmic event. Hölderlin refuses to swap out sacred fire for sacred form, because he 
fails to see the warrant for such an exchange. When the poet does reflect on his 
experience, he does not come up with a conceptual “image of the universe” like 
Schleiermacher. Rather, he stumbles on his own blindness: “Was ist dies?” Hölderlin 
celebrates no creeds, for all formalizations of the divine come at the expense of the 
thing—or rather the event—itself. 
 
The Divine Touch 
 
In the first part of this chapter we have looked at the role of the body in the representation 
of religious reality. In every case, divine communication is unthinkable except through 
physical means. This physicality of the divine produces a paradox, which we can observe 
in Fichte, Schleiermacher, and Hölderlin: the material revelation of God simultaneously 
gives and withholds God from us. Precisely because the divine first appears in a physical 
(or physical-like) event, “spirit” cannot commune directly with “spirit,” i.e., God and the 
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soul cannot become two moments of the same spiritual reality, as in Hegel. The deus 
revelatus thus constitutes the deus absconditus. 
 What we can never see with the eye of understanding can nevertheless leave its 
imprint on representation. Hölderlin’s poetry is, as Rainer Nägele puts it, an “Echoraum,” 
in which the poet’s speech “nicht Schöpfung und Zeugen ist, sondern Zeugnis dessen, 
was er vernommen hat” (Kritik 26-27). Poetry is relieved of the “symbolic” task of 
participating in divine reality,13 and instead just has to pass along what it has observed. 
Poetry comes just after the fact, and its God is the God of Moses: “I will cover you with 
my hand until I have passed by; then I will take away my hand, and you shall see my 
back; but my face shall not be seen” (Ex. 33:22-23). Poetry’s “experience” is God 
passing by—or having passed by—and it offers up the marks of this passage. 
 We have established that the marks of the divine passage are physical and 
affective. The physical marks attest to the reality of the divine, while the affective ones 
give us limited knowledge about the divine character (e.g. God is good). In the remainder 
of this chapter we will look at both kinds in more detail starting with the physical. 
 We saw in “Friedensfeier” how tactile or kinetic imagery is intimately involved in 
the representation of the divine (röten die Wangen, halten, aufhalten). There are many 
more examples throughout Hölderlin’s work (all italics are mine): 
  ...und nicht geweissagt war es, sondern 
Die Locken ergriff es, gegenwärtig 
 
*** 
 
Aber der Mut von ihnen ist groß, es füllen das Herz ihm 
   Ihre Freuden... 
                                                 
13 Goethe, most notably, described the symbol as a sign participating in—rather than arbitrarily standing in 
for—the reality being signified. See Todorov, Theories of the Symbol, Blackwell, 1982. 
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*** 
 
So bewegt sie die Welt und die hoffende Seele der Menschen, 
 
*** 
 
Nur zu Zeiten erträgt göttliche Fülle der Mensch. 
 
*** 
 
   ...so auch 
Treiben uns lächelnd hinaus die Götter. 
 
*** 
 
Doch lebts in ihm und gegenwärtig, 
   Wärmend und wirkend, die Frucht entquillt ihm. 
 
*** 
 
   Und schon Jahre genug leb ich in sterblicher 
      Unverständiger Liebe 
         Zweifelnd, immer bewegt vor ihm, 
 
*** 
 
Zu mächtig, ach! ihr himmlischen Höhen, zieht 
   Ihr mich empor, bei Stürmen, am heitern Tag 
      Fühl ich verzehrend euch im Busen 
         Wechseln, ihr wandelnden Götterkräfte. 
 
  *** 
 
      Wo wunderbar zuerst, als du die 
         Locken ergriffen, und unvergesslich 
 
Der unverhoffte Genius über uns 
   Der schöpferische, göttliche kam, daß stumm 
      Der Sinn uns ward und, wie vom 
         Strahle gerührt, das Gebein erbebte... 
 
  *** 
 
   ...es sorget mit Gaben 
   Selber ein Gott für ihn, kennet und sieht er es nicht. 
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Tragen muß er, zuvor 
 
  *** 
 
Denn schonend rührt des Maßes allzeit kundig 
Nur einen Augenblick die Wohnungen der Menschen 
Ein Gott an, unversehn, und keiner weiß es, wenn? 
I do not want to give the false impression that most of the language used to describe 
encounters with the divine in Hölderlin is tactile or kinetic. Without having examined the 
matter statistically, I would say that Hölderlin draws on the tactile, the aural, and the 
visual in roughly equal measure. Sometimes it is hard to isolate a single governing sense. 
However, the tactile references are important because they are most able to stand alone 
without confirmation from the other senses, or even in contradiction to the other senses. 
In the list above, the last two passages are good examples of tactile primacy. In the 
second to last example, we feel the weight (tragen) of the divine before we can see and 
know it (sehen and kennen). In the last example, we are “touched” (gerührt) by the divine 
without even knowing so much as “when” or “if” (wenn) it happened, a strange paradox 
to which we will return in the next chapter on religious temporalities. In any case, the 
tactile is clearly important to Hölderlin’s conception and representation of divine 
experience.  
 Why is this tendency toward the tactile significant for the representation of divine 
difference? To answer this question we must digress and discuss what tactility is not: 
vision. 
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“Because thou hast seen me, thou hast believed”: Epistemology and Vision 
 
In the eighteenth century, visuality and epistemology were tightly interconnected, since 
“seeing” seemed to offer the best access objective reality. The optical theory of the day 
understood vision by analogy to the camera obscura, a primitive photographic device 
with an aperture through which external images are reproduces on an inside wall. 
Similarly, the eye was thought to take up particles from external objects and project them 
on the “wall” of the mind without essential modification.14 The eye is literally a window 
through which the world enters the mind. Vision has the most intimate relation to reality, 
since it seems to reproduce things transparently without interference from the visual 
organ. The eye is a self-effacing technology. 
With this understanding of vision, it is not surprising that eighteenth-century 
epistemology would be built on visual metaphors. Epistemological criteria common at the 
time (and every bit as frequent today) generally privilege vision over the other senses: 
“clear,” “distinct,” “illuminating,” and “enlightening” all suggest a high truth-value. 
Christian Wolff, the philosophical systematizer who best represents the pre-critical, 
rationalist tradition of the 18th- century, teaches that every idea (Begriff) can be 
categorized within a fixed hierarchy of binary judgments, the first and most important of 
which are entirely visual: klar/dunkel, deutlich/undeutlich (Wellbery, 12). Nonvisual 
descriptors like “touching,” “moving,” or “harmonious” play no role in Wolff’s 
epistemological vocabulary. 
                                                 
14 Jonathan Crary has written on the shift in the early 19th century away from the kind of optical science 
represented by the camera obscura to model of vision that takes into account the modifications made by the 
eyes and the brain to visual stimuli (represented by devises such as the phenakistiscope and stereoscope). 
See Techniques of the Observer: On Vision and Modernity in the Nineteenth Century (Cambridge, MA: 
MIT, 1990). 
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 Vision is not just involved in making epistemological judgments, however. The 
mental representations constituting knowledge are themselves a visual product. Since the 
object itself cannot enter our mind, it must be reconstructed or “represented” (vorgestellt) 
as a kind of picture in our head before we can claim knowledge of it. Abstract objects are 
represented in the same way, which means that “all mental activities...have their source 
in—are modifications of—the soul’s representational activity” (Wellbery 9). Wolff felt 
this was an uncomplicated process resembling the painting of a picture. Thus we not only 
“see” when we make judgments about the world, but we “see” in order to initiate the 
possibility of judgment, in order to create the object to be judged. The upshot of a 
representational epistemology is that the subject-object relation underlies all knowledge. 
Everything I know or can know is something (an object) that I (the subject) place before 
myself (the literal meaning of vorstellen), spatialize, and master with my gaze. 
It is worth pointing out that many philosophers have been suspicious of the 
epistemological “gaze.” Heidegger, as Stephen Houlgate observes, disapproves of our 
modern age insofar as it “conceives of whatever is as something ‘placed before us’ 
(vorgestellt), as objective, that is, as something whose being lies in standing over against 
us—there—as an object (Gegenstand) which is present to us in all its clarity” (Levin, 
91).15 Heidegger worries that the representational way of understanding the world—that 
all knowledge consists of images constructed by my mind and placed before me—is 
                                                 
15 The title of Houlgates essay in the volume edited by David Macheal Levin is “Vision, Reflection, and 
Openness: The ‘Hegemony of Vision’ from a Hegelian Point of View.” It should be noted that Houlgate 
finds the twentieth-century villainization of visuality unwarranted. In particular, his reading of Hegel sees 
vision as a reifying power which always, however, leads beyond its own reifications. The disagreement is 
not so much about the way vision works, but its use as a stopping point in the dialectic of thought. I would 
merely add the even if vision leads beyond itself, it still works in terms of visuality and reification, whereas 
Hölderlin’s distinctive use of tactility gestures toward something qualitatively different, a new kind of 
epistemological language. 
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becoming more and more entrenched as modern technologies allow us to manipulate 
everything as objects. By living in the world exclusively as manipulating subjects, we 
lose a sense of the simple mystery of coming-into-being, and forfeit a primary, 
constitutive experience of being for a secondary, instrumental one. 
Coming from a different philosophical perspective, Bergson describes the travesty 
of representation in fairly similar terms: 
As soon as we try to give an account of a conscious state, to analyze it, this state, 
which is above all personal, will be resolved into impersonal elements external to 
one another, each of which calls up the idea of a genus and is expressed by a 
word. But because our reason, equipped with the idea of space and the power of 
creating symbols, draws these multiple elements out of the whole, it does not 
follow that they were contained in it. For within the whole they did not occupy 
space and did not care to express themselves by means of symbols; they 
permeated and melted into one another. Associationism thus makes the mistake of 
constantly replacing the concrete phenomenon which takes place in the mind by 
the artificial reconstruction of it given by philosophy, and of thus confusing the 
explanation of the fact with the fact itself. (163) 
 
For both Heidegger and Bergson, representing or “giving an account” of experience is a 
reductive spatialization process.  
 For our present purpose, it is also important to point out that visual epistemology 
eventually contradicts a theology of transcendence. The “putting before” of 
representation is inherently repressive. The metaphor of “putting” something in front of 
us inevitably suggests that we are in the position of power. We are capable of seizing and 
restraining the object’s essence in order to take it in as knowledge. This is simply 
incompatible with the tradition view of God. Any God that we can seize and restrain is no 
longer the inscrutable transcendent being of orthodox theology. 
This danger is not merely potential. Representationalism seriously undermines 
theology in the eighteenth century, but not in the way one might expect. The problem is 
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not that overweening philosophers start manhandling God, “putting him before them” to 
master him with their epistemological gaze. Rather, philosophers exclude God from their 
labors in first philosophy because he is only representation. Like all other representations, 
God emerges in our mind from more basic principles. Consequently, juggling 
representations—even sacred ones—is not the road to truth, which can only lie in the 
transcendental (not transcendent) operations of the mind. 
We get a concrete example of how representationalism impacts religion in 
Schelling’s 1795 text Vom Ich. For Schelling, consciousness not only must represent 
things to itself, but it must invest those things with being (Sein), since only the 
representing subject has being in itself. Such an Ich-Philosophie moves beyond 
representational epistemology to representational ontology. Knowledge no longer 
consists of real things generating mental images, as in Wolff, but rather the imaging mind 
generating real things. God is one such thing. While I am free to assert that God reveals 
himself to me, I must also acknowledge that it is I who invest God—and everything 
else—with being. 
This is obviously problematic for religion. The problem is not so much that God 
could not exist independently of the Ich; rather, the problem is that an independent God 
could not find room to dwell in us alongside the oversized ego. Jesus describes the Holy 
Ghost as the “Spirit of truth, whom the world cannot receive, because it neither sees him 
nor knows him. You know him, because he abides with you, and he will be in you [i.e., 
he is coincident with the self].” This blurring of the line between self and God is not 
possible for Schelling, who says that the self is epistemologically and ontologically prior 
to God. It strains logic (for Schelling) to say that God is active in us before we have even 
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brought him into existence. What is our justification for retrofitting the subject with a 
second divine self, a cohabitator of the soul who is not immediately given in our 
representation of self? The doctrine of the God “abiding” in us seems arbitrary at best.  
This incompatibility between representationalism and theology makes it clear 
why Hölderlin would want to explore a non-visual, non-representational kind of religious 
rhetoric. Representationalism leads to the idea that whatever can be known can be known 
clearly. If it is not clear, it has no being (as least for the early Schelling). 
Representationalism has little patience for things that are intrinsically unrepresentable, 
such as the inscrutable God, especially if this God is seen as the source of reality! If we 
take Schelling as the background for Hölderlin’s religious thought, we can see why the 
poet would be compelled to cling to the “divine” (a quality of experience) rather than to 
“God” (a representation). Once “God” enters the picture, philosophy can dispatch him. 
This need to “hide” God from philosophy also explains Hölderlin’s preference for neuter 
nominalized adjectives (das Höchste, das Beste, das Erfruende), plural divinities (die 
Himmlischen, die Seligsten, die Guten), and a general inconsistency in divine 
nomenclature (Gott, ein Gott, die Götter, Halbgötter, das Göttliche, etc.). 
 
Divine Kinesis 
 
Vision is not always luminous. Because it puts us in relation to an external world, vision 
always enacts the distinction between subject and object, and the subject-object 
distinction in turn creates a space, as Kant demonstrated, for a “thing-in-itself” 
impenetrable to sight. Vision, in other words, may produce knowledge that is klar and 
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deutlich, but this same clarity also erects an epistemological wall between the one seeing 
and the thing seen. It reveals and veils. One might ask if there is a non-visual register of 
experience in which the problem of the “in-itself” never emerges. Hölderlin, I suggest, 
finds this alternative in tactility. 
 Touch is opaque and produces knowledge that is relatively dunkel and undeutlich. 
Its manner of relating the internal and external world is oblique, since the skin (unlike 
eyes, ears, mouth, or nose) is not an orifice, such as would allow us to construct an 
epistemological metaphor of direct intake. Skin is the primal barrier between self and 
world, inside and out; a breach in the skin is not an orifice but a wound. Unlike the eye, 
the flesh translates the object into a mediate form (i.e., pressure or pain) in order to 
produce sensation. It is nothing like the seemingly self-effacing medium of the eye. 
Describing touch in this way seems to hold little epistemological promise, but a 
rhetoric of tactility has one religiously useful consequence; it opens up the interior of the 
body as a whole new site of experience. Although most things we can touch we can also 
see, the interior of the body is a space of utter darkness, where only tactile sensation is 
possible. Of course, anatomy opens the interior of the body to vision as well, and when I 
feel my heart beating, I (having learned anatomy) can also “see” the physical organ in my 
mind’s eye. But not all internal processes can be reduced to anatomy or physiology, since 
they include a mental or spiritual component. The “heart” captures this ambiguity 
perfectly: is it a metaphor of spirit, a synecdoche for the body, or both? Some internal 
events may be mostly spiritual with only a trace of the physical, or vice versa. 
In any case, inner experience obscures the boundary between the representing 
subject and the represented object. The human interior is of part of “me,” but it is not the 
 122 
thinking part of me. Nor is it merely my body, which I can think of as detached from my 
self. Phenomenologically this creates an interesting situation. If the visual-
representational distinction of subject and object does not obtain in inner (tactile) 
experience, then what remains is pure feeling. This feeling will initially appear in 
consciousness as something physical, which will allow the subject to distinguish itself 
from the feeling. But there will also be something intimate and spiritual about the feeling, 
which will prevent the subject from classifying it with other external stimuli. This inner 
realm that does not belong to my thinking self could well be called “spirit,” and it is 
frequently where we look for religious knowledge.  
 Another important phenomenological point is that in the absence of an object 
around which to coalesce, interior events will be experienced primarily as a stirring or 
elation. This is Otto’s divine Energisches. Because this stirring sits at the threshold 
between the physical and the intellectual, it is possible for representations to emerge from 
it (as opposed to capturing it). This is what happens when, for instance, Hölderlin 
associates terms like “hope,” “gratitude,” and “love” with the “touch” of the gods. 
Whatever that “touch” may actually be in itself, it is intrinsically suggestive of a 
mysterious benevolence. This quality of the experience is what justifies the attribution of 
the “touch” to the gods in the first place. 
 The object-less stirring of the divine “touch” can be captured in the term 
“kinesis.” The OED defines kinesis as “an undirected movement of an organism that 
occurs in response to a particular kind of stimulus” (my emphasis). Used mostly in 
reference to microbiotic life, the “particular” kind of stimulus in question is tactile rather 
than visual. As an undirected burst of movement unleashed by a particular, tactile 
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stimulus, kinesis is quite different from romanticism’s favored biological model: 
organicism. There is no driving inner form in kinesis, but only a transient tactile force 
like the Johannine wind “blow[ing] where it chooses, and you hear the sound of it, but 
you do not know where it comes from or where it goes.” Kinesis can be thought of as the 
prolongation of touch, the energy that flows out from touch and stimulates thought and 
action. This perplexing arousal of spirit is what we find again and again when tactile 
verbs like treffen, bewegen, rühren, treiben, tragen, füllen, schüttern, ergreifen, 
erwecken, and so forth. The divine “touch” releases a kinetic force that drives and 
disorders history, and this creative disorder becomes the signature of the divine.  
Before giving positive examples of the “undirected movement” of the kinetic 
divine in Hölderlin’s poetry, let begin with the negative example of Wordsworthian 
pantheism. In “Lines written a few miles above Tintern Abbey,” the divine manifests 
itself as an inner movement (“a motion and a spirit, that impels / All thinking things), but 
this movement is neither undirected nor unrepresentable. In the scene before him, the 
poet senses 
   ...something far more deeply interfused, 
Whose dwelling is the light of setting suns, 
And the round ocean, and the living air, 
And the blue sky, and in the mind of man, 
A motion and a spirit, that impels 
All thinking things, all objects of thought 
And rolls through all things.16 
Wordsworth’s “motion...that impels / All thinking things...And rolls through all things” is 
superficially similar to Hölderlin’s Bewegung that stirs the world and the “hoffende Seele 
der Menschen” in “Brod und Wein.” However, Wordsworth claims that this motion 
                                                 
16 Lyrical Ballads, p. 115. 
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“dwells” in nature and the “mind of man.” It is “interfused” and essentially 
indistinguishable from them. Coleridge calls this divinity the “one life within us and 
abroad,” and the “intellectual breeze, / At once the soul of each, and God of All.” In a 
similar vein, Herder speaks of God as the “Urkraft aller Kräfte,” the selfsame power that 
animates both mind and nature. These writers’ pantheistic interpretation of the divine 
movement prevents it from signifying anything new or different from the world we 
already know. The inner stage of feeling becomes a mirror of mind and nature rather than 
an alternative to them.  
Hölderlin does not actually believe that God, mind, and nature form a single 
spiritual whole. God and nature frequently seem to converge, but man is never part of this 
equation.17 When God penetrates the interior of man, the result is confusion and even 
distress. We don’t know why the divine comes and goes, or where it leads us. In its 
kinetic relation to man, the divine is decidedly “unnatural.” 
 All of this is apparent in the ode “Mein Eigentum.” The first stanzas present us 
with a pantheistic mood that is disrupted in the fourth stanza by the poet’s awareness of 
his spiritual exclusion.  
In seiner Fülle ruhet der Herbsttage nun, 
   Geläutert ist die Traub und der Hain ist rot 
      Vom Obst, wenn schon der holden Blüten 
         Manche der Erde zum Danke fielen. 
 
Und rings im Felde, wo ich den Pfad hinaus, 
   Den stillen, wandle, ist den Zufriedenen 
      Ihr Gut gereift und viel der frohen 
         Mühe gewähret der Reichtum ihnen. 
                                                 
17 This is the central theme of Hölderlin’s epistolary novel Hyperion, where human nature is distinguished 
by an infinite desire for intellectual, artistic, and political beauty. This drives man out of the pantheistic 
union between spirit and nature, and makes him dependent on a vaguely theistic Schicksal, which can look 
favorably on us, but can also cast us “ins Ungewisse hinaus” (StA 3: 118). 
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Vom Himmel blicket zu den Geschäftigen 
   Durch ihre Bäume milde das Licht herab, 
      Die Freude teilend, denn es wuchs durch 
         Hände der Menschen allein die Frucht nicht. 
 
Und leuchtest du, o Goldenes, auch mir, und wehst 
   Auch du mir wieder, Lüftchen, als segnetest 
      Du eine Freude mir, wie einst, und 
         Irrst, wie um Glückliche, mir am Busen? 
(StA 1,1: 306) 
Nature appears saturated with the divine: “in seiner Fülle ruhet der Herbsttage nun.” It 
has been clarified (“geläutert”) by a more-than-natural Licht (l.10), or Goldenes (l.13), 
which is also the source of joy (Freude, lines 11 & 15) for certain classes of people. It is 
crucial to understand that Hölderlin—just like Wordsworth—tends to treat the rural lower 
class like children or objects of nature rather than like free rational subjects. They can 
live in unity with nature—and through nature with the divine—because they are not yet 
human. The self-reflective subject of the fourth stanza has left this pre-human condition 
behind.  
Even so, the third stanza gives us a hint of human isolation even among the 
simple class of men. We read that the light distributes joy (“die Freude teilend”), but 
“teilen” is just as divisive as it is unifying. Sharing is not merging “rolling through all 
things”; it implies an ontological separation between the divine giver and the human 
receiver, which requires them to interact as free persons rather then organically connected 
parts.18 Accordingly, joy must be given as a gift, in this case the Frucht (l.15) that “wuchs 
durch Hände der Menschen allein...nicht.“ 
                                                 
18 There is an ambiguity in the phrase “die Freude teilend.” In my interpretation, I assume that “das Licht” 
shares out the “Freude” with the “Geschäftigen.” It is also possible that the Licht shares in the “Freude.” 
The former is more likely, however, since “Freude” often functions as a gift in Hölderlin’s poetry. Also, in 
the fourth stanza it is clear that the “Goldenes” is in a position to bestow “Freude” on the poet, which 
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Only in the fourth stanza do we see man fully cut out of the pantheistic economy. 
The poet can address the divine by name (in the Trinitarian guise of “Goldenes,” 
“Lüftchen,” and “Freude”) only because he has separated from it. As “Lüftchen,” the 
divine is like the Johannine wind, which “blows” (wehen) over us without resting upon 
us. It must pass over us or it will cease to exist. Most importantly, the precise way in 
which the divine “Freude” infiltrates the human subject is very telling. The divine does 
not “dwell” in us, as in the Gospel of John or in Wordsworth, but rather consecrates a joy 
for us (“segnetest / Du eine Freude mir”). The dative pronoun (mir) and the verb 
“segnen” establish an interpersonal distance between the human and the divine, which is 
at odds with pantheistic identity. If the divine does not merge with self, it must employ an 
intermediary, which is what we get in “Freude”: “segnetest du eine Freude mir.” The 
divine is the second person “Du,” while the “Freude” is a third-person go-between. Just 
as telling in the fourth stanza is the verb “irren” in the last line, which evokes an image 
diametrically opposed to the “dwelling” Spirit of Hegel, Wordsworth, and John 14 (but in 
harmony with John 3). The space necessary for irren is simultaneously the space 
separating the human and the divine. It is the space that explains why the divine is “um 
Glückliche” rather than “in Glücklichen,” and “am Busen” rather than “im Busen.” These 
positions of nearness never lead to penetration and unification. The divine remains an 
ambient and ambulatory power, at once intimate and alien.  
 This alienation-within-intimacy comes to the fore in the seventh stanza, as we saw 
in the previous chapter. After being caught up in the divinely “interfused” scene of the 
opening stanzas, the poet reflects on his own “uprootedness”: 
                                                 
suggests that the “Licht” in the third stanza would be doing the same, i.e., sharing out and not sharing in 
“Freude.” 
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Denn, wie die Pflanze, wurzelt auf eignem Grund 
   Sie nicht, verglüht die Seele des Sterblichen, 
      Der mit dem Tageslichte nur, ein 
         Armer, auf heiliger Erde wandelt. 
(StA 1,1: 307) 
The earth is holy, but the poet is not; he is “poor” (arm) and “mortal” (sterblich). The 
earth is not the “eigener Grund” of the “Seele des Sterblichen.” Nature’s glory is its own, 
and while man can admire and cultivate nature, he remains alien to it. Against the steady 
backdrop of the “heiliger Erde,” man is a melancholy “fading away” (verglühen) into the 
night of death. Confronted with the “saturated phenomenon”19 of an autumnal harvest, 
the poet indeed feels the divine “impelling all thinking things,” as Wordsworth says, but 
this pressure is not centripetal; it does not pull the human spirit and nature into a common 
organic whole. On the contrary: 
Zu mächtig, ach! ihr himmlischen Höhen, zieht 
   Ihr mich empor, bei Stürmen, am heitern Tag 
      Fühl ich verzehrend euch im Busen 
         Wechseln, ihr wandelnden Götterkräfte. 
(StA 1,1: 307) 
Here, at last, we encounter the divine kinesis for which the preceding stanzas set the sage. 
The “himmlische Höhe” are “im Busen,” but this is an unstable and discordant condition. 
The seamless image of the divine “rolling through all things”—including the poet—in the 
Wordsworthian idyll contrasts sharply with the clash between the poet and the divine in 
Hölderlin. What the Hölderlinian poet sees—the serene fullness of nature—and what he 
feels—the “consuming alternation” (“verzehrend...Wechseln”) of “roaming” divine 
powers (“wandelnden Götterkräfte”) in the poet’s bosom—are heterogeneous 
manifestations of the divine. The kinetic violence inside the poet’s body (“im Busen”) 
                                                 
19 This is a key term in Jean-Luc Marion’s religiously-mindful phenomenology. See, for instance, In 
Excess: Studies in Saturated Phenomena (New York: Fordham UP, 2004). 
 
 128 
does not institute any kind of wholeness or completion comparable to what we find in 
nature. 
The irren of the divine am Busen is gentle enough, but im Busen it becomes “zu 
mächtig” and “verzehrend.” This violence is made more extreme by its apparent lack of 
purpose, which is the “undirectedness” of the kinetic. Because the subject cannot see 
whence, whereby, or whereto it is being moved upon, it can perceive the divine as a 
burden, or even a threat, as the divine “settles” in the subjective interior. 
 But have we contradicted ourselves? Can the divine—contrary to our conclusions 
in the last chapter—“settle into the subjective interior” after all? At the beginning of 
“Mein Eigentum” the divine is still exterior to the poet, but in the stanza above (“Zu 
mächtig, ach!...”) the divine has entered the paradigmatic interior space: the Busen. Of 
course this interiorization does not work very well. The divine tears mercilessly at the 
flesh in which it has been caged. Nevertheless, the poet has at least made an attempt to 
think about the divine as something im Busen rather than am Busen. 
I believe that this attempt at interiorizing the divine is more typical of the early 
poetry. (“Mein Eigentum” is an earlier ode.) Peter Szondi proposes that the earlier poetry 
(e.g. the elegies) is characterized by a pained desire for personal reconciliation with the 
divine, while the later poetry (e.g. the “hymns” or vaterländische Gesänge) tends to 
obliterate the self in disinterested praise of the gods. In the early Erlebnislyrik, the poet 
suffers “das Gefühl von Finsternis, von Götterferne, von Liebelosigkeit [und] die 
Erfahrung der Vereinzelung” (50), and he nurses these. His suffering is ultimately self-
willed. The only solution is to abandon the entire cause of the self. “Das Elegische 
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mündet nicht eigentlich in das Hymnische, ein qualitativer Sprung trennt die beiden 
Formen: der von der Erlebnislyrik zum selbstlosen Preis der Götter” (54).  
 On one level I think Szondi is wrong, since subjective elements of Erlebnis never 
disappear from Hölderlin’s poetry. The feel of the personal encounter remains important. 
At the same time, Szondi is right to identify an elegiac tendency in the earlier poetry 
accompanying the poet’s attempts to capture and restrain the divine for himself. In the 
more mature poetry, the poet is less anxious about capturing the divine, and more 
prepared to calmly reflect on its fleeting appearances and the intervening absences. He 
finally understands that the divine is kinetic rather than organic. 
One way to read the poetic development of Hölderlin’s oeuvre is in terms of an 
increased acceptance of divine kinesis over and against the more comprehensive and 
comprehensible model of organic pantheism. This gradual acceptance of the kinetic has a 
superficial similarity to the religious capitulation that Eric Santner identifies in 
Hölderlin’s late work. For Santner, it is “as if it had suddenly become safe for the poet to 
let go his breath and be there, with the things of the world; the anxieties associated with 
the stranded objects and shards of the narrative of redemption begin to be modulated into 
the consolations of the Tageszeichen” (126). The poet, in other words, is not so worried 
about the big picture, and how—or if—a grand reconciliation between God and man is to 
take place. The poet’s task, for Santner, is “no longer...to transcend the flux of time, but 
rather, in a peculiar sense to let us feel it more deeply, more fully, more caringly, and 
perhaps, even, to celebrate it” (136). I think Santner is right to point to a reduction of 
anxiety in some of the later poems (or at least parts of the poems). An image of quiet, 
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resigned contemplation is beautifully captured, for example, in the very late, final draft of 
“Mnemosyne”: 
Vorwärts aber und rückwärts wollen wir 
Nicht sehn. Uns wiegen lassen, wie 
Auf schwankem Kahne der See. 
(StA 2,1: 197) 
The poet is not always trying to “get” somewhere in this “schwankem Kahne.” Yet the 
opening lines of another late poem suggest that the poet has not outgrown his religious 
ambition, nor has the world quieted down, as Santner suggests, into a gentle 
“consolation”: 
Jetzt komme, Feuer! 
Begierig sind wir, 
Zu schauen den Tag, 
Und wenn die Prüfung 
Ist durch die Knie gegangen 
Mag einer spüren das Waldgeschrei. 
(“Der Ister,” StA 2,1: 190) 
Hölderlin never denies the “fire” of the divine and the power of its voice 
(“Waldgeschrei”). The poet merely comes to accept a hiatus between heaven and earth. 
Modernity finds itself in this hiatus and is powerless to close it. To sit in the schwankem 
Kahne is not, as Santner suggests, to forget the gods in quiet “celebration” of the world, 
but rather to relax our pursuit of the gods in acknowledgment of our religious impotence.  
Nowhere is this transition from anxiety to resigned acceptance of divine kinesis 
better captured than in the following sequence from the late poem “Patmos,” where 
Christ’s anguished disciples are watching his final ascent into heaven: 
...und nicht geweissagt war es, sondern 
Die Loken ergriff es, gegenwärtig, 
Wenn ihnen plözlich 
Ferneilend zurük blikte 
Der Gott und schwörend, 
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Damit er halte, wie an Seilen golden 
Gebunden hinfort 
Das Böse nennend, sie die Hände sich reichten – 
 
Wenn aber stirbt alsdenn 
An dem am meisten 
Die Schönheit hieng...  
 
...wenn die Ehre 
Des Halbgotts und der Seinen 
Verweht und selber sein Angesicht 
Der Höchste wendet 
Darob, daß nirgend ein 
Unsterbliches mehr am Himmel zu sehn ist oder 
Auf grüner Erde, was ist diß? 
 
Es ist der Wurf des Säemanns, wenn er faßt 
Mit der Schaufel den Waizen, 
Und wirft, dem Klaren zu, ihn schwingend über die Tenne. 
Ihm fällt die Schaale vor den Füßen, aber 
Ans Ende kommet das Korn, 
Und nicht ein Übel ists, wenn einiges 
Verloren gehet und von der Rede 
Verhallet der lebendige Laut, 
Denn göttliches Werk auch gleichet dem unsern. 
Nicht alles will der Höchste zumal. 
(StA 2,1: 169-170) 
In the first stanza we have an extraordinary kinetic encounter with the divine as it 
“seizes” the lonely disciples “by the locks.” This experience was not predicted 
(geweissagt), because that would entail a kind of representability—specifically a 
foreseeability—uncharacteristic of the divine. Like the poet in certain early poems, the 
disciples here want to restrain the divine—“damit er halte...sie die Hände sich 
reichten”—within the field of history. In its most extreme version, this immature 
compulsion to grab hold of and restrain the divine leads to self-sacrifice, as in the odes 
“An die Parzen,” “Empedokles,” and “Stimme des Volkes” (second version) respectively: 
Nur einen Sommer gönnt, ihr Gewaltigen! 
   Und einen Herbst zu reifem Gesange mir, 
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      Daß williger mein Herz, vom süßen 
         Spiele gesättiget, dann mir sterbe. 
(StA 1,1: 241) 
 
*** 
Das Leben suchst du, suchst, und es quillt und glänzt 
   Ein göttlich Feuer tief aus der Erde dir, 
      Und du in schauderndem Verlangen 
         Wirfst dich hinab, in des Aetna Flammen. 
(StA 1,1: 240) 
 
*** 
Denn selbstvergessen, allzubereit, den Wunsch 
   Der Götter zu erfüllen, ergreift zu gern, 
      Was sterblich ist, wenn offnen Augs auf 
         Eigenen Pfaden es einmal wandelt, 
 
Ins All zurük die kürzeste Bahn; so stürzt 
   Der Strom hinab, er suchet die Ruh, es reißt, 
      Es ziehet wider Willen ihn, von 
         Klippe zu Klippe, den Steuerlosen, 
 
Das wunderbare Sehnen dem Abgrund zu; 
   Das Ungebundne reizet und Völker auch 
      Ergreift die Todeslust... 
(StA 2,1: 51) 
Like the apostles in “Patmos,” the subject in these other poems has been visited by the 
gods and dreads their withdrawal. Rather than learn to deal with the emptiness endemic 
in human existence, the subject clings to his gods through the self-sacrifice of death. The 
reason for this resort to death is suggested in “Stimme des Volkes,” where the subject, the 
“Steuerlosen,” wanders “auf eigenen Pfaden” in pursuit of “Das Ungebundne.” The 
subject pursues the source and telos of its religious desire in vain, since the divine is 
formless: “das Ungebundene.” Consequently, the poet must wander along “eigenen 
Pfaden” (not God’s ways), directionless (steuerlos) in its search for the divine. The 
kinetic nature of revelation does not provide us with a soteriological or eschatological 
blueprint, and so the religiously afflicted can only take one route: death. In Hölderlin, 
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death is not, as in Novalis, a kind of dissolution into the beloved, and thus a movement 
within a defined, conservative (albeit infinitely productive) system.20 One of the striking 
things about Hölderlin’s mature work is that it contains virtually no reference to an 
afterlife, not even a romantic re-absorption into the Weltgeist.21 This means that death 
does not mark any kind of teleological progress. Man is no closer to the gods through 
death, but only one step further from his present anguish. Death is sacred only as a 
gesture of self-sacrifice, a sign of readiness to follow the gods at all costs. Hölderlin 
never provides us with the metaphysics to justify the belief that death takes us anywhere. 
 As I said, death is an extreme and “immature” reaction to a hiatus in divine 
history. In “Patmos,” the disciples “aber...liebten unter der Sonne / Das Leben und lassen 
wollten sie nicht / Vom Angesichte des Herrn / Und der Heimat.” They have not yet 
understood and accepted the impermanence involved in divine kinesis, but they are not 
utterly desperate. The disciples are like the poet in the ode “Empedokles,” who would 
like to follow Empedocles “in die Tiefe / Hielte die Liebe mich nicht” (StA 1,1: 240). 
They do not seek death because they are bound to the world by love. They would rather 
restrain God in this world than follow him into death. They are in danger of falling into 
despair or madness if they actually believe they can restrain the divine, but they have no 
                                                 
20 I am thinking especially of the opening hymn of Hymnen an die Nacht, where the poet experiences the 
“night”—an image explicitly identified with death later in the work—as an erotic other: “liebliche Sonne 
der Nacht,—nun wache ich—denn ich bin Dein und Mein [...] zehre mit Geisterglut meinen Leib, daß ich 
luftig mit dir inniger mich mische und dann ewig die Brautnacht währt” (42). 
 
21 It is important to distinguish between the early and late work here, since the novel Hyperion (published 
1798 after six years of writing) contains some concentrated meditations on the afterlife, especially 
Diotima’s deathbed letter to her beloved: “Wie sollt ich mich verlieren aus der Sphäre des Lebens, worin 
die ewige Liebe, die allen gemein ist, die Naturen alle zusammenhält?...nein! nein! im Bunde der Natur ist 
Treue kein Traum. Wir trennen uns nur, um inniger einig zu sein, göttlicher fridlich mit allem, mit uns. Wir 
sterben um zu leben” (StA 3: 148). This pantheistic immortality is markedly absent in the great elegies and 
“hymns” of the period 1800-1805. 
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choice (apart from death) other than to try. The disciples’ hopeful yet hopeless action 
resembles the poet’s prayer in “Mein Eigentum”: 
Ihr segnet gütig über den Sterblichen, 
   Ihr Himmelskräfte! jedem sein Eigentum, 
      O segnet meines auch, und daß zu 
         Frühe die Parze den Traum nicht ende. 
(StA 1,1: 307) 
The poet prays that the gods will linger in his song, but the prognosis is not good. The 
poet is aware of his own bad faith. He knows he is praying for something that will really 
only dull or forestall the pain of spiritual emptiness: “daß zu / Frühe die Parze den Traum 
nicht ende.” The fleeting, kinetic nature of the divine is tacitly understood, but not really 
accepted. 
In moving on to the second and third stanzas quoted above from “Patmos,” we 
move beyond the disciples’ reluctance to something more theologically realistic and 
spiritually courageous. The mature poet asks: when the God-man (Jesus) dies, the 
heavens are shut, and we can no longer even see a trace of the divine...was ist dies? Such 
an honest question was too much for the earlier poet. It was almost too much for the poet 
of “Hälfte des Lebens,” who had the courage to stare divine absence in the face only to be 
robbed, in the end, of the power of speech: “Die Mauern stehn / Sprachlos und kalt, im 
Winde / Klirren die Fahnen.“ The concessions made in the question “was ist dies?” are 
too great. To acknowledge what theologians call “divine hiddenness”—the idea that God 
may really not be available—is silently to reject pantheism, panentheism, 
transubstantiation, and any other theology putting us in direct contact with the divine. 
The mature poet can let the Griff of the divine come and go, as it inevitably must. He has 
learned to relinquish his claim on God and take up the more impersonal task of 
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interpreting what has been left behind. By the end of “Patmos,” the poet has come to 
view the interpretation of remains as the very task of poetry (which is not the 
expressivist-idealist view of poetry found in the earlier theoretical writings): 
  ...der Vater aber liebt, 
Der über allen waltet, 
Am meisten, daß gepfleget werde 
Der feste Buchstab, und Bestehendes gut 
Gedeutet. Dem folgt deutscher Gesang. 
(StA 2,1: 172) 
But what remains to be interpreted in the “Bestehendes”? As we saw in the 
passage quoted earlier, the Bestehendes is incomplete: “Nicht ein Übel ists, wenn einiges 
/ Verloren gehet.” The “einiges” refers to some of the grain being threshed, and if God is 
the Säemann doing the threshing (which seems to me to be the case),22 the implication is 
that God is not watching over every sparrow that falls, or at least choosing not to 
intervene. Does this mean that God is not omnipotent? Or does it precisely mean that God 
is omnipotent, i.e., a being who is not bound by human expectations? In either case, God 
leaves behind an erratic trail that significantly challenges his interpreters. Hölderlin 
avoids the usual apologetic tendency to “leave nothing contingent in cosmic processes.”23 
 “Einiges Verloren gehet” is Hölderlin’s way of saying that there is something 
irregular in the divine making it impossible to represent in any stable way. God has the 
freedom to change unexpectedly. Whatever trail God leaves behind in the world may not 
add up to any recognizable meaning. This, however, is not necessarily a bad thing. Any 
rational pattern that God did leave behind would probably end up replacing him. 
                                                 
22 The “Wurf des Säemanns” is extremely ambiguous, and has been called the “figure for the figure of 
figure(s)” (Warminski 488). Later in the stanza, however, the lines: “Denn göttliches Werk auch gleichet 
dem unsern, / Nicht alles will der Höchste zumal” suggest a fairly clear identification between the Säemann 
and der Höchste. 
 
23 Owen Gingerich, God’s Universe (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 2006), 115. 
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Hölderlin represents the divine as a kinetic, inner experience primarily, I believe, to 
deliver it from philosophical reduction. 
 
The Fruit of the Spirit 
 
We should now ask a final, crucial question: why does divine kinesis not lead to despair? 
If kinesis resists coherent form, how can it have any meaning for us? Why, if the divine 
does not join up with philosophy, does our faith in it not fail entirely? Whence the hope 
that resurfaces again and again in Hölderlin’s poetry? I have suggested the answer to 
these questions at few points in this chapter and the preceding one, but the topic deserves 
specific treatment. 
At the end of the last chapter I suggested that the divine is an encounter. Divine 
spirit and human spirit are not simply two moments in a single Hegelian Spirit, but really 
are two spirits (or a spirit and something else), and if we get nothing else from religious 
experience, we can at least take away the memory of two things having come together. 
What the current chapter adds to this story is a rhetorical strategy for capturing the 
quality of the divine encounter. As an “inner” event, the divine encounter is equidistant 
from a physical sensation and an intellectual movement. It produces a feeling that is both 
immediately real and immediately meaningful. It is both treffen, ergreifen, etc. and 
Freude, Liebe, Dank, and Demut. Having looked at the former aspect in the preceding 
section, I now want to spend a moment on the latter aspect.  
There is no higher moment, perhaps, in Hölderlin’s poetry than the simple 
statement near the end of “Heimkunft”: “Törig rede ich. Es ist die Freude” (StA 2,1: 98). 
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Criticism is more drawn to the lines just below, which allow us to forget the “uncritical” 
moment of törige Freude and see emotion as a mere accompaniment of language: 
Schweigen müssen wir oft; es fehlen heilige Namen, 
   Herzen schlagen und doch bleibet die Rede zurück? 
(StA 2,1: 99) 
A poststructural reading might see the desire to name (“es fehlen heilige Namen...doch 
bleibet die Rede zurück?”) as the direct cause of the “Herzen schlagen.” An intellectual 
anxiety about naming spills over into a physical anxiety.24 Similarly, a Heideggerian 
reading might see the schlagen as a corollary to an intellectual anxiety about the 
hiddenness of Being. In his “Erläuterung” of “Heimkunft,” Heidegger asks the question: 
“Was ist die Freude?” to which he gives the answer: “Das ursprüngliche Wesen der 
Freude ist das Heimischwerden in der Nähe zum Ursprung” (25). “Joy” is 
indistinguishable from the ontological activity of Dasein, and this robs “joy” of any 
independent significance. In contrast, Hölderlin’s connection between joy and 
incoherence (“Törig rede ich. Es ist die Freude”) suggests that affect can be entirely 
different from linguistic or philosophical activity, and a fundamental experience requiring 
no theoretical accounting. Schlagen can precede Rede in every sense: temporally, 
causally, ontologically; it need not be reduced to an accompaniment, a mere “moment” in 
the process of language or in Dasein’s disclosure of Being. 
 The gift of God can be immediate affect. Paul says: “die Frucht aber des Geistes 
ist: Liebe, Freude, Friede, Geduld, Freundlichkeit, Gütigkeit, Glaube, Sanftmut, 
                                                 
24 Rainer Nägele, for example, sees a physical dimension in God’s “striking” (treffen), but there is no 
question for him that the “real” meaning of the treffen is intellectual. It is the tramautic blow from the 
“Zeichen setzender Gott.” God is conceived as an essentially linguistic (“zeichen setzender”) rather than a 
physical force, and anything that comes from God will likewise be essentially linguistic. See Text, 
Geschichte, und Subjektivität, esp. pp. 17-120. 
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Keuschheit.” (Gal. 5:22, Luther translation). None of these is a synonym for knowledge. 
Rather, the gift of God consists only of these emotions, which in some cases (Liebe, 
Freundlichkeit, Gütigkeit, Glaube) have an ethical or interpersonal component. St. 
Ignatius also describes the influence of God, or “consolation,” in terms of unmediated 
affect: 
It is characteristic of God and His Angels, when they act upon the soul, to give 
true happiness and spiritual joy, and to banish all the sadness and disturbances 
which are caused by the enemy.... God alone can give consolation to the soul 
without any previous cause. It belongs solely to the Creator to come into a soul, to 
leave it, to act upon it, to draw it wholly to the love of His Divine Majesty. 
 
Hölderlin’s poetry does not make sense without this unmediated uplift, and we must 
understand Hölderlin’s Liebe and Freude as relatives to those of Paul and Ignatius. They 
are not fruits of reason or even of beauty, but are directly divine. They are the other side, 
more beautiful side of divine kinesis. Because the two writers are on the same page, 
Ignatious’s recommendation of caution when reacting to the divine gift has relevance to 
the interpretation of Hölderlin: 
When consolation is without previous cause, as was said, there can be no 
deception in it, since it can proceed from God our Lord only. But a spiritual 
person who has received such a consolation must consider it very attentively, and 
must cautiously distinguish the actual time of the consolation from the period 
which follows it. At such a time the soul is still fervent and favored with the grace 
and aftereffects of the consolation which has passed. In this second period the 
soul frequently forms various resolutions and plans which are not granted directly 
by God our Lord. They may come from our own reasoning on the relations of our 
concepts and on the consequences of our judgments, or they may come from the 
good or evil spirit. (119) 
 
The “period” following the “actual time of consolation” is a period of potential error. As 
we move from a religious mode into a rational mode, we can easily misapply a divine 
good to a human problem. Theoretically, one might even argue that an “appropriate” 
application is impossible, since we are not dealing with compatible domains. In terms of 
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reading Hölderlin, this means that poetic reflection is almost certain to be inadequate to 
the task of representing and interpreting the divine gift to which the poetry is, at some 
level, a response. The poet understands this, and it explains the extraordinary, even 
excruciating, care he takes in pursuing his craft. 
 The doctrine and counsel of St. Ignatius are recast in a more philosophical idiom 
by Rudolf Otto: 
Unser Gemüt kann etwa von einer tiefen Freude erfüllt sein ohne daß wir uns im 
Augenblick klar sind über den Grund des Freudegefühles oder über das Objekt 
auf das es sich bezieht. (Denn Freude ist immer Objekt-bezogen, ist immer Freude 
über etwas.) Grund oder Objekt der Freude ist uns dann zeitweilig dunkel. 
Richten wir aber unsere Aufmerksamkeit darauf, besinnen wir uns scharf darauf, 
so wird er uns klar... Ein solches Objekt werden wir dann nicht für ein Irrationales 
halten, obgleich es zeitweilig dunkel und nicht dem klaren Begreifen sondern nur 
dem Gefühl gegen war. Ganz anders aber ist es mit der Seligkeit über das 
Fascinans des Numinosen. Auch bei stärkster Spannung der Aufmerksamkeit 
gelingt es hier nicht, das Was und Wie des beseligenden Gegenstandes aus dem 
Dunkel des Gefühls in den Bereich begreifenden Verstehens zu bringen. Er bleibt 
im unauflöslichen Dunkel des rein gefühlsmäßigen unbegrifflichen Erfahrens, und 
nur durch die Notenschrift der deutenden Ideogramme ist er—nicht deutbar 
aber—andeutbar. (76) 
 
The danger in reflecting on the divine is that the divine is irrational, and to understand it 
would be to mistake it and put something else in its place. The divine is at work in the 
world and “ruffles” the fabric of our immanent existence, but it is not part of this fabric 
and can therefore only be negatively, allegorically, or “ideogrammatically” represented. 
At the same time, the Irrational is not unknown to us. On the contrary, we positively 
experience it as a “Seligkeit” moving in the intimate “Dunkel des rein 
gefühlsmäßigen...Erfahrens,” a “tiefe Freude” that fills our soul (Gemüt).  We have to be 
careful to not intellectualize what is essentially affective. 
The line between the rational and the irrational is admittedly very fine. What one 
person labels “unbegrifflich” might be—or seem to be—explained by someone else. In 
 140 
our extremely scientific age, we are accustomed to thinking that there are only 
uncomprehended realities, never incomprehensible ones, and we feel it is our duty and 
privilege to eventually explain everything. This is certainly the ethos of the experimental 
sciences, and much of it can be found in the hermeneutic ones as well. For this reason, we 
have more of an ear for Hegel than Jacobi or Schleiermacher, who (Hegel tells us) 
stopped at the feeling of God, without grasping that every feeling is also a reflection. We 
have already seen how Hegel goes on to subordinate the physical dimension of the divine 
feeling to its intellectual dimension, thus purging God of anything that reflection cannot 
eventually bring to light. It is very easy to approach Hölderlin with a Hegelian 
confidence, since the poetry carries the form of philosophical reflection. There is no 
logical reason, however, why the rational form of Hölderlin’s poetry cannot serve the 
negative purpose of isolating the irrational. There can, ironically, be a “rational 
irrationality,” which protects feeling from reason’s own intellectual encroachment, 
alongside the more familiar reason, which colonizes everything. Reason can be humble as 
well as proud. Otto tells us that once reason’s pride has fallen before the Irrational, there 
is a still a humble work for reason to do.  
Zugleich stellt uns aber das Irrationale in diesem Sinne eine bestimmte Aufgabe: 
nämlich die, uns nicht mit seiner bloßen Feststellung zu beruhigen und nun dem 
Belieben und dem schwärmenden Gerede Tür und Tor zu öffnen sondern in 
möglichst nahe kommender ideogrammatischer Bezeichnung seine Momente so 
fest zu legen wie möglich und auf diese Weise das was in schwankender 
Erscheinung bloßen Gefühles schwebte zu festigen mit dauernden “Zeichen,” um 
so zu Eindeutigkeit und Allgemeingültigkeit der Erörterung zu kommen und  
“gesunde Lehre” zu bilden, die feste Fügung hat und objektive Gültigkeit erstrebt 
auch wenn sie statt mit adäquaten Begriffen nur mit Begriffs-symbolen arbeitet. 
(77) 
 
With these words, Otto describes the nature of his own critical work, yet we should not 
overlook the extraordinary irony of this rationally irrational project. (Even to name it is 
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paradoxical.) Once reason is converted to the reality of the irrational, its job is scarcely 
different from what it was before. By analzying the “Momente” of the divine carefully, 
irrational reason manages to isolate and fix the divine nature with “festigen und 
dauernden ‘Zeichen,’” which effectively gives the representation objective validity 
(“objektive Gültigkeit”). The only difference between a rationally irrational system and a 
merely rational one is that the first has a negative relation to its object, while the second 
names comprehends its object. In terms of functional accuracy, there is no difference.  
 I don’t think Hölderlin achieves the level of rational irrationality we find in Otto’s 
work, but I think he is undertaking something similar, even if he is not always conscious 
of the fact. In “Brod und Wein,” for example, the divine Irrational receives its 
“ideogrammatischer Bezeichnung” in the inexplicable optimism that fills the final lines 
of the poem despite the dismal reflection on history in the poem’s central stanzas. An 
even more poignant representation of the Irrational is the hope, built up from previous 
encounters with das Energische, which emerges from the dumbfounded silence between 
these lines in “Patmos”: 
  ...was ist dies? 
 
   Es ist der Wurf des Säemanns... 
The poet gives us the divine Irrational in a more subtle yet knowing way in the 
ode “An die Hoffnung” (the last stanza of which appears as an epigraph to this chapter). 
In this poem, “hope” has disappeared, and the poet reflects on the possibility of its 
retrieval.  
O Hoffnung! holde! gütiggeschäftige! 
   Die du das Haus der Trauernden nicht verschmähst, 
      Und gerne dienend, Edle! zwischen 
         Sterblichen waltest und Himmelsmächten, 
 142 
 
Wo bist du? wenig lebt ich; doch atmet kalt 
   Mein Abend schon. Und stille, den Schatten gleich, 
      Bin ich schon hier; und schon gesanglos 
         Schlummert das schaudernde Herz im Busen. 
 
Im grünen Tale, dort, wo der frische Quell 
   Vom Berge täglich rauscht, und die liebliche 
      Zeitlose mir am Herbsttag aufblüht, 
         Dort, in der Stille, du Holde, will ich 
 
Dich suchen, oder wenn in der Mitteracht 
   Das unsichtbare Leben im Haine wallt, 
      Und über mir die immerfrohen 
         Blumen, die blühenden Sterne, glänzen, 
 
O du, des Aethers Tochter! erscheine dann 
   Aus deines Vaters Gärten, und darfst du nicht, 
      Ein Geist der Erde, kommen, schröck, o 
         Schröcke mit anderem nur das Herz mir. 
(StA 2,1: 59) 
After asking “wo bist du?” the poet instinctively turns for replenishment to nature, where 
“das unsichtbare Leben...wallt,” and where things are grün, frisch, lieblich, blühend, still, 
immerfroh, and glänzend. However, the mere presence of nature does not connect man to 
the divine in the deep way he is seeking. The poet remains an admiring observer of nature 
rather than an integrated part of it. The poet must go one step further, and plead to heaven 
for an infusion of hope: “O du des Aethers Tochter! erscheine dann / Aus deines Vaters 
Gärten...” He makes an appeal to something beyond the immanent sphere altogether, and 
the content of his appeal is curious: 
...darfst du nicht, 
      Ein Geist der Erde, kommen, schröck, o 
         Schröcke mit anderem nur das Herz mir. 
How are we to understand these commas? Is the poet appositively naming hope a Geist 
der Erde, or is he saying hope cannot come as a Geist der Erde? The latter makes more 
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sense in context, but the grammatical ambiguity already hints at the irrationality of the 
poem’s transcendental referent. In either case, we don’t know what the poet means by 
“Geist der Erde.” Does Geist have a quasi-philosophical meaning here? Is it naming an 
intellectual reality? Or is it a supernatural reference? Does “Erde” point to nature (or 
Nature), or does it suggest immanence, as in the opposition Himmel/Erde? It is 
impossible to say, but maybe that is the point. Whatever particular meaning we give 
them, Geist and Erde are things we understand to some extent. They are familiar. The 
poet is suggesting, however, that the divine does not have a familiar form, and cannot be 
understood. It can accommodate itself to earthly forms, as in nature, but deep down it is a 
thing apart. Hence the poem’s mysterious final plea: “schröck, o / Schröcke mit anderem 
nur das Herz mir.” Hope must come as a sudden convulsion of the heart, precisely the 
kind of interior, kinetic event we have looked at in this chapter, although the verb 
schröcken adds an element of trauma to the experience. The theological moment of this 
plea comes in the phrase “mit anderem.” If hope comes from nature, it is natural. If it 
comes from my own mind, it is intellectual. In either case, the divine risks becoming 
something immanent: matter or mind. There is a third way, however, going through the 
“heart” (“Schröcke mit anderem nur das Herz mir”), which is the seat of feeling, and a 
philosophical grey space between subjectivity and objectivity. The tangible shock 
(schröcken) of hope penetrating the dark interiority of the heart is a perfect rational 
representation of the Irrational, and a perfect image of the part physical, part affective 
experience of the divine event. 
 
  
 
Chapter 4 
 
“Keiner weiß es, wenn”: The Temporality of Divine Experience 
 
Hölderlin’s poetry is full of divine encounters, but there are no eyewitness reports. One 
reason, as we saw in the last chapter, is that the eye—including the “mind’s eye” that 
represents or “sees” intelligible realities—is not the organ privileged by divine 
communication. Another reason is that Hölderlin’s God tends to reside in the past or the 
future. He reveals himself now as something that has already occurred or that is still to 
come, making us forever too early or too late. There is still a direct relation between 
God’s action and human experience, but the relation is now non-simultaneous. Indeed, 
the delay between divine cause and effect may span centuries. 
 The non-simultaneity of giving and receiving revelation is implicit in the by-now 
familiar lines from “Friedensfeier”:  
Denn schonend rührt des Maßes allzeit kundig 
Nur einen Augenblick die Wohnungen der Menschen 
Ein Gott an, unversehn, und keiner weiß es, wenn?” 
(MA 1: 363) 
God touches the “dwellings of men” for “just a moment [Augenblick],” and yet no one 
can put a finger on this moment: “keiner weiß es, wenn?” Despite the etymology of 
Augenblick, the event never occurs in the visual present, a curious fact reiterated 
elsewhere in Hölderlin’s poetry: “unempfunden kommen sie [i.e., the gods] erst...So ist 
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der Mensch...es sorget mit Gaben / Selber ein Gott für ihn, kennet und sieht er es nicht” 
(my emphasis). 
 It is not the Augen that is important in the Augenblick of “Friedensfeier,” but 
rather the blicken. Meaning “to glance” or “to gaze,” blicken is an intransitive verb that 
acquires an object only through the mediation of a preposition like “auf.” In other words, 
it marks the intention of vision rather than the product of vision, which is what the verb 
sehen points to. With blicken, something has captured our attention, but we do not yet 
know what it is. It is the activation of vision, the concentration of our focus in order to 
encompass something in the field of knowledge. It suggests the anticipation of 
knowledge rather than knowledge itself, and thus has a subtle temporal dimension. 
Somehow, it is in the duration of blicken—and I am invoking the Bergsonian meaning of 
“duration”1—that religion happens, and not in the instantaneity of perception or sehen.  
This contrast between sehen and blicken is related to the contrast David Levin 
makes between the reifying gaze and a vision that is “diffused, spacious, open, alive with 
awareness and receptive to the presencing of the field as a whole” (97). This latter sort of 
vision has a clear debt to Heidegger’s critique of visuality and specifically to his concept 
of Gelassenheit, a way of perceiving in which the how of beings (the temporal process of 
their coming into being) is more important than the what. 
 This temporal de-centering or diffusion of the divine is economically expressed in 
the third stanza of “Brod und Wein,” where the poet speaks of Greece, the place of 
spiritual origin: 
                                                 
1 Bergson contrasts the felt quality of time, which he calls durée, to the spatialization of time as quantity. 
Durée is that register of experience where “states of consciousness, even when successive, permeate one 
another,” and where we can “thus conceive of succession without distinction.” See Time and Free Will, 
trans. F.L. Pogson, 3rd ed. (London: G. Allen, 1913), p. 98, 101. 
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Dorther kommt und zurück deutet der kommende Gott. 
(StA 2,1: 91) 
Where in time is this “coming God”? The god points back to his origin before he has 
even arrived. In our experience of him, the coming god is not first known to us as a thing 
that is or was, but from the first moment as a thing stretching toward or away from us in 
time and space. Perhaps we, too, are stretching toward and away from ourselves in the 
divine moment. Perhaps there is a temporally “blurred” self corresponding to the 
temporal blurring of the divine. 
Is the “stretching toward or away” of the divine like the foreshortening of 
memory? When I recall something out of my past experience and place it before my 
mind’s eye, the resulting perception distorts, in some degree, my sense of past and 
present. Is the “coming god” such a performance of memory? If by memory we mean 
recollection, then the answer is “no.” Although the god touches the “dwellings of men” in 
a particular Augenblick, we are told, the divine is not a mere recalling of this moment, 
since it was never clear which moment of consciousness corresponded to the divine touch 
(“keiner weiß es, wenn?”).2 Instead of referring to the historical past, the divine carries 
the mark of anteriority. It does not recall a specific past event, even if there was (and 
continues to be) some such event. The god’s touch is always already a fait accompli 
whenever it knocks at the doors of consciousness: 
Unempfunden kommen sie erst... 
...kaum weiß zu sagen ein Halbgott, 
Wer mit Namen sie sind, die mit den Gaben ihm nahn. 
                                                 
2 Psychoanalysis gives one explanation of the divine event of which we were never conscious. In 
Civilization and its Discontents, Freud explains religion’s “oceanic feeling” as the vestige of an infantile 
narcissism that once filled our consciousness completely (724-725). Although the quality of the divine in 
Hölderlin is different from Freud’s “oceanic feeling,” the idea of religious consciousness being pre-
subjective is something they share, as will become clear in the next chapter. 
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(StA 2,1: 92) 
The gods are already there before we feel them, and our feeling always includes the 
knowledge of this anteriority. We have missed them, and therefore cannot properly name 
them. The only thing we immediately encounter is the gift left behind. Such divine 
anteriority does not fit the paradigm of memory, which is a re-presentation of an old 
experience, a recycling and modification of something that originally occurred in the 
here-and-now form of the present. Hölderlin’s God, however, never appears in the here 
and now, or more precisely: he does not present himself in the here-and-now as the here-
and-now. 
 This last statement is crucial, albeit paradoxical. If the divine never presented 
itself in the here-and-now, it would be erroneous, or at most metaphorical, to speak of a 
divine “event” at all. Some postmodern theology accepts the pure metaphoricity of the 
“event,” turning it into a phenomenological “disturbance” intrinsic to Being.3 But 
Hölderlin’s poetry ceases to make sense (in my opinion) if we entirely remove the literal, 
historical dimension of the divine “touch.” The mystery in Hölderlin’s style of religious 
representation—one which I believe can be traced back to the historical tension between 
theology and philosophy—is the simultaneous presence of two apparently irreconcilable 
temporal forms: first, the historical “event,” and second, the sense of anteriority or 
futurity, i.e., the sense that God is always already in the past or always still in the future. I 
will take up the significance of this paradox more thoroughly in the last section of this 
chapter. 
                                                 
3 I am thinking of the “weak theology” of John Caputo. See The Weakness of God: A Theology of the Event 
(Indiana UP, 2006). 
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 In the next two sections I want to limit myself to exploring the event character of 
the divine, which proves to be inconsistent and therefore unstable. The problem emerges 
in part because Hölderlin upholds a notion of radical temporality (i.e., time that is not 
understood by analogy to space), and this makes impossible to “plot” the event within 
some spatial-like temporal “whole.” Consequently, divine memory is unable to represent 
itself to itself. Experiencing and remembering the divine event are temporally paradoxical 
to the core.  
The last section, as I said, will question the very reality of the divine event, which 
follows naturally from our encounter with its paradoxicality. Although Hölderlin’s poetry 
repeatedly treats the event as something empirical or “kinetic,” this model does not 
always hold up. Sometimes the event seems to be completely figurative, like the “time” 
of discursive logic or the inner “disturbance” of Being. My intent in pointing this out will 
not be to “deconstruct” Hölderlinian time and undermine my own the argument, so much 
as to show once again that Hölderlin’s poetry is caught in the historical tension between 
religious and philosophical discourse. To resolve the temporal paradox of the event 
would be to lose sight of the poetry’s historical meaning.  
 
God in Time and Space 
 
In everyday life, we constantly convert time into space. Clocks, calendars, and timelines 
are all tools for representing—i.e., letting us “look at”—something that is invisible and, 
by most accounts, constantly flowing. While these time-to-space conversions work for us, 
none of us are convinced that they demonstrate the equivalence of time and space. (The 
 149 
Einsteinian space-time equivalence is of a very different sort, and utterly non-intuitive.) 
In our intuitive experience, space is something that stays put, while time is forever 
running away. In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant says that time “has only one 
dimension: different times are not simultaneous, but successive” (162). Within this 
succession the only time that actually exists is the immediate “now,” which makes an 
infinitely large fraction of all possible time nonexistent. We can relate “now” to a concept 
or image of the past or future, but this connection is imaginative rather than real, since 
time-in-itself has no extended parts that can be “fit” together. Any time we think of time 
as anything more than an instant, we have already translated it into a spatial metaphor. 
“Die ‘Erzeugung’ der Zeit durch die verständige Einbildungskraft [ist] gleichbedeutend 
mit der entaktualisierenden Verräumlichung dessen, was an der Zeit das eigentlich 
Zeitliche ist.”4 
Because this spatialized view of time is artificial, it has weaknesses that can be 
harnessed for religious representation. Since time is forever destroying one “now” in 
favor of the next, it can never become a whole. To create a whole, all the parts must come 
together and communicate at the same time. Since the essence of time is succession, it 
can never be gathered into one. If, therefore, we should choose to think of God as 
somehow more “like” time than space, we lose all hope of knowing him rationally, since 
he can never be “gathered up” and placed before us in a contemplable form. Time is a 
series of exclusions, in which one moment can never co-exist with the next, and what is 
excluded never forms part of a whole. This is a problem, since it is only in relation to 
wholes—which are necessarily spatial—that we can understand anything. 
                                                 
4 Krüger, “Über Kants Lehre von der Zeit,” p. 282.  
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But why should we want to think of God as more like time than space? The 
answer has, I believe, emerged in the preceding chapter. To think spatially is to represent, 
to “paint” the image of a thing in our mind, and this puts us in a position of visual 
mastery. Philosophy is the developed form of this mastery. But the divine is, among other 
things, that which exceeds all human mastery, and therefore cannot be adequately 
represented. The ancient prohibition against divine images can be seen in this spirit. 
When we do articulate the divine through representations, we run the risk of success. By 
this I mean that our representations can be out-maneuvered by a philosophy, such as 
Fichtean or Hegelian idealism, which explains all representational activity without 
leaving room for transcendence. If, in contrast, we want to think of the divine as being 
more like time than space, there is no danger of visual mastery. Space allows itself to be 
colonized, but time puts us on the defensive. We need not look far into the past or the 
future before we see ourselves disappear into the very fabric of time. We can manipulate 
the experience of time to a considerable degree through cycles and rituals, but we know 
that these very cycles and rituals are subject to time, and will not last. Most importantly, 
we cannot subject it to our gaze. We cannot cut it up, lay it out, and say, “here it is, take a 
look.” For all these reasons, the rhetoric of time is a powerful resource for the poetic 
(non-)representation of the divine.  
If God were somehow more like time than space, then our traditional 
representations of God would have to be utterly figurative. The Jehovah of the Old 
Testament behaves like one physical being among others, and is profoundly “spatial.” 
The Christian idea that God is the same “yesterday and today and forever” (Heb. 13:8) is 
nothing if not the constancy of space (or something like it) amidst the flow of time, and a 
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truly “temporal” theology would require us to abandon altogether the spatial ideal of 
divine sameness. This is, I shall argue in a minute, is just the direction Hölderlin is 
heading. 
Before getting to Hölderlin, however, we need to consider the more orthodox 
approach to “temporalizing” the divine found in Hegel. On one level, it might seem that 
Hegel has entirely shifted God from the spatial to the temporal field. Spirit, after all, is a 
certain kind of intellectual movement (i.e., negation), and its “body” is history.  But we 
need to remember that Hegelian history is a teleological unfolding. “God,” as we saw in 
the last chapter, is merely the “region [of consciousness] in which all the enigmas of the 
world are solved” (128-129; my emphasis), the unity-across-difference that makes history 
a meaningful process. The “region” we call God is, moreover, part of a system, a 
dialectical pattern explaining how and why human history evolves as it does. Theology 
must be understood as the story of this system, as the chronicle of God’s self-realization 
in the form of history. 
In comparison to what we find in Hölderlin, Hegel’s historicism seems to be more 
about space than time. The problem emerges in the relation of history to logic. History, 
for Hegel, is syllogistic: a state of consciousness (A) “precedes” another state (B) that 
negates the first, which is in turn “followed” by the negation of the negation (C), and so 
forth. Once we start thinking about the past, history and logic become blurred, and it is 
dialectical logic that ultimately determines the truth of history. History, in other words, 
acquires shape. It moves from the realm of time over into the spatial realm of dialectics. 
All judgments, indeed, require the juxtaposition, superimposition, division, or 
identification of discreet representations, which are all spatial operations. History is no 
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exception. In historical judgments the temporality of history is the same as the 
“temporality” of logic. Hegel’s Lectures demonstrate, for example, how religions of 
divine immediacy (nature worship) precede religions that elevate the spiritual above the 
natural (Judaism, Greek religion), which are in turn followed by a religion that reconciles 
the spiritual to the natural via the human subject (Christianity), all in the same logical 
way that A “precedes” B, and C “follows” from A and B in a syllogism. There is an 
unbroken continuity in this process, which resembles the continuity of space rather than 
the contiguity of time. 
This is not to say that time is optional or unreal for Hegel. Historical time is the 
tracing-out of Spirit, and as such is inescapable. There is no way to “skip” directly from 
A to B, or from a given idea to its negation. There is no divination that can sidestep the 
duration of the tracing-out. Hegel tells us that  
impatience demands the impossible, to wit, the attainment of the end without the 
means. But the length of this path has to be endured, because, for one thing, each 
moment is necessary; and further, each moment has to be lingered over, because 
each is itself a complete individual shape, and one is only viewed in absolute 
perspective when its determinateness is regarded as a concrete whole... (17) 
 
Thought travels the “length” of a temporal “path” as it patiently familiarizes itself with an 
endless series of “moments.” Time is thus the “time it takes” to perceive and reflect upon 
each of these “moments.” This does not change the fact, however, that time is still only 
the performance of a dialectical form, the geometric accretion around the “complete 
individual shapes” of our individual experiences. Time yields nothing beyond the 
“individual shape” of the moment and the dialectical shape of its connection to other 
moments in a consecutive series. The “moments” of the past are consequently reduced to 
the “already acquired property [i.e., a spatial thing] of universal spirit which constitutes 
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the Substance of the individual, and hence appears externally to him as his inorganic 
nature” (16; my emphasis). Spirit drains temporality out of present experience leaving 
behind dead “property,” which can then be piled high as the accumulated “riches” of 
human knowledge. Time immediately converts itself to space in Hegelian dialectic. 
 Hegel’s account of time is limited on another account. The “length of the path” 
traversed by thought explains time as a subjective human experience, but it does not 
address the possibility (which we can assume that Hegel rejects) of a divine, non-human 
temporality, i.e., the time of non-human agency. Hegel only ever talks about the tracing-
out of Spirit’s progress, which is my (or our) human progress. Now if, through a magical 
symmetry, time could hold a similar significance outside the human world, then the 
divine could be tracing-out its own path. This sounds strange, but it is really just the 
timeless religious notion of spiritual pluralism, i.e., the ontological distinction between an 
agent God (or gods) and an agent soul. It is this pluralism that Descartes upholds 
philosophically when he distinguishes between God and the cogito, and which Spinoza 
rejects in making our thinking a mere “attribute” of divine substance. There are 
competing “cosmic imaginaries” at work between Descartes and Hegel, and Hölderlin, 
although he is pulled both ways, seems to clearly lean toward the pluralistic one. He takes 
the basically religious view that something can be actively going on in the world that 
eludes or contradicts the rational measures we bring to bear on it, or could ever bring to 
bear on it. There can be another historical power at work that is not Spirit (or even 
Nature), and which we, with the epistemological tools of Spirit, cannot adequately 
comprehend.5 This other living truth might appear as nothing more than an indefinable 
                                                 
5 Of course, this pluralism can also have an anti-religious valence, where the non-human truth is diabolical 
or absurd. We see a hint of this in poems like “Hälfte des Lebens” and “Hyperions Schicksalslied,” and 
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disturbance in our experience (like that of the phenomenological “event” of postmodern 
theology), or it could appear as something more. 
Hegel would perhaps reject this idea as a “science-stopper,” and would probably 
argue that the inexplicable is only ever a temporary, imperfect misunderstanding. God, 
for instance, remained uncomprehended until Hegel explained him as the “absolute, 
eternal idea” of antecedent being-in-itself that manifests itself to itself as Spirit, i.e., as 
negation and reconciliation (see Lectures, pp. 415-416). Divine otherness, for Hegel, 
would simply be the appearance worn by negation until it is integrated with its opposite 
through reconciliation. At that point the opposition does not disappear, but it is seen in its 
proper light as part of a unified process of Spirit or Nature.   
 Now there is a moment of faith in all this. Hegel believes that dialectic will 
always work, and that difference will always prove tractable. Dialectical interpretation 
has worked so well—Hegel’s vast writings are the evidence—that it is safe to wager 
everything on it. Put in terms pertinent to our present argument, Hegel believes that there 
is only one meaningful temporality: the tracing-out of the dialectic, which is really a 
spatiality-experienced-over-time. But a philosophy subordinating time to space (like 
Hegel’s) necessarily suggests the possibility of a counter philosophy in which time would 
not merely be the “time it takes” to produce a form. On the contrary, form would be the 
expression of time. But what would this mean? How can we tell the difference between 
space-experienced-over-time and time-experienced-over-space? 
Part of the answer comes in the prioritization of unity and difference. As we have 
pointed out, Kantian time is disjunctive, and a “temporal” truth rendered spatially would 
                                                 
more of it in the fiction of Tieck, Kleist, and Hoffmann. The idea of an anti-religious non-rational truth 
comes to fullness in the pessimistic metaphysics of Schopenhauer and Nietzsche. 
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look disjunctive or unformed. The “shapes” of each successive moment of time do not 
compact nicely into a larger, unified, dialectical shape. A “temporal” divine would have 
no clear teleological objective, such as Hegel’s “absolute knowing,” where the “one” and 
the “many” form a single sublime whole. Instead, it would produce multiple wholes, and 
“absolute knowing”—if the term were still allowed—would at most signify an absolute 
knowing. Each “shape” of knowledge along the way would be an independent 
culmination, and “God” would be the agent of eternal difference between these 
culminations. We could not “know” God through any kind of panoramic survey of 
History, Nature, or Reason, because God is a vertical incision into these “horizontal” 
representations. He is a wound in our understanding, which is precisely what the 
Hölderlinian Zäsur, discussed in the introduction, is all about. Our only hope for knowing 
God lies in the detection of “depth” within the vertical. This depth is crucial if religion is 
not to simply fall apart into difference. In Hölderlin, the surface is broken in order to 
reveal a mystery underneath, and not merely to uncover a depressing emptiness. 
Hölderlin is not Nietzsche, and his God is (among other things) a Christian God who 
cannot be separated from certain experiences of love and joy. But I am getting ahead of 
myself. Before we get into an analysis of the quality of divine depth, I want to look at 
some of the ways Hölderlin tries to heal the wound of time (putting aside the fact that 
divine love and joy can be concealed in the wound), and restore continuity across the 
caesura of historical experience. 
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History and Memory 
 
We have concluded thus far that to understand time frequently means to substitute it with 
space, which obscures time’s distinctive character as non-continuity. It would be too 
extreme to say that Hölderlin simply turns this on its head. Ultimately, he wants to clarify 
the nature of the divine in some way, and if God is in time, the poet must introduce some 
kind of spatial stability into temporality. Otherwise we would not understand him. (Of 
course, some of his latest poetry before falling into madness was incomprehensible.) 
Poetry is a play of words, and words—if they are to have any meaning at all—must 
evoke representations, even if only to subvert or confuse them. Much of Hölderlin’s 
poetry, however, seems to hold out real hope that a sufficiently sophisticated 
representation will make spatial sense of time, and consequently of God’s relation to the 
world through time. This hope is played out in his discussion of history and memory, to 
which we now turn. 
 Perhaps Hölderlin’s most important break with Hegel’s treatment of time occurs 
in his view of historical process. Rather than describing history as a teleological 
progression, Hölderlin talks about it as a succession of “particular wholes” (besonderen 
Ganzen): 
Das untergehende Vaterland, Natur und Menschen insofern sie in einer besondern 
Wechselwirkung stehen, eine besondere idealgewordene Welt, und Verbindung 
der Dinge ausmachen, und sich insofern auflösen damit aus ihr und aus dem 
überbleibenden Geschlechte und den überbleibenden Kräften der Natur, die das 
andere reale Prinzip sind, eine neue Welt, eine neue aber auch besondere 
Wechselwirkung, sich bilde, so wie jener Untergang aus einer reinen aber 
besondern Welt hervorgieng. (MA 2: 72) 
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In these opening lines of this essay-fragment, Hölderlin describes the relation between 
historical moments as one of collapse and rebirth. One world achieves its “particular” 
(besondere) ideal completion and is displaced by a second world with a different ideal 
configuration. There is no conflict with Hegel here, but Hölderlin uses the suggestive 
phrase: “eine idealgewordene Welt,” almost as if its ideality were subordinate to “das 
andere reale Prinzip,” the naked, non-“spiritualized” force of man and nature (i.e., the 
“überbleibende Geschlechte und...Kräfte der Natur”) that is always present. If a world 
“becomes” ideal only when “Vaterland, Natur und Menschen...in einer besondern 
Wechselwirkung stehen,” then ideality would be only an intermittent feature of the world, 
and the “other, real principle” would be the more radical, permanent truth (or lack of 
truth) abiding even in times of historical rupture. These unstructured ruptures between 
ideal worlds could still be reconciled with Hegel, as long as we posit a transhistorical 
principle such as Spirit guiding the transition of worlds through the rupture. This way, 
there could be a spiritual accumulation or progress spanning the alternation of worlds. 
Without this guiding principle, historical rupture could reset the humanity’s spiritual 
counter back to zero with every epochal change. But does Hölderlin employ such a 
transhistorical principle in his Geschichtsphilosophie, or does he accept the non-
cumulative model of history?  
 The answer seems to be a bit of both. On the one hand, he seems to reject 
historical teleology. Hölderlin’s description of historical transformation suggests the 
appearance of the absolute in history rather than the progress of history under the 
absolute. 
Denn die Welt aller Welten, das Alles in Allen, welches immer ist und aus dessen 
Seyn alles angesehen werden muß, stellt sich nur in aller Zeit—oder im 
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Untergange oder im Moment, oder genetischer im Werden des Moments und 
Anfang von Zeit und Welt dar... (MA 2: 72) 
 
In the turning points of history, a primal world (the Welt aller Welten) communicates 
with the particular, historical world(s). Past and future are connected only through this 
primal world, and not (as far as we can tell) through the direct relation of “negation.” To 
a degree, the Welt aller Welten corresponds to Hegel’s God, i.e., the “region” of 
consciousness where all contradictions are resolved, but Hegel’s God does not show itself 
(sich darstellen) in history as the Welt aller Welten does. Hegel’s God plays a regulative 
function as the ideal of unity; he does not appear on the stage of history, as we find in the 
moments of Begeisterung and divine encounter that recur in Hölderlin’s work and the 
work of a contemporary like Novalis. 
 It is easy to read Hölderlin as a dialectical historian, because he employs 
dialectical structures in his thought. Yet his conceptual building blocks are not cut to a 
true dialectical pattern. To see this, let us consider the following description of 
“Untergang,” which is roughly equivalent to the Hegelian process of negation: 
Dieser Untergang oder Übergang des Vaterlands...fühlt sich in den Gliedern der 
bestehenden Welt so, daß in eben dem Momente und Grade, worinn sich das 
Bestehende auflöst, auch das Neueintretende, Jugendliche, Mögliche sich fühlt. 
Denn wie könnte die Auflösung empfunden werden ohne Vereinigung, wenn also 
das Bestehende in seiner Auflösung empfunden werden soll und empfunden wird, 
so muß dabei das Unerschöpfte und Unerschöpfliche, der Beziehungen und 
Kräfte, und jene die Auflösung mehr durch diese empfunden werden, als 
umgekehrt, denn aus Nichts wird nichts, und diß gradweise genommen heißt so 
viel, als daß dasjenige, welches zur Negation gehet, und insofern es aus der 
Wirklichkeit gehet, und noch nicht ein Mögliches ist, nicht wirken könne. 
Aber das Mögliche, welches in die Wirklichkeit tritt, indem die 
Wirklichkeit sich auflöst, diß wirkt, und es bewirkt sowohl die Empfindung der 
Auflösung als die Erinnerung des Aufgelösten. (MA 2: 72-73) 
 
Here we have a basic rhetoric of Hegelian dialectic: “Bestehende,” “Neueintretende,” 
“Negation,” “aus der Wirklichkeit gehet...in die Wirklichkeit tritt.” However, Hölderlin 
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compromises the dialectical logic of this passage by equating the “Neueintretende” with 
“das Unerschöpfte und Unerschöpfliche.” What negates the old is not the new, but the 
New (with a capital “n”). The old “particular” (besondere) reality is not replaced by a 
new “particular” reality that directly and logically negates the first, because the absolute 
(Unerschöpfte-Unerschöpfliche) makes an appearance in between these realities and 
dissolves what the second reality would have inverted or overcome to construct itself. 
The loose parts (i.e., “das andere reale Prinzip”) are reassembled to create the new, but 
the ideality of the new is a fresh creation emerging directly from the womb of eternity, 
not from a logical relation to the old. Once it falls apart, the old is nothing and can 
produce nothing (“aus Nichts wird nichts”) without some kind of addition, in this case a 
qualitative transformation of the old “particular” into the absolute before it becomes a 
new “particular.” The absolute is thus an additional coordinate lacking—or at least re-
positioned—in Hegel’s version of historical progress. It is an extra hinge: the “old” folds 
into the “New” (i.e., the Unerschöpfte-Unerschöpfliche), which folds again into the 
“new.” This ontology is important because it disrupts the possibility of an intellectual 
continuity (e.g. the logic of Geist) in history. 
 This non-dialectical view of history is clearly represented in Hölderlin’s 
epistolary novel Hyperion, especially in the last letter of the first volume. Here the 
difference between the ancient Athenian and the modern European is not related to any 
kind of linear progression of human spirit. Although Hölderlin is directly responding to 
Schiller’s Aesthetische Briefe, he does not really take up Schiller’s idea (later to be 
exploited by Hegel) that the “health” of ancient Greece is inherently responsible for 
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modern self-alienation. Schiller’s Greece produces its own negation by an immanent 
logic: 
Die Kultur selbst war es, welche der neuern Menschheit diese Wunde schlug. 
Sobald auf der einen Seite die erweiterte Erfahrung und das bestimmtere Denken 
eine schärfere Scheidung der Wissenschaften, auf der andern das verwikkeltere 
Uhrwerk der Staaten eine strengere Absonderung der Stände und Geschäfte 
nothwendig machte, so zerriß auch der innere Bund der menschlichen Natur, und 
ein verderblicher Streit entzweyte ihre harmonischen Kräfte. (5:583) 
 
Modern Zerissenheit is a direct result of the growth that resulted from the Greeks’ 
harmonious nature. Schiller’s remedy, of course, is to artificially re-establish the harmony 
of human drives through the pedagogy of art, which “trains” our passion and reason to 
work together like they used to in the “natural” condition of Greek culture. It is an 
unreligious solution to an unreligious problem. 
 Hölderlin identifies modern Zerissenheit in basically the same terms as Schiller. 
In the “Scheltrede” at the end of the novel, we find Germans who are 
Barbaren von alters her, durch Fleiß und Wissenschaft, und selbst durch Religion 
barbarischer geworden, tiefunfähig jedes göttlichen Gefühls...dumpf und 
harmonielos, wie die Scherben eines weggeworfenen Gefäßes.... Die Tugenden 
der Deutschen...sind ein glänzend Übel und nichts weiter; denn Nothwerk sind sie 
nur.... (MA 1: 754, 755; my emphasis) 
 
The language is Schillerian, and the obvious thing to do here would be to employ 
Schiller’s historical method to illuminate the relation between antiquity and modernity. 
Hölderlin, however, refrains from doing so. At the end of the Scheltrede we get 
Hölderlin’s solution to modern barbarism, which has only a superficial resemblance to 
Schiller’s call for aesthetic labor. 
O Bellarmin! wo ein Volk das Schöne liebt, wo es den Genius in seinen Künstlern 
ehrt, da weht, wie Lebensluft, ein allgemeiner Geist, da öffnet sich der scheue 
Sinn, der Eigendünkel schmilzt, and fromm und groß sind alle Herzen und Helden 
gebiert die Begeisterung. (MA 1: 757) 
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Hölderlin’s love of beauty is not the calculating use of aesthetic pleasure we find in 
Schiller. It is, rather, a kind of aesthetic worship, which calls forth a spiritual 
dispensation: “Helden gebiert die Begeisterung.” In the middle of the novel, Hyperion 
tries to instill this Begeisterung in the Greek freedom fighters. He shows Schillerian 
optimism when, as “Erzieher [des] Volks” (MA 1: 693) he speaks to them “von besseren 
Tagen...und glänzend gehn die Augen ihnen auf, wenn sie des Bundes gedenken, der uns 
einigen soll, und das stolze Bild des werdenden Freistaats dämmert vor ihnen” (MA 1: 
715). Believing in the moral power of the aesthetic Bild he has disseminated among the 
army, Hyperion triumphantly claims: “wir nehmen dem Zufall die Kraft, wir meistern das 
Schiksaal” (MA 1: 716). Now, Schicksal plays no role in Schiller’s humanistic account of 
history, and with this metaphysical term Hölderlin changes everything. The aesthetically-
inspired Greeks fall to raping and pillaging their own countrymen, and a penitent 
Hyperion confesses his hubris: “Das Schicksaal stößt mich ins Ungewisse hinaus und ich 
hab’ es verdient“ (MA 1: 7132). Hyperion’s Schillerian fantasy bears bitter fruit because 
it neglected the supernatural. Begeisterung is not merely aesthetic vision, but a real gift, 
or Schicksal, from the gods. It cannot be forced, and the beautiful society depends 
absolutely on this gift. If history is to “advance,” like it did in ancient Greece, it will 
require a direct intervention from the divine. When that intervention is terminated, the 
divine—the Unerschöpfte-Unerschöpfliche—will be lost as an active historical principle. 
This is an utterly non-dialectical, non-Schillerian, non-Hegelian view of historical 
process.  
 We can conclude that Hölderlin seems to reject historical continuity. Instead of a 
single unfolding world, we have multiple, successive worlds separated by the sea of the 
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absolute. But now we need to spend some time considering the ways that Hölderlin 
resists this discontinuity in his struggle to create a sense of historical meaning. This is a 
desperate, seemingly futile project, since the discontinuity of history has a metaphysical 
foundation. Nevertheless, Hölderlin seeks to connect past and present in two semi-related 
ways. On the one hand he tries to (1) to expand the boundaries of the “particular whole” 
through typological historiography. If the particular era to which we belong can be 
redefined broadly enough—i.e., if we can demonstrate post-Enlightenment Europe to be 
part of the same historical “particular” as ancient Greece—then the ontological problem 
of historical discontinuity can simply be ignored. If we have the Greeks in our local 
“slice” of history, who cares what lies outside? The best way to unify Greece, Palestine, 
and Germany turns out to be typological: the departure of the gods from Greece “is” the 
departure of Christ from his disciples, who in turn “are” the sorrowful yet hopeful poets 
of the modern day. On the other hand the poet (2) “remembers” the hidden presence of 
the divine in the saecula surrounding the divine moment. In other words, he challenges 
the ontology of disruption, at least as it occurs on the borders of our own historical 
moment. Let us look at these two activities—expanding the historical particular and 
“remembering” the divine’s hidden presence—in greater detail.  
 
1. The need for historical continuity can be met—at least superficially—by shifting our 
tactical approach. Instead of trying to see all of history as united a priori by some ideal 
principle (which, we have just noted, seems to be lacking in Hölderlin), we can try to 
redefine the boundaries of the present era. History, we have seen, is made up of 
besondere Ganzen, which are unified in themselves, but not in their interrelation. All of 
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these particular wholes spring from the same Welt aller Welten, which means that none of 
them flows necessarily from any of the others, and we cannot hope to rationally analyze 
the large-scale operation of history. But we can talk about the unity within each of these 
historical wholes. Perhaps, then, if we can expand the historical boundaries of this whole 
(the one we are living in right now) far enough, the spiritual need for historical unity will 
be pacified. I will call this the “local unity approach” to history. This local approach does 
not satisfy the philosophical need for a universalizing a priori argument about the nature 
of history, but it does rob the latter of its urgency. If I can feel a local unity connecting 
me back, say, to ancient Greece, I’m content leaving the rest of human history shrouded 
in mystery. It is far enough removed from my immediate situation that I can just shrug it 
off. (In the end, however, this dark prehistory does play a role for Hölderlin, as we shall 
see.) 
We can go pretty far with this local approach, because there is no instrumental 
way of measuring the boundaries of any “particular whole” in history. There is a lot of 
room for creative revision. It is logically defensible, then, to ask whether those historical 
units that seem to be wholes—e.g. classical Greece, medieval Christianity, modern 
Europe—might not, in fact, be subdivisions of a larger, complex whole: the West. All of 
Hölderlin’s historical reflections in his larger poems can be read as this kind of attempt. 
In “Brod and Wein,” he laments the sudden termination of Greece’s ancient glory, and 
then toys with the idea that the dissolution of Greece may have “stretched” in some way 
up until the death of Christ, thereby bringing two (sub-)wholes (Greece and early 
Christianity) into an overlapping relation: 
Warum zeichnet, wie sonst [i.e., in Greek times], die Stirne des Mannes 
ein Gott nicht, 
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   Drückt den Stempel, wie sonst, nicht dem Getroffenen auf? 
Oder er kam auch selbst und nahm des Menschen Gestalt an 
   Und vollendet’ und schloß tröstend das himmlische Fest. 
(StA 2,1: 93) 
The poet toys with the idea that Christ (the most obvious candidate for the “er” in line 
three) is the end of the golden age of Greece. If this is so, the divine discontinuity 
between ancient Greece and Roman Palestine is bridged. The intervening centuries are 
not a void in religious history that has to be filled. The strange use of “oder” in the 
beginning third line, however, expresses the poet’s uncertainty about this extension of the 
ancient Greek world into the Christian world. The logic by which the poet bridges this 
void is not one that we can name. (What is the hypotactic function of “oder”? It’s 
impossible to say.) At the same time, this uncertainty allows the poet to put forward this 
bold idea. It is not certain where one “whole” ends and the next begins. Similarly, the 
vagueness surrounding the “er” in the third line both facilitates and raises doubt about the 
identity of god in question. We immediately think of Christ (i.e., the god who takes “des 
Menschen Gestalt” and completes [“vollendet”] the divine work), but it is not “provable” 
that this is a Christ reference. Perhaps the reference is (also) to Dionysus. Or perhaps “er” 
is merely the type of the dying God, which naturally encompasses both Christ and 
Dionysus. In later poetry, Hölderlin will feel more confident in asserting the fraternity of 
Christ and the gods of Greece (“zu sehr, / O Christus! häng ich an dir, / Wiewohl 
Herakles Bruder / Und kühn bekenne ich, du / Bist Bruder auch des Eviers...”). 
Typological thinking helps blur the boundaries of (sub-)wholes into larger wholes. But 
what is the ontological warrant for typological history? 
 Hölderlin’s revised, complex whole begins with the departure of the gods of 
Greece, which is typologically “stretched” to include the departure of Christ. This 
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eliminates the rupture between golden-age Greece and New Testament Palestine. The 
death of Christ, in turn, “stretches” to encompass the entire modern age, which is one 
long “night” of the gods. All of history since Greece is thus a single narrative of decline, 
and in the modern age we stand at the threshold of the Unerschöpftes-Unerschöpfliches, 
the sacred moment marking the death of one world and the birth of a new one. 
One possible warrant for extending the bounds of the “particular whole” across 
time is the analogy with a similar extension across space, which we find the essay 
fragment frequently titled “Über Religion.” Here Hölderlin tells us that every individual 
constitutes a unique religious whole, and human sociality generates collective religious 
wholes in addition to the individual ones. When people have a “gemeinschaftliche 
Sphäre” in which they “menschlich, d.h. über die Notdurft erhaben wirken und leiden,” 
then they experience and share a “gemeinschaftliche Gottheit” (MA 2: 51-52). This 
common divinity is also a God along with the individual’s personal God. Hölderlin does 
not suggest that my divinity is absorbed or “sublated” into the common divinity, nor 
would we expect him to do so in light of the resistance to spiritual monism we 
encountered in the previous chapters. Rather, we have multiple religious existences, 
which can co-exist harmoniously. One of our religious existences can potentially emerge 
at an all-inclusive global level: 
Und wenn es eine Sphäre gibt, in der alle zugleich leben, und mit der sie in mehr 
als notdürftiger Beziehung sich fühlen, dann, aber auch nur insoferne, haben sie 
alle eine gemeinschaftliche Gottheit. (MA 2: 52) 
 
 Of course, this “communal” (gemeinschaftlich) strategy for unifying individuals 
across space cannot work for individuals separated by time, since such individuals cannot 
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“wirken,” “leiden,” and “leben” together as a community. Is there some way to 
imaginatively socialize with the dead and the unborn? To be sure, Hölderlin does say: 
Es muß aber hiebei nicht vergessen werden, daß der Mensch sich wohl auch in die 
Lage des andern versetzen, daß er die Sphäre des andern zu seiner eigenen Sphäre 
machen kann. (MA 2: 52) 
 
However, identifying with the “Lage des andern” may only bring empathy, not unity. In 
the community-model, religious unity is not established through identity, i.e., through 
inhabiting someone else’s personal “sphere,” but on a higher plane by participating in a 
communal “sphere.” Furthermore, it becomes ever more difficult to put yourself “in die 
Lage des andern” as historical distance increases. How can a modern European put 
himself in the position of an ancient Greek? The parallel between the spatial unity of 
society and the temporal unity of history is tenuous at best. 
 We can conclude that Hölderlin’s attempt to “expand” the historical particular by 
viewing it as a subset of a larger, complex particular is very questionable. The analogy 
between community and history is not very helpful. We can find suggestive, typological 
ways of bridging the divide between historical particulars, but these never harden into 
certainty. It is hard to see how they could become certainties without directly challenging 
the ontology of discontinuity suggested by Hölderlin’s notion of Zäsur. Philosophically, 
the quest for historical unity seems to be a doomed enterprise. 
 In attempting to unify history by expanding the reach of the “particular whole,” 
Hölderlin walks a fine line between satisfying an intellectual need and compromising his 
philosophical integrity. Instead of finding fault with this, we should view it in context. 
The romantic period coincides with a Copernican upheaval in our view of history. 
Biblical criticism in the 18th century had severely compromised the authority of biblical 
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history, and geology was just beginning to discover the extreme antiquity of the earth. 
(James Hutton’s pathbreaking paper on the age of the earth was presented to the Royal 
Society of Edinburgh in 1785.) Because of these revolutionary changes in the perceived 
factual basis of history, the tradition notion of history had to be modified. Hölderlin, like 
most people in his environment, felt on some level that history was supposed to be a 
progressive, teleological process. This view is part of the 18th-century “cosmic 
imaginary,” to use Charles Taylor’s phrase. With the expansion of the earth’s age and the 
discrediting of biblical history, there was an increased tendency to view the progress of 
history as something gradual, rather than a dramatic story of Fall, Flood, and apocalyptic 
Redemption. In the early stages, however, this shift could feel confusing. Can events in 
history really have all that much meaning when history is so vast? Or is it history itself 
that carries meaning? If so much of history lies in “prehistorical” darkness, can we ever 
hope to know history’s meaning? What value, if any, is there in restricting our focus to 
the local scene of history? 
Human history is open to the same questions as history in general. When did 
human history start? Can we make general statements about it from the small slice of 
human history available to us? I think that the ambivalent feeling generated by such 
questions is present in Hölderlin’s work, even if he does not speak about it in these terms. 
The typological hermeneutic he brings to bear on the “slice” of history containing ancient 
Greece and modern Germany is a thoughtful way of acknowledging the immensity of 
time, while also trying to expand the meaning of the present into that immensity. The 
“type” is a transhistorical figure partially inhabiting a “higher” time equidistant from all 
historical moments. All of history, despite its incomprehensible vastness, is gathered 
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together in the aura of higher time surrounding the “type.” So even if the poet’s 
typological hermeneutics fail to convincingly demonstrate the continued presence of the 
divine in history, they do suggest how history may have continual access to the “higher” 
time of the divine. In other words, “types” no longer functions as “sign posts” marking 
the inner unity of some particular historical narrative, such as the biblical, in which the 
meaning of a type is another piece of history (e.g. Isaac on the altar and the Passover 
pointing to the life of Jesus); rather, types signify history’s capacity for ecstatic self-
transcendence, and they do not point to anything in history, past or future. Or perhaps it 
would be better to reverse the agency: types mark history’s receptivity to the irruptions of 
transcendence. The only spiritual unity in history, then, is its perennial capacity to suffer 
the divine. God unifies history, then, only by being the active and ever-ready mysterium 
just beyond the human world. 
The (a)historical truth of Hölderlinian typology, as I have just interpreted it, does 
not assist the poet in establishing the immanent continuity of the divine that he is looking 
for, but it nonetheless gets at something profound. The second method the poet uses to 
bridge the spiritual discontinuity of history takes an “inside” view of historical process 
rather than the bird’s-eye view of typological interpretation. In contrast to the inability of 
the typological approach to support its large narratives with “internal” historical 
evidence, memory’s internal evidence cannot manage to erect large narratives. The two 
approaches, typology and memory, could be mutually reinforcing, but the middle term 
linking the two together seems to be lacking. We can better understand this problem if we 
look more closely, now, at Hölderlin’s notion of memory. 
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2. Hölderlin is not merely concerned with the abstract form (i.e., part/whole, 
particular/universal) of historical unity; he is also concerned about the feeling of it. We 
just saw how working and feeling (“wirken und leiden”) can establish a unified historical 
community, but not a unified history of community. Any attempt to write such a history 
involves philosophical compromises. This historiographical dilemma only serves to 
highlight another question: how does the idea or feeling of unity-across-history arise in 
the first place? How do we come by it? How do we maintain it? 
The answer is memory (Erinnerung, Gedächtnis). Memory is partly a retentive 
faculty, but it also has a constructive dimension, not unlike reason. Yet Hölderlin tends to 
hold the discourses of reason and memory apart. The hermeneutic “expansion” of the 
particular, which is a work of reason, presupposes some vision of the whole into which 
the particular is meant to fit. Memory operates without this presupposition of the whole, 
and will therefore never have the breadth of historical hermeneutics. It will, however, 
have a correspondingly greater grasp of the “feel” of unity, how it arises and how it is 
maintained. Memory is associated more with the experience of historical unity than with 
the understanding of it. 
By making memory more “experience-near” than reason, Hölderlin loses a certain 
degree of representative control over it. By this I mean that memory is harder to treat as a 
single, integral thing. In the remainder of this section I will discuss two versions of 
memory, which seem to be rather disconnected. It may be that a single word, “memory,” 
is used to refer to entirely separate faculties. What unites them, in any case, is their end 
result: a sense of historical unity.  
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(i) The first form memory can take is a “holding on” to experience in defiance of 
time. Such “holding on” is both an act of retention and creation, as in these lines from 
“Der Rhein”: 
Dann feiern das Brautfest Menschen und Götter... 
 
Doch einigen eilt 
Dies schnell vorüber, andere 
Behalten es länger. 
Die ewigen Götter sind 
Voll Lebens allzeit; bis in den Tod 
Kann aber ein Mensch auch 
Im Gedächtnis doch das Beste behalten, 
Und dann erlebt er das Höchste. 
(StA 2,1: 147, 148) 
Memory (Gedächtnis) establishes a spiritual unity to a person’s life by holding on to a 
divine experience (the “Brautfest Menschen und Götter”) all the way into that person’s 
death (“bis in den Tod”). It is obvious how this is an act of retention, but there is more 
than simple retention going on here. Only when a person preserves “das Beste” all the 
way to the end does he experience “das Höchste,” which is more than “das Beste.” In 
other words, the direct experience of the divine (“das Beste”) is not the fullest possible 
experience of the divine (“das Höchste”), and this fullest experience is remembered only 
at life’s end. Something has been accruing in memory, which surpasses the direct 
revelation. 
This makes sense. When we talk about “remembering” something, we are often 
talking about much more than mere recollection. It is easy to recall that such-and-such a 
thing happened on such-and-such a date; it is another thing to re-live the experience in 
our mind and in our feelings. In order to keep hold of an experience (and not just a fact), 
we have to continually re-create it in our changing circumstances. To the extent that we 
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succeed in this re-creative act, the experience becomes more powerful and more 
meaningful, since it influences a greater portion of our life. Such re-creation of the past 
cannot halt time, however, and this leads to one of two results: either the experience will 
gradually alter its shape with each re-creation, until it can no longer be called the same 
experience; or we will find the world increasingly out of sync with our treasured 
experience, to the point that we fall out of the world (perhaps in a Hölderlinian madness 
or an Empedoclean death). In other words, either the experience dies in us or we die in 
the experience. Because memory tries to maintain the past in the present, it gradually 
loses integrity and fails. 
It is worth pointing out that the argument just made does not have universal 
validity. In primitive “enchanted” societies, the same moment of “higher,” sacred time 
could, it seems, be reproduced in the rituals and festivals of religion.6 In a modern, 
“disenchanted” society, the divine is far more elusive and erratic, and cannot, strictly 
speaking, be reproduced at all. It can only be represented or “remembered,” which allows 
us to feel it and appreciate it more deeply (as Hölderlin says in his essay “Über 
Religion”), but at the cost of losing the original. We live almost exclusively in secular 
time, unlike primitive societies embedded in both sacred and secular time. The poet 
understands this on some level, and that his why he resorts to memory and reflection 
rather than ritual or festival as the path back to the divine. (He likens certain experiences 
to festivals in his poetry, but this “likening” betrays the fact that we are not dealing with 
the thing itself. The direct return to sacred time via the sacred festival is not an option in a 
disenchanted society. The festivals we still do have—e.g. the Super Bowl—generally 
                                                 
6 The classic articulation of this theory is in Mircea Eliade’s The Sacred and the Profane (San Diego: 
Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1959). 
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have little or no cosmic significance.) “Das Höchste” is better than “das Beste” not 
because it is more divine than “das Beste”—that would be a contradiction of terms—but 
because it uses “das Beste” in the best possible way given the circumstances: as a 
memory that is stretched, albeit creatively, across a lifetime in order to give that life a 
sense of spiritual unity. 
 (ii) The first kind of Hölderlinian memory, then, works against the spiritual 
emptying of heterogeneous time. It “holds on” to a divine moment in defiance of time, 
even though there is necessarily some loss and distortion in mnemonic (as opposed to 
ritual) re-creation. There is, however, another, very different path by which memory can 
bridge the spiritual gaps between the successive moments of time. This path works 
backwards from the divine moment, and begins with a feeling of dissolution (“die 
Empfindung der Auflösung”) signaling the disappearance of something that will have to 
be remembered. What disappears is not the divine, but the secular world—usually a 
historical saeculum—preceding the divine. The divine, the Unerschöpftes-
Unerschöpfliches, emerges from this dissolution, as we have already seen. For the short-
sighted, this moment of dissolution and emergence is a happy thing, but for those looking 
for meaning in history, it is perplexing. If the divine is here now, where was it before? 
What was the reason for its absence? If the divine can come and go as it pleases, are we 
powerless to effect our own salvation? We may have intimations of the divine in 
abundance, but if we have no sacramental access to God, what good are these 
intimations? The world of divine traces becomes a world of divine ruins. 
 The second form of memory in Hölderlin gesture toward a resolution of this 
problem. The old historical world comes undone (sich auflöst) in a certain way, and this 
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manner of self-undoing reveals its full nature. We cannot see the nature of this world 
while we are still inside of it, so the dissolution has a revelatory significance. One thing it 
reveals is the necessity of the old world’s self-undoing (“die Auflösung als 
Notwendige”), which is not something we cannot see while we are still inside the old 
world. Only at the end can you know the beginning from the end, and understand the 
necessity of the whole. (To be sure, this view compromises the idea of human freedom, 
but many thinkers were making this sacrifice in the neo-Spinozist climate of the late 
Enlightenment.) 
Now, this issue of necessity has meaning for our understanding of the divine, 
because the dissolution of the secular world is the negative image of the divine. The 
Unerschöpftes-Unerschöpfliches is what opens up beneath the secular as it comes 
undone, and we are suddenly faced with a choice: does the force of necessity come from 
within the secular, or does it come from without? Since the secular and the sacred share a 
common border, the “engine” of dissolution could come from either side. Thus the 
necessity of the secular world’s self-undoing might also be seen as a hidden thread of 
divine logic extending back into the heart of the secular. Perhaps the divine was with us 
all along, and not just as a vestige, trace, or ruin. Perhaps it was an active force in history, 
and we just didn’t recognize it as such. 
This second kind of memory is backward-looking and reconstructive rather than 
forward looking and re-creative (as in the case of memory 1). It only perceives the divine 
in a past unity, and whether or not that unity extends into the future will depend on 
memory 1. But even if our powers of mnemonic retention and creation are prodigious, we 
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only carry the divine unity forward as individuals. In other words, memory 1 and memory 
2 cannot be combined to assure the continuity of divine history on a large scale. 
Let me now deal with a source of potential confusion about this reconstructive 
form of memory. Hölderlin employs a Hegelian-sounding rhetoric of self-negation to talk 
about it, which might lead us to think that the poet is articulating a less sophisticated form 
Hegel’s philosophy of Geist.  
Die Auflösung als Nothwendige, auf dem Gesichtspuncte der idealischen 
Erinnerung, wird als solche idealistisches Object des neuentwikelten Lebens, ein 
Rükblick auf den Weg, der zurükgelegt werden mußte, vom Anfang der 
Auflösung bis dahin, wo aus dem neuen Leben eine Erinnerung des Aufgelösten, 
und daraus, als Erklärung und Vereinigung der Lüke und des Contrasts, der 
zwischen dem neuen und dem Vergangenen stattfindet, die Erinnerung der 
Auflösung erfolgen kann. (MA 2: 73-73) 
 
There is a “new life” (“neuentwikeltes Leben”) that takes as its “ideal object” the 
necessity of the dissolution of the “old” life, which, seen from the other side, is also the 
necessity of the construction of the “new” life. Memory, then, is now concerned with the 
relation of the past unity to the freshly born present. The character of the “new” life 
seems to consist of nothing but the awareness that the old had to dissolve. In other words, 
the “new” is simply a state of higher consciousness. This sounds a bit like Hegelian 
dialectic (although for Hegel it is really the third step—which is lacking in Hölderlin—
that marks a new level of consciousness). However, there is a crucial difference here, 
since for Hölderlin there is no development of “content” to accompany this 
consciousness-raising. Indeed, the old world dissolves into the Unerschöpftes-
Unerschöpfliches. Hölderlin’s “negation” is only a negation; it is not a simultaneous 
affirmation of some new content. In Hegel, by contrast, there is the transmission and 
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reshaping of content in the negation: the freedom of none becomes the freedom of one, 
and eventually becomes the freedom of many. 
Hölderlin’s “loose” dialectic is represented more clearly at the end of the same 
paragraph, where he slightly alters what he said before: 
...und nachdem diese Erinnerung des Aufgelösten...mit dem unendlichen 
Lebensgefühl durch die Erinnerung der Auflösung vereiniget und die Lüke 
zwischen denselben ausgefüllt ist, so gehet aus dieser Vereinigung und 
Vergleichung des Vergangenen Einzelnen, und des Unendlichen gegenwärtigen, 
der eigentlich neue Zustand, der nächste Schritt, der dem Vergangenen folgen 
soll, hervor. (MA 2: 74) 
 
The structure of the idea is the same, but the language is different in one crucial respect. 
Instead of “neuentwickltes Leben,” Hölderlin speaks “unendliches Lebensgefühl” and 
“das Unendliche gegenwärtige.” The “new” is clearly not just the negation of the old, in 
the way that capitalism is the negation of feudalism, or the Christian God is the negation 
of the Jewish God. The “new” is something beyond the chain of negation altogether: the 
eternal (Unendliches).  Hölderlin in effect reaffirms that he is using the “double-hinged” 
model of history discusses earlier, whereby one particular reality (in this case, “das 
Vergangene Einzelne”) folds into the absolute (“das Unendliche gegenwärtige”), out of 
which new particular reality (“der eigentlich neue Zustand, der nächste Schritt”) then 
emerges. Crucially, the absolute mediates the connection between the “old” and “new” 
worlds in an extra-rational way that leaves no clear tracks for reflection to follow. 
 The epistemological barrier posed by the intervention of the absolute explains 
why the aspirations of memory 2 are very modest. In a dramatic contrast to Hegel’s 
grandiose “absolute knowing,” Hölderlin seeks a mere a thread of insight. The poet’s 
final task (“letzte Aufgabe“) is 
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eine Erinnerung zu haben, damit der Geist nie im einzelnen Momente, und wieder 
einem einzelnen Momente, sondern in einem Momente wie im andern 
fortdauernd, und in den verschiedenen Stimmungen sich gegenwärtig bleibe...” 
(“Wenn der Dichter einmal des Geistes mächtig...“ MA 2: 87) 
 
There is something desperate about this effort to remain spiritually conscious (“sich 
gegenwärtig bleiben”) from one moment to the next. The poet lays down a “thread” 
(Faden) connecting the past to the present, and we can hardly expect a single fiber to 
hold its form or remain intact for long. The “thread” is not a “chain” of reasoning; it is 
not a rational, communicable insight. At most, it can be experienced in passing in 
language, as we shall consider more fully below. 
 The take-away here is that memory 2, or “reconstructive” memory, only 
illuminates the relation between a “particular” past and a divine present. The movement 
that occurs in this relation cannot be viewed as a teleological advance, because there is no 
development of “content.” Memory does not, for example, help actualize “freedom” or 
advance any particular form of social, political, or moral life. The standpoint of memory 
is that of the Unerschöpftes-Unerschöpfliches, which is precisely formless. It melts down 
the old to create the new. Hegel, in contrast, has one “particular” building on the next (via 
negation) along an inexorable path toward a free and self-regulating bourgeois State. 
Hegel tucks the absolute away “inside” of history, making it the force of history rather 
than a force in history. Hegel has his own analogy: “just as the germ of the plant carries 
within itself the entire nature of the tree, even the taste and shape of its fruit, so the first 
traces of Spirit virtually contain all history” (21). Spirit is the alpha and omega, 
everywhere or nowhere, always or never. 
The Hölderlinian absolute, however, is not identical with history, and this creates 
temporal heterogeneity. This is not the kind of heterogeneity that can be resolved when 
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viewed sub specie aeternitatis, because eternity is not simply a perspective in Hölderlin; 
it is a site of foreign agency. This foreign, or divine, agency can intervene in history, and 
when it does it puts a vertical break in the horizontal plane of historical time. 
Consequently, not all events can be plotted on the horizontal plane. Without taking the 
vertical into account, the divine will appear merely as a rupture in time. The two-
dimensionality of time, and the consequences that flow from it are what I am referring to 
when I speak of temporal “heterogeneity.” 
Before leaving moving on, let me note that the heterogeneity of time is only a 
conundrum for us moderns, who tend to think of the divine as something elusive and 
internal. In an “enchanted” world, the divine keeps a regular schedule of public 
appearances (via rituals, festivals, seasonal changes, etc.), and the fact that it retreats 
afterward into its native “higher” time does not trouble the inhabitants of the “enchanted” 
world. There is no danger of losing the divine, at least not until we begin to view society 
and nature in more mechanistic terms. At that point the priority of sacred and secular time 
shifts. The calendar used to be built around sacred events—the solstice, the harvest, the 
founding of the nation—but now it is built on scientific measurements—the rotation and 
revolution of the earth seen from no-man’s perspective out in space. In the modern age, 
sacred time has to answer to secular time. Hans Frei speaks, for example, of “the gradual 
change [in the modern West] to the sense of another temporal reality than the biblical. 
The self might or might not claim this new historical world as its appropriate home, but 
in any case the true narrative by which its reality is rendered is no longer identical with 
the Bible’s overarching story” (50).  
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Let me summarize what we have discussed thus far in this chapter. For Hölderlin, 
time is not uniform. Secular time is disrupted by divine moments that obscure the logical 
and substantive unities of history. This is what I have called Hölderlin’s “ontology of 
temporal discontinuity” or “heterogeneous time.” We can attempt to counter this 
discontinuity in two (or really three) ways. 
 First, we can finesse our understanding of history in such a way that the 
“particular” island of history on which we find ourselves is seen to include our ancestors-
of-choice. For a German in the age of Winckelmann, these are the Greeks. This “local” 
unity takes on divine significance (and that’s the goal here) if the unity is a spiritual one. 
In Hölderlin’s case, the “merciful” withdrawal of the divine (“so sehr schonen die 
Himmlischen uns”) that began in Greece is the same withdrawal we see in Christ’s death 
and our in the modern “night” of the gods. Through a typological hermeneutic, the 
religious voids between Greece and modern Germany (and modern Germany is one of 
these voids) are seemingly overcome. The sacred types of the departing God, the hopeful 
disciple, and the prophet-poet (which we didn’t discuss earlier) suggest a fraternal 
relation between past and present, which cannot, however, be substantiated by more 
concrete historical evidence. 
Second, we can “remember” the divine where it would otherwise remain hidden. 
On a certain level, this is not much different than the first method, since both are trying to 
create a larger story out of one or more smaller stories. But the faculties involved in 
memory are different from the faculties involved in re-interpreting history. Historical 
hermeneutics draws on the analytical and imaginative faculties, while memory is more of 
a “felt” process, and that in two ways. On the one hand, memory (1) can be a willful 
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“holding on” to the divine despite the spiritual entropy of time. The “felt” component of 
this kind of memory is precisely this willfulness, which is the power of the moral faculty. 
Unlike the renewal of the divine through ritual, “holding on” to the divine is an intangible 
mnemonic activity. Because it is intangible, distortion and loss occur, and it is only the 
strongest who manage to hold on to some portion of the divine “bis in den Tod.” On the 
other hand, memory (2) can be a backward-facing excavation of the divine “thread” into 
the past. Instead of charging ahead with our hand clasped tightly around the divine, we 
follow its roots down to their hidden sources within the preceding saeculum. We 
“remember” how the old world had to dissolve into the New, and perceive this as a 
hidden operation of the divine. This is a “felt” process to the extent that it is an aesthetic 
experience; the divine pattern or “thread” extending into the past emerges through a 
power of its own, just like beauty emerges by itself (or, on a Kantian account, by an 
involuntary resonance of the mental faculties before certain objects). Reflection follows 
hard on the heels of this revelation, but it does not bring the revelation about. 
All these methods of bridging the spiritual discontinuity of history have limited 
value. Both forms of memory (i and ii) only uncover the divine in the saecula 
immediately surrounding us. None of these methods (1, 2i, or 2ii) can give us knowledge 
a priori of the divine unity of all history.  
What are we to make of this? Why does Hölderlin expend so much effort on the 
“unified theory” of divine history, when he has none of the right tools? The nature of the 
divine as transcendence guarantees that he will never have the right tools. (Keep in mind 
that the authority of the Bible was no longer intact.) On some level he knows that the 
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gods will never grant him the beatic vision—and certainly not the beatic articulation—of 
the unity that he seeks. 
Ich sei genaht, die Himmlischen zu schauen, 
Sie selbst, sie werfen mich tief unter die Lebenden, 
Den falschen Priester, ins Dunkel, daß ich 
Das warnende Lied den Gelehrigen singe. 
(“Wie wenn am Feiertage...” StA 2,1: 120) 
So why does the poet write at all? What is the motivation? Is he moved by a repressed 
fear, a silent sense that we may live in an atheistic universe? Is poetry a way of indirectly 
working this out, facing and not facing it at the same time? Some people understand 
Hölderlin this way, but I want to propose a different motivation. 
Earlier I said that memory is a “felt” process, because it takes the form of moral 
resolve (memory 1) or aesthetic discovery (memory 2). So even if Hölderlin’s theory 
and/or poetic representation of memory does not “figure out” anything in final terms, it 
does involve us directly in the “feel” of the divine. Poetry can be the experience of divine 
engagement, and in this sense it is not unlike devotion, prayer, and meditation. The 
ancient Greek theoria contains something of this emphasis on the subjective experience 
of truth, independent of the conceptual knowledge that emerges from this experience. The 
labor of poetic memory is an essential one, not for any specific goal it accomplishes, but 
for the working intimacy it establishes with the sublime.   
 
The Moment of Poetic Truth 
 
I want to conclude this chapter on religious temporality by looking at a different, more 
troubling question. Throughout this study I have spoken of divine “events” and 
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“moments” as if such things really exist. They may be subtle and easily lost, but they are 
ultimately real and discrete phenomena. The discussion of memory in the previous 
section assumes that at some point the divine is “there,” and at some other point it is not. 
This being the case, it is fair to ask: how long is a divine moment? Where does it start and 
stop? 
 These are difficult questions. Sometimes the divine moment lasts for years, as in 
the Greek golden age, or the life of Christ. Sometimes it is the culmination of a 
“tausendjähriges Wetter,” as in the poem “Friedensfeier.” Sometimes, however, the 
divine moment is something ecstatic and brief, requiring us to “hold on” to it. These brief 
moments can in turn be subdivided into a few kinds. There is the “lightning strike” we 
read of in “Patmos”: 
Drum sandt er ihnen 
Den Geist, und freilich bebte 
Das Haus und die Wetter Gottes rollten 
Ferndonnernd über 
Die ahnenden Häupter... 
 
 ...und nicht geweissagt war es, sondern 
Die Locken ergriff es, gegenwärtig, 
Wenn ihnen plötzlich 
Ferneilend zurück blickte 
Der Gott... 
(StA 2,1: 168, 169) 
There is also a kind of “blessed mood” when heaven and earth seem to align just right: 
Und herrlich ists, aus heiligem Schlafe dann 
Erstehen und, aus Waldes Kühle 
Erwachend, abends nun 
Dem milderen Licht entgegenzugehen... 
Auch ruht und zu der Schülerin jetzt, 
Der Bildner, Gutes mehr 
Denn Böses findend, 
Zur heutigen Erde der Tag sich neiget.— 
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Dann feiern das Brautfest Menschen und Götter, 
Es feiern die Lebenden all, 
Und ausgeglichen 
Ist eine Weile das Schicksal. 
(“Der Rhein,” StA 2,1: 147) 
There are also moments that seem to bleed across the temporal spectrum of past, present, 
and future. Not only the chronological placement, but also the duration of this moment 
can be profoundly unclear. It may be experienced as something immediate, but when we 
look at this immediacy more closely, its temporal boundaries suddenly stretch. 
Let us look, for instance, at part of the second and third stanzas of 
“Friedensfeier,” where the poet reflects on his encounter with the ambiguous divine 
figure of the “Fürst des Fests.” At he end of the second stanza we read: 
Und dämmernden Auges denk ich schon, 
Vom ernsten Tagwerk lächelnd, 
Ihn selbst zu sehn, den Fürsten des Fests... 
  ...Nichts vor dir, 
Nur Eines weiß ich, Sterbliches bist du nicht. 
Ein Weiser mag mir manches erhellen; wo aber 
Ein Gott noch auch erscheint, 
Das ist doch andere Klarheit. 
(MA 1: 362) 
In these lines, the divine moment takes the form of a god’s appearance (“denk ich...Ihn 
selbst zu sehn,” “Ein Gott...erscheint”). But this simple moment of divine presence is 
immediately complicated in the third stanza:  
Von heute aber nicht, nicht unverkündet ist er; 
[...] 
Das ist, sie hören das Werk, 
Längst vorbereitend, von Morgen nach Abend, jetzt erst, 
Des Donnerers Echo, das tausendjährige Wetter, 
Zu schlafen, übertönt von Friedenslauten, hinunter. 
(MA 1: 362) 
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The statement “Von heute aber nicht, nicht unverkündet ist er,” alters the nature of the 
previous Erscheinung, which no longer seems to be a sudden appearance of the divine as 
much as a sudden awareness of the divine’s gradual emergence out of the past (“das 
Werk, / Längst vorbereitend”). Drawing on the types of divine memory presented in the 
previous section, we can say that the poem moves from a memory 1 scenario (where 
memory “holds on” to divine presence) in the second stanza to a memory 2 scenario 
(where memory detects the divine emerging into the present from the dissolution of the 
past) in stanza three. The poem complicates both scenarios, however, by placing them in 
immediate proximity. The Fürst des Fests appears in his divine immediacy, and only 
afterward does the poet “hear” the divine “Werk, / Längst vorbereitend” rising out of 
history. The problem here is that the Fürst and the Werk are not the same thing. The latter 
seems to prepare for the former, but this connection remains conjectural; the Fürst never 
acknowledges the Werk as his own. The poem tentatively places the two experiences 
together, but they remain separated by different religious phenomenalities (erscheinen 
and hören). This is complicated all the more by the fact that the fifth stanza describes the 
divine in yet a third way: a “touch” that precedes divine awareness, and gradually 
emerges in consciousness as “Wahn,” “Schicksal,” and finally “Dank,” but not as 
“Erscheinung.” 
 The flexibility of the divine moment can irritate the rational observer, especially 
when a single poem can present incompatible versions of it. But this flexibility may point 
to another sort of truth. Every way of isolating the human-divine relation in time—the 
recurrence of types, the mnemonic “holding on” to a passing inspiration, the birth of 
historical worlds out of the womb of the absolute, the “visitation” of the gods during 
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golden ages—may be figurative rather than real. This seems the most logical conclusion 
when we are faced with variety of religious temporalities that cannot be reconciled at the 
surface level. If all divine “moments” or “events” are figurative, the divine ceases to be 
something empirical altogether. 
 At this point we come to what may be the insoluble aporia in Hölderlin’s poetic 
thought. The diverse temporal profiles of the event being irreconcilable, it may seem best, 
as I just suggested, to no longer think about the event as something real. The language of 
temporality seems to be adapting itself, like a metaphor, to some other reality, rather than 
serving as a frame for reality. More reliable and consistent than the temporal structure of 
the event is the divine quality of the event, which Otto calls energisch and I have called 
“kinetic.” The problem is that the energetic or kinetic “feel” of the divine resists an 
immanent explanation, and so a revelatory event is required to introduce it from outside 
the normal course of life. But if, as I am now suggesting, the very notion of the revelatory 
event is figurative, then it cannot serve as the ontological grounding for the kinetic 
revelation. We are stuck in a paradox.  
The best way to make sense of this, I believe, is to go back to the idea I put 
forward in the introduction, namely that a poem needs to be read as a site of historical 
tensions. The paradox of the divine moment can make sense if we think of it in terms of 
incompatible religious and philosophical accounts of the divine trying—and failing—to 
reconcile themselves. To unify them would be to disfigure them entirely. Let me explain. 
Religious experience cannot be accounted for by an analysis of consciousness, but 
rather requires an addition that comes through a historical event. We see this in Saint 
Teresa’s account of the divine: 
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If you...ask how it is possible that the soul can see and understand that she has 
been in God, since during the union she has neither sight nor understanding, I 
reply that she does not see it then, but that she sees it clearly later, after she has 
returned to herself, not by any vision, but by a certitude which abides with her 
and which God alone can give her.7 
 
The abiding certainty of God can’t be gotten behind, since its means of transmission are 
completely mysterious. At first we aren’t even sure this transmission has occurred. (There 
is a strong parallel here to Hölderlin’s idea that the gods come “unempfunden” and that 
“keiner weiß es, wenn?“) What is certain is that this knowledge comes to us at some 
particular moment, “during the union” when the soul “has been in God.” Religious 
knowledge comes through an event that cannot be penetrated by the gaze of reflection. 
 Philosophical experience is exactly the opposite. The “events” that philosophy—
in particular idealism—investigates are of a transcendental sort. They do not actually 
occur in real time. There is no specifiable moment in the life of an individual when (to 
take an example from Fichte) the self-positing self first encounters a “check” to its 
consciousness and becomes aware of itself, or when it first realizes that the notion of 
division can be reconciled in the notion of unity. These “events” in the development of 
consciousness are really analytical moments that “succeed” each other only in the 
temporality of discursive or speculative logic. Philosophical knowledge thus comes 
through reflection and not through any kind of historical event. 
 Now, the aporia between religion and philosophy in Hölderlin’s work occurs 
because in the final analysis the poet never adequately distinguishes between the religious 
event and the rational event. Hölderlin does not unambiguously reject the stance taken by 
Hegel, for whom the whole of history is a physical outworking of the speculative logic of 
                                                 
7 Quoted inWilliam James, p. 446. My emphasis. 
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Geist. On this view, all events carrying spiritual meaning—even an event like the 
resurrection of Jesus (taken mythically)—are speculative events. This is the point I made 
earlier in this chapter, where I argued that Hegel has no radical concept of time and sees 
it as a spatial “tracing-out” of the shape of Geist. At that point I argued that Hölderlin 
differed from Hegel in his more radical view of time as medium through which absolute 
difference can enter history and consciousness. I still stand by that statement, but I would 
now add that Hölderlin does not make a committed and consistent use of this radical view 
of time, even though it is an essential prerequisite for the religious event. Instead, 
Hölderlin tries to find a connective or speculative logic between different moments in 
divine history and between these moments and our sacred inner experience. The danger, 
of course, is that a speculative connection between all these things would threaten the 
autonomy of the divine, since the divine could be seen as interchangeable with this 
speculative logic. This is exactly the kind of danger that the Nominalists saw in 
Scholastic realism, which seemed to bind God to the rational order of the world as we 
experience it. It is a short step from binding God to reason to replacing God by reason.  
 The key point is this: Hölderlin makes the temporal profile of the divine event 
very fluid in order to tease out the divine form from multiple angles, but in doing so he 
tacitly suggests that the divine is a rationally masterable form rather than a non-rational 
content coming to us through a revelatory event. Insofar as the divine is such a form, it 
loses is divine autonomy. In handling the divine form from many angles rather than 
simply witnessing to a divine content, Hölderlin is thinking like Hegel, who “was not 
offering empirical descriptions” of religious history in his Lectures on Religion, “but 
rather imaginative constructions intended to evoke disclosures of the ‘truth’ of the world 
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in which human beings dwell.”8 This-worldly truths are the object of speculative reason. 
When he blurs the empirical profile of the divine event, Hölderlin looks like a 
philosopher trying to “evoke disclosures of the ‘truth’ of the world in which human 
beings dwell” rather than testifying of something extramundane. 
 Both religion and philosophy lose in this process. Religion loses because the 
divine is mistaken for something worldly, and philosophy loses because it is burdened 
with a divine content (das Energische, unmediated joy, etc.) for which it cannot account.  
 But in another sense Hölderlin gains his first real success here, since he provides 
us with a representation of the precise conflict between religion and philosophy. It is a 
gain, for the intellectual historian, to see that around the year 1800 an educated German 
poet trying to represent the moment of divine experience falls into a paradox that can be 
understood in terms of religious and philosophical temporalities of the event. My reading 
of Hölderlin does not wish to resolve this dual tendency. If we look at passages 
representing either version of the divine event—the kinetic revelation and the speculative 
movement—we will see that they each have their own attraction. We get the kinetic 
moment in the opening stanza of “Am Quell der Donau”: 
Denn, wie wenn hoch von der herrlichgestimmten, der Orgel 
Im heiligen Saal, 
Reinquillend aus den unerschöpflichen Röhren, 
Das Vorspiel, weckend, des Morgens beginnt 
Und weitumher, von Halle zu Halle, 
Der erfrischende nun, der melodische Strom rinnt, 
Bis in den kalten Schatten das Haus 
Von Begeisterungen erfüllt, 
Nun aber erwacht ist, nun, aufsteigend ihr, 
Der Sonne des Fests, antwortet 
Der Chor der Gemeinde; so kam 
Das Wort aus Osten zu uns, 
                                                 
8 Peter Hodgson’s introduction to the Lectures, p. 14. My emphasis. 
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Und an Parnassos Felsen und am Kithäron hör' ich 
O Asia, das Echo von dir und es bricht sich 
Am Kapitol und jählings herab von den Alpen 
 
Kommt eine Fremdlingin sie 
Zu uns, die Erweckerin, 
Die menschenbildende Stimme. 
Da faßt' ein Staunen die Seele 
Der Getroffenen all und Nacht 
War über den Augen der Besten. 
Denn vieles vermag 
Und die Flut und den Fels und Feuersgewalt auch 
Bezwinget mit Kunst der Mensch 
Und achtet, der Hochgesinnte, das Schwert 
Nicht, aber es steht 
Vor Göttlichem der Starke niedergeschlagen… 
(“Am Quell der Donau,” StA 2,1: 126-127) 
A philosophical “event” seems to be subject of these lines from “Friedensfeier”: 
Viel hat von Morgen an, 
Seit ein Gespräch wir sind und hören voneinander, 
Erfahren der Mensch; bald sind wir aber Gesang. 
Und das Zeitbild, das der große Geist entfaltet, 
Ein Zeichen liegts vor uns, daß zwischen ihm und andern 
Ein Bündnis zwischen ihm und andern Mächten ist. 
Nicht er allein, die Unerzeugten, Ew'gen 
Sind kennbar alle daran, gleichwie auch an den Pflanzen 
Die Mutter Erde sich und Licht und Luft sich kennet. 
Zuletzt ist aber doch, ihr heiligen Mächte, für euch 
Das Liebeszeichen, das Zeugnis 
Daß ihrs noch seiet, der Festtag, 
 
Der Allversammelnde, wo Himmlische nicht 
Im Wunder offenbar, noch ungesehn im Wetter, 
Wo aber bei Gesang gastfreundlich untereinander 
In Chören gegenwärtig, eine heilige Zahl 
Die Seligen in jeglicher Weise 
Beisammen sind… 
(“Friedensfeier,” MA 1: 364) 
Both passages are built around the image of a musical call-and-response, but the meaning 
of this image is very different in each case. The Antwort of the Chor der Gemeinde in 
“Am Quell der Donau” is a creaturely response to the overwhelming feeling of divine 
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fullness. Words and phrases like “weckend,” “erfrischend,” “bis in den kalten Schatten,” 
“von Begeisterungen erfüllt,” “erwacht,” “faßt’ ein Staunen die Seele,” and 
“Getroffenen,” capture the kinetic joy and elation of the religious event. Because it is 
religious, there is a historical moment (however vague) at its core: the advent of the 
“Erweckerin…aus Osten.” In the passage from “Friedensfeier,” by contrast, there is no 
concrete event. “Von Morgen an” we have been a “Gespräch,” and the background of this 
conversation is “das Zeitbild, das der große Geist enfaltet.” Time is an image (Zeitbild) to 
be deciphered by discourse; it is not the carrier of das Energsiche. Love, too, is a puzzle 
(Liebeszeichen) to be solved, not a visceral experience. Even the Festtag seems to be an 
extension of the Zeitbild rather than a kinetic event; the poet observes the discourse of the 
divine “choruses” from a distance, and is not personally overwhelmed by the music as in 
the previous poem. In summary, one poem gives us the divine as das Energische while 
the other one gives us a divine Sprechen, i.e., the back-and-forth of discursive or 
speculative knowledge.  
 If there is a “höherer Zusammenhang” uniting these two varieties of the divine 
moment that crisscross Hölderlin’s oeuvre, it is not present in the poems themselves. This 
is as it should be. Poetry, as Hölderlin says, is the attempt to represent a “höheren 
Zusammenhang... [der] sich genau betrachtet weder recht denken ließe noch auch vor den 
Sinnen liege (MA 2: 53; my emphasis). Ironically, the early essay fragment in which the 
notion of the “höherer Zusammenhang” appears is precisely a call for a new religion. 
This new religion is supposed to incorporate the old revelatory religion and unify it with 
reason.9 If the young Hölderlin is really serious about this, his project is paradoxical in an 
                                                 
9 In his edition based on the Frankfurter Ausgabe, Michael Knaupp sees this essay fragment as part of a 
project to write a series of philosophical letters in imitation of and in response to Schiller (MA 3: 388). In 
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extreme degree, because strictly speaking revelation requires transcendence, and 
transcendence is by definition (at least since the Nominalists) unbounded by reason. In 
the later poetry, the force of this paradox wins out over Hölderlin’s idealism, but the 
meaning of Hölderlin’s poetry as a whole cannot be labeled “religious” or “idealist.” 
When scholars ask ““ob Hölderlin diesseits oder jenseits des Idealismus zu verorten 
sei,”10 the best answer would be the question itself. I would only add that the 
destabilizing factor, the thing that makes it difficult to answer this question, is the 
crosscurrent of uniquely religious Denkformen—specifically the notions of transcendence 
and revelation—troubling the stream of Hölderlin’s thought right to the bitter end.  
                                                 
these letters, Hölderlin writes to Niethammer on 24 February 1796, “will ich das Prinzip finden, das mir die 
Trennungen, in denen wir denken und existiren, erklärt, das aber auch vermögend ist, den Widerstreit 
verschwinden zu machen, den Widerstreit zwischen dem Subject und dem Object, zwischen unserem Selbst 
und der Welt, ja auch zwischen Vernunft und Offenbarung“ (MA 2: 614; my emphasis). 
 
10 See Christoph Jamme’s introduction to “Es bleibet aber eine Spur / Doch eines Wortes”: Zur späten 
Hymnik und Tragödientheorie Friedrich Hölderlins (München: Fink, 2004), p. 11. 
 
 
 191 
Bibliography 
 
 
Abrams, Meyer. Natural Supernaturalism. New York: Norton, 1971. 
 
Adorno, Theodor. Noten zur Literatur. 3 vols. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1965.  
 
Balfour, Ian. The Rhetoric of Romantic Prophecy. Stanford: Stanford UP, 2002. 
 
Beiser, Frederick. The Fate of Reason: German Philosophy From Kant to Fichte. 
Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard UP, 1987. 
 
-----. The Romantic Imperative. Cambridge, MA: Harvard, 2003. 
 
Benjamin, Walter. “Zwei Gedichte von Friedrich Hölderlin.” Illuminationen. Frankfurt 
am Main: Suhrkamp, 1977. 
 
Bergson, Henri. Time and Free Will. trans. F.L. Pogson, 3rd ed. London: G. Allen, 1913. 
 
Binder, Wolfgang. “Hölderlin: Theologie und Kunstwerk.” Zeitschrift für Theologie und 
Kirche 69 (1972): 350-378. 
 
Blumenberg, Hans. The Legitimacy of the Modern Age. Trans. Robert Wallace. 
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1983. 
 
Campbell, Jeremy. The Many Faces of God. New York: Norton, 2006. 
 
Caputo, John. The Weakness of God: A Theology of the Event. Bloomington: Indiana UP, 
2006. 
 
Coleridge, S.T. Lay Sermons. Vol. 6 of The Collected Works of Samuel Taylor Coleridge. 
Ed. Kathleen Coburn. Princeton: Princeton UP, 1972. 
 
Corngold, Stanley. Complex Pleasure: Forms of Feeling in German Literature. Stanford: 
Stanford UP, 1998. 
 
-----. The Fate of the Self: German Writers and French Theory. 2nd ed. Durham: Duke 
UP, 1994. 
 
Constantine, David. Hölderlin. Oxford: Clarendon, 1988. 
 
Crary, Jonathan. Techniques of the Observer: On Vision and Modernity in the Nineteenth 
Century. Cambridge, MA: MIT, 1990. 
 
de Man, Paul. “Heidegger’s Exegeses of Hölderlin.” Blindness and Insight. 2nd rev. ed. 
Minneapolis: U Minnesota P, 1983. 
 192 
 
Eliade, Mircea. The Sacred and the Profane: The Nature of Religion. New York: 
Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1959. 
 
Fenves, Peter. “Measure for Measure: Hölderlin and the Place of Philosophy.” The Solid 
Letter: Readings of Friedrich Hölderlin. Ed. Aris Fioretos. Stanford: Stanford UP, 
1999. 
 
Fichte, Johann Gottlieb. Versuch einer Kritik aller Offenbarung (1792). Ed. Hans Jürgen 
Verweyen. Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1983. 
 
Frank, Manfred. “Hölderlin über den Mythos,” Hölderlin-Jahrbuch 27 (1990-1991): 140-
171. 
 
-----. The Philosophical Foundations of Early German Romanticism. Albany: SUNY, 
2004. 
 
Frei, Hans. The Eclipse of Biblical Narrative: A Study in Eighteenth and Nineteenth 
Century Hermenuetics. New Haven: Yale UP, 1974. 
 
Freud, Sigmund. The Freud Reader. Ed. Peter Gay. New York: Norton, 1989. 
 
Frey, Hans-Jost. “Das Heilige und das Wort.” Studien über das Reden der Dichter. 
München: Fink, 1986. 
  
Gaier, Ulrich. “’Bald sind wir Gesang’—Vom Sinn des Hymnischen nach 1800.” “Es 
bleibet aber eine Spur / Doch eines Wortes”: Zur späten Hymnik und 
Tragödientheorie Friedrich Hölderlins. Eds. Christoph Jamme and Anja Lemke. 
München: Fink, 2004. 
 
-----. Hölderlin: Eine Einführung Tübingen: Francke, 1993. 
 
Gasché, Rodolphe. „Der unterbbrechende Augenblick: Hölderlin über Zäsur, Zeit und 
Gefühl.“ “Es bleibet aber eine Spur, Doch eines Wortes: zur späten Hymnik und 
Tragödientheorie Friedrich Hölderlins. Eds. Christoph Jamme und Anja Lemke 
München: Fink, 2004. 
 
Hayden-Roy, Priscilla. A Foretaste of Heaven: Friedrich Hölderlin in the Context of 
Württemberg Pietism. Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1994. 
 
-----. “Zwischen Himmel und Erde: der junge Friedrich Hölderlin und der 
württembergische Pietismus.” Hölderlin-Jahrbuch 35 (2006-2007): 30-66. 
 
Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich. Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion: One-volume 
Edition: The Lectures of 1827. Ed. Peter C. Hodgson. Berkley: U of California P, 
1988. 
 193 
 
Heidegger, Martin. Erläuterungen zu Hölderlins Dichtung. 6th expanded ed. Frankfurt: 
Klostermann, 1996. 
 
Henrich, Dieter. “Hegel und Hölderlin.” Hegel im Kontext. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1971. 
 
Herder, Johann Gottfried. Gott: einige Gespräche. Vol. 16 of Sämmtliche Werke. Ed. 
Bernhard Suphan. Berlin: Weidmann, 1887. 
 
Hölderlin, Freidrich. Sämtliche Werke. (Große Stuttgarter Ausgabe.) Ed. Freidrich 
Beißner, Adolf Beck and Ute Oelmann. Stuttgart: J.G. Cottasche Buchhandlung 
Nachfolger, 1943-1985. 
 
-----. Sämtliche Werke und Briefe. Ed. Michael Knaupp. München: Hanser, 1992. 
 
Ignatius, of Loyola, Saint. The Spiritual Exercises of Saint Ignatius. Trans. Louis J. Puhl. 
New York: Vintage, 2000. 
 
Jacobi, Friedrich Heinrich. Über die Lehre des Spinoza in Briefen an den Herrn Moses 
Mendelssohn (1785). Ed. Marion Lauschke. Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 2000. 
 
Jager, Colin. The Book of God: Secularization and Design in the Romantic Era. 
Philadelphia: U of Pennsylvania P, 2007. 
 
James, William. The Varieties of Religious Experience. New York: Modern Library, 
1994. 
 
Jay, Martin. Downcast Eyes: The Denigration of Vision in Twentieth-Century French 
Thought. Berkeley: U of California P, 1993. 
 
-----. Songs of Experience: Modern American and European Variations on a Universal 
Theme. Berkeley: U of California P, 2005. 
 
Kant, Immanuel. Critique of the Power of Judgment. Ed. Paul Guyer. Cambridge: 
Cambridge UP, 2000. 
 
Kreuzer, Johann. Hölderlin-Handbuch: Leben—Werk—Wirkung. Ed. Johann Kreuzer. 
Stuttgart: Metzler, 2002. 
 
-----. “‘Alles ist gut.’ Anmerkungen zu einem Satz in Hölderlins Patmos-Hymne.” 
Wechsel der Orte: Studien zum Wandel des literarischen Geschichtsbewußtseins. 
Ed. Irmela von der Lühe and Anita Runge. Göttingen, 1997. 
 
Krüger, Gerhard. “Über Kants Lehre der Zeit.“  Philosophie und Moral in der kantischen 
Kritik. Tübingen: Mohr, 1967. 
 
 194 
Kuzniar, Alice. Delayed Endings: Nonclosure in Novalis and Hölderlin. Athens, GA: U 
of Georgia P, 1987. 
 
Lacoue-Labarthe, Philippe. “Caesura of the Speculative,” Glyph: John Hopkins Textual 
Studes 4 (1978): 57-84. 
 
Lemke, Anja. “’Nichts als Zeit”: Zum Verhältnis von Sprache, Gott und Geschichte in 
Hölderlins Tragödienkonzeption.” “Es bleibet aber eine Spur, Doch eines 
Wortes: zur späten Hymnik und Tragödientheorie Friedrich Hölderlins. Eds. 
Christoph Jamme und Anja Lemke. München: Fink, 2004. 
 
Levin, David Michael, ed. Modernity and the Hegemony of Vision. Berkeley: U of 
California P, 1993. 
 
Lilla, Mark. The Stillborn God. New York: Knopf, 2007. 
 
Löwith, Karl. Meaning in History. Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1949. 
 
Marion, Jean-Luc. The Idol and Distance. New York: Fordham UP, 2001. 
 
Menninghaus, Winfried. Hälfte des Lebens: Versuch über Hölderlins Poetik. Frankfurt: 
Suhrkamp, 2005. 
 
Milbank, John. Theology and Social Theory: Beyond Secular Reason. 2nd ed. Oxford: 
Blackwell, 2006. 
 
Nägele, Rainer. Hölderlins Kritik der poetischen Vernunft. Basel: Engeler, 2005. 
 
-----. “Poetic Revolution.” A New History of German Literature. Ed. David Wellbery. 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 2004. Pp. 511-516. 
 
-----. Text, Geschichte, und Subjektivität in Hölderlins Dichtung: “Uneßbarer Schrift 
gleich.” Stuttgart: Metzler, 1985. 
 
Nancy, Jean-Luc. “Of Divine Places.” The Inoperative Community. Minneapolis: U 
Minnesota P, 1991. 
 
-----. “The Calculation of the Poet.” The Solid Letter: Readings of Friedrich Hölderlin. 
Ed. Aris Fioretos. Stanford: Stanford UP, 1999. 
 
Nancy, Jean-Luc and Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe. The Literary Absolute: The Theory of 
Literature in German Romanticism. Trans. Philip Barnard and Cheryl Lester. 
Albany: SUNY, 1988.  
 
Novalis (Friedrich von Hardenberg). Werke. Ed. Gerhard Schulz. 4th ed. München: Beck, 
2001. 
 195 
 
Otto, Rudolf. Das Heilige: Über das Irrationale in der Idee des Göttlichen und sein 
Verhältnis zum Rationalen. München: Beck, 1963. 
 
Richard Roberts, The Romantic Conception of Life. Chicago: Chicago UP, 2004. 
 
Ryan, Lawrence. Hölderlins Lehre vom Wechsel der Töne. Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1960. 
 
Santner, Eric. Friedrich Hölderlin: Narrative Vigilance and the Poetic Imagination. New 
Brunswick: Rutgers UP, 1986. 
 
Schelling, Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph. Ausgewählte Schriften. Vol. 1. Ed. Manfred Frank. 
Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1985. 
 
Schleiermacher, Friedrich. Über die Religion. Vol. 1.2 of Kritische Gesamtausgabe. Ed. 
Hans-Joachim Birkner et al. Berlin: de Gruyter, 1980-.  
 
Schmidt, Jochen. “Hölderlin: Die idealistische Sublimation des naturhaften Genies zum 
poetisch-philosophischen Geist” in Die Geschichte des Genie-Gedankens in der 
deutschen Literatur, Philosophie und Politik, 1750-1945. Darmstadt: WBG, 1988. 
 
-----. Hölderlins Elegie “Brod und Wein”: Die Entwicklung des hymnischen Stils in der 
elegischen Dichtung. Berlin: de Gruyter, 1968. 
 
-----. Hölderlins geschichtsphilosophische Hymnen “Friedensfeier,” “Der Einzige,” 
“Patmos.” Darmstadt: WBG, 1990. 
 
Spinoza, Benedict de. A Spinoza Reader: The Ethics and other Works. Ed. and trans. 
Edwin Curley. Princeton: Princeton UP, 1994. 
 
Stierle, Karlheinz. “Dichtung und Auftrag: Hölderlins Patmos-Hymne.” Hölderlin-
Jahrbuch 22 (1980-1981): 47-68. 
 
Szondi, Peter. Hölderlin-Studien. Frankfurt: Insel, 1967. 
 
Taylor, Charles. A Secular Age. Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 2007. 
 
Todorov, Tzvetan. Theories of the Symbol. Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP, 1982. 
 
Vries, Hent de. “‘Winke’: Divine Topoi in Hölderlin, Heidegger, Nancy.” The Solid 
Letter: Readings of Friedrich Hölderlin. Ed. Aris Fioretos. Stanford: Stanford UP, 
1999. 
 
Waiblinger, Wilhelm. Friedrich Hölderlins Leben, Dichtung und Wahnsinn (1827/1828). 
Ed. Pierre Berteaux. Wurmlingen : Schwäbische Verlagsgesellschaft, 1982. 
 
 196 
Warminski, Andrzej. “‘Patmos’: The Senses of Interpretation.” MLN 91 (April 1976): 
478-500. 
 
Wellbery, David. Lessing’s Laocoon: Semiotics and Aesthetics in the Age of Reason, 
Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1984. 
 
Wordsworth, William and S.T. Coleridge. Lyrical Ballads, 1798. Ed. W.J.B. Owen. 2nd 
Ed. Oxford: Oxford UP, 1969. 
 
Ziolkowski, Theodore. Das Wunderjahr in Jena: Geist und Gesellschaft 1794/1795. 
Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1998. 
 
-----. Vorboten der Moderne: Eine Kulturgeschichte der Frühromantik. Stuttgart: Klett-
Cotta, 2006. 
 
 
